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THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY BY INTERNATIONAL ACTION. *I*

INTERNATIONAL action in the economic field has seldom taken a more venturesome departure than the present attempt to establish the eight-hour working day by agreement between the members of the International Labor Organization. This project has long had currency in European circles interested in labor legislation; for ever since the beginning of the factory system international competition has been regarded as one of the chief reasons for the longer working day.

The Commission on International Labor Legislation of the Peace Conference, made up of representatives of the chief Allied, Associated and friendly Powers, decided that this matter was fit and ripe for international accord. Thus, first among the objects that they inscribed in the Preamble of Part XIII of the Peace Treaty for the attention of the future International Labor Organization was "the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week"; and they put at the head of the Agenda which was drawn up for the first conference of this organization "the application of the principle of the eight-hour day or forty-eight-hour week." The Organizing Committee for this conference which took place in Washington in October, 1919, wrote in its preparatory report for the use of the conference, "the principle having been confirmed, the question of its application under the actual circumstances and conditions of industry remains; and

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that is the question which has been referred to the Conference for determination".

Up to the beginning of the war the eight-hour day régime had been almost universally declared to be impracticable, but the last years of the war, as needs no fresh emphasis, brought revolution into the economic sphere as well as into the political. The year 1919 (that milestone of all current political speculation) witnessed the establishment of the eight-hour day in some form or other in most of the states of Europe, either by means of collective agreements or by legislation. The miseries and sacrifices of the war had stirred throughout the world a spirit of consideration for all humanity which found its outlet partly in the world of industry. The Russian Revolution was still an ominous and overshadowing event, exerting a constant influence upon the minds of the workers and stirring the anxieties of business classes and governments. Indeed, out of the spirit of hope and the seeking for justice which were summarized in President Wilson's utterances, and out of the preoccupation for the public safety, far more daring changes than the eight-hour day were being introduced throughout Europe.

In the light of these facts we can understand why most of the representatives at the Washington Conference considered that their task was merely to define the methods and details of application of a principle that was already widely in practice and apparently permanently accepted in most industrial countries. Government representatives at the Conference vied with each other in expounding the measures their countries had taken to secure the shorter working day; and the representatives of those states which had already put eight-hour day measures into practice tended to take the view, as expressed by the Italian Government Delegate, that the purpose of the Conference was to consult "with those countries which have no such legislation, to see what basis there can be reached for an understanding between them and those that already have legislation on the eight-hour day". A representative of the Dutch Government remarked, in the course of debate in the Conference, that "if there is still anyone who wishes to appoint a Commission to consider the principle of the eight-hour day, I

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should like to couple such a motion with one to appoint a committee for the discovery of America".

The workers' representatives tended to regard the eight-hour day as an already established practice from which there could be little or no turning back. As the Director of the International Labor Office wrote when describing the Conference, "The trade-union organizations were conscious of having acquired in their respective countries a credit, nay, a prestige altogether unprecedented. They were conscious of exerting upon their governments an influence which they sometimes exaggerated but which was still undeniable". The eight-hour day was to the representatives of these organizations the first and most essential step of a great transformation, required in their eyes to guard the worker's health and energy, to preserve his spirit under the factory routine, and to give him the leisure necessary for the pursuit of his happiness and development.

The debates of the Conference reveal that the aim of the workers' organizations was not merely a basic eight-hour day, to be exceeded at pleasure by the payment of overtime—a device for raising wages rather than anything else; it was the régime of the genuine, regular, eight-hour working day that they sought to have confirmed and extended in the Conference. This distinction was put clearly by Mr. George N. Barnes, a former member of Lloyd George's war cabinet and British Government representative at the Conference: "That is not a mere basic eight-hour law or eight-hour rule with additional pay for additional hours of work that we are after. That would not give us what we are after . . . what we want is leisure, and we must therefore keep that in mind all the time . . ." The workers' representatives did bear it in mind and to the sincerity of that wish, indeed, may be ascribed some of the difficulties of ratification that the Convention has since met. These workers' organizations did not seek increased wages as a result of the Convention; neither, it is true, did they contemplate reductions. In their reasoning concerning the possible effect of the Convention upon the future level of wages, they appear to have put full trust in their opinion that the power of industry to produce would not decline under the eight-hour working day, and in their own power to maintain wages at the current level.

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Even the employers' representatives—with a few outspoken exceptions—appear to have had this same general conception of the purpose of the Washington Conference. They were naturally much more anxious than the other elements at the Conference that moderation and great caution should be shown in the actual application of the eight-hour principle to the different conditions of industry. This attitude of consent and cooperation on the part of the employers was sincere though frequently ill-thought-out and perhaps superficial. The statements of the employers' representatives often took such a half-contradictory form as this: "I do not therefore object to the eight-hour day *per se*. My objection comes from the fact that in present world-wide conditions we are not prepared for it and we cannot fit it into our individual country's economic system." The employers repeatedly put before the Conference the problems of production involved in the shortening of the working day and made their best endeavor to have full account taken in every detailed decision of all the necessities and conditions of industry.

Before going on to summarize the terms of the Convention that was passed by this Conference, it may be well to dwell shortly upon the nature of the constitutional processes which are followed by the International Labor Organization in the formulation and ratification of a convention such as this one, and to point out the character of the obligation assumed by any state which ratifies a convention. The International Labor Organization seeks by means of its Conferences and subsequent activities to create among its member states a voluntary mutual agreement, looking forward to the application by each state of the measures agreed upon in conference. The composition of the annual Conferences (each state is entitled to send two government delegates, one employers' delegate, and one workers' delegate) and the character of the matters discussed make it out of the question to provide for immediate ratification of conventions through plenipotentiaries authorized to sign for their governments. Thus a somewhat unique procedure was provided in the constitution of the International Labor Organization. All government delegates at the Conference as well as

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the other representatives, are free to vote as individuals upon the subjects under consideration. The government delegates usually, it is true, act under instructions from their governments; but their vote for or against a convention in the Conference does not bind their government one way or the other. No matter how their representatives may have voted on a particular convention in any Conference, each government is left entirely free to take whatever final action it chooses in regard to it—to ratify or reject it. The obligation assumed by each state by virtue of its membership in the International Labor Organization is only to submit within a limited time the measures passed by the Conferences to the governmental authority competent to ratify and make them into law, if it so decides.

When a convention is adopted by a Conference, the process of securing ratification is put under way. The necessary steps preliminary to ratification differ from country to country, dependent upon the political structure of each. The task and duty of the International Labor Office (the permanent secretariat of the International Labor Organization) is to see that any measures passed are submitted to the consideration of the competent authority in each state, and to try to encourage ratification as well as it can by developing simultaneous action by different states and by clearing up small difficulties. It will be seen at once how completely the progress of ratification of any measure depends upon the widespread support of this measure in the various member states, upon the development of national interest in the conditions of labor, and upon the desire in each country for international cooperation.

As for the obligation assumed by any state ratifying a convention, there are a few special points to be observed. Any state which ratifies a convention pledges itself to pass such legislation as is necessary to carry out the requirements of the convention into law, and to keep such legislation in force for the term of the convention, which in the case of the Eight-Hour Convention is at least ten years. The passing of national legislation carrying out the requirements of a convention is not in itself ratification of that convention; ratification is a separate act which must be communicated to the Secretary-General of

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the League of Nations. In several states, for example, Belgium, the terms of the Eight-Hour Convention have been enacted into national law but the Convention itself has not been ratified. Ratification is an international engagement, and, as in practically all other engagements of the same kind, the state entering into it gives up its freedom to reverse its policy during a stated period of time—in this instance—ten years. The chief purpose of that provision in the Convention is to create security for every signatory; in addition some such period of time is required in order to enable each country to form a considered judgment upon the results of such industrial measures as it may pass to put a convention into effect. To this need for a relatively permanent agreement—a vital one in the estimate of the International Labor Organization—must certainly be attributed a share of the difficulties the Eight-Hour Convention has met. It may be noted in this connection that no state can ratify a convention with reservations to its main terms; the only reservations that, up to the present, have been considered permissible are formal ones—for example, a state may ratify, subject to like action by other designated states. This limitation to the right of individual states to ratify with reservations serves to prevent disturbance of the essential equality of conditions provided in the Convention.[1]

The task of formulating the actual terms of the Eight-Hour Convention at the Washington Conference proved by no

[1] Mr. David Hunter Miller has pointed out that nothing in Part XIII of the Peace Treaty would bar any country from ratifying this Convention with substantive reservations, as for example, with a reservation of the right to withdraw from the Convention at any time upon a year's notice; he also draws attention to the fact that there have been many such reservations to multilateral treaties in the past. In this respect there would appear to be no good reason for differentiating between labor conventions and multilateral treaties. All other parties to the Convention could claim the same right as would be gained in the reservation. In the case of the Eight-Hour Convention, which has already been ratified by some states, a situation of great difficulty would result if any such reservation as that just discussed was made by an important industrial state, and the force of the Convention would be greatly weakened.

Mr. Miller has written a historical and analytical study of the subject of treaty reservations covering all American action in the past. *Reservations to Treaties—Their Effect and Procedure in Regard Thereto.* Privately printed (1919).

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means an easy one, despite the vague agreement and general sympathy for the principle of the eight-hour day that prevailed. If the Convention was to fulfil its purpose in reality and to carry out the terms of the Peace Treaty, it had to be framed so as actually to secure for the great majority of industrial workers the eight-hour day, or at any rate the forty-eight-hour week. But it was also recognized that if international accord was to be secured for the Convention, it would have to be made reasonably acceptable to all countries. It was plain, in the first place, that allowance had to be made for the various peculiar and special requirements of different industries; it had also to take into account the variations of activity to which all industry is subject. National experience with similar legislation had amply demonstrated these things. The terms of the Convention had to be such as to permit each country to make the necessary adaptations and exceptions demanded by the diversity of its economic activities. Furthermore, the Conference had to reckon with the wide divergence of industrial development and of social legislation in different countries, with the difference in climate and human temperament and with the differences of political and administrative systems.

The records of the Conference are available. There is no need to recount the various stages of debate that preceded the adoption of the Convention or to give all of its details. In its final form it represented distinctly a compromise between the desires of the workers and the measures that seemed practicable to the employers—and in the final result this compromise was voted for with practical unanimity even by the employers' representatives. In order that its later history be easily grasped it is advisable at this point to give a short summary of its most important features:

1. Scope (Article 1)

The terms of the Convention apply to all "industrial undertakings", which phrase is defined to include all mining and manufacturing processes and construction industries and communication and transportation enterprises. The question of application to transportation by sea and inland waterways is

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referred to a future Conference. Commerce and agriculture are definitely excluded.

2. WORKERS INCLUDED (Article 2)

The Convention does not apply to persons working in undertakings in which only members of the same family are employed. It thus excludes most home work, for which reason it was severely criticized by the workers' representatives. It also does not apply to persons holding positions of supervision or management or persons employed in a confidential capacity.

3. MAIN PRINCIPLE (Article 2)

The main principle stated in the Convention is that, outside of the exceptions definitely provided, the working hours are not to be more than eight in the day *or* forty-eight in the week. Where the forty-eight-hour week is enforced, the hours on any single day may not be in excess of nine.

4. EXCEPTIONS

To the general principle just summarized, the Convention provides that there may be a very considerable number of exceptions in order to meet the individual requirements of separate industries and countries:

(*a*) (Article 2)

In the case of work carried on in shifts, both the eight-hour day and forty-eight-hour week may be exceeded—provided the average number of hours worked over a period of three weeks is not in excess of eight hours per day. This provision was inserted in order to meet the situation which arises whenever there is an exchange of working hours under the shift schedule.

(*b*) (Article 5)

In cases where it is recognized that the eight-hour limit of work cannot be strictly applied because of the character of the industry (railroad operation may be given as a case in point) agreements between workers' and employers' associations concerning the daily limit of work over a longer period of time

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may be given the force of regulations, if the government approves. In such circumstances the average hours worked per week over the period of the agreement is not to exceed forty-eight.

(*c*) Article 4)

In continuous operations, such as blast furnaces, the limits of the working day may be extended to fifty-six hours per week on the average. This provision was inserted mainly in order to meet the same objection as that put forward by the United States Steel Corporation in regard to the three-shift system—that it would require a larger addition to the working force than could be made quickly.

(*d*) (Article 6)

It is provided that permanent exceptions may be allowed for preparatory and complementary work and for all classes of workers whose work is essentially intermittent. This provision has perhaps raised more difficulties of interpretation than any other, as each part of it is open either to a narrow interpretation or a very broad one.

(*e*) (Article 6)

It is provided that temporary exceptions may be allowed during periods of "exceptional pressure of work". The importance of this last exception for almost any industry is evident, since even in comparatively normal times there are constant fluctuations of activity and frequent short periods of extra pressure.

The Convention provides that the granting of all exceptions of the type mentioned in (*d*) and (*e*) should be governed by regulations made by a public authority after consultation with the organization of employers and workers in each industry concerned, if such exist. The text of the articles dealing with these types of exceptions requires only consultation with these parties, not necessarily agreement between them. It is also laid down in the Convention that these regulations should require the payment of overtime at a rate of not less than time and a quarter.

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(*f*) (Article 3)

The Eight-Hour Decree and forty-eight-hour week may be exceeded in case of actual or threatened accident, urgent work to machinery or plant or "in the event of *force majeure*".

(*g*) (Article 7)

Each government must communicate to the International Labor Office all facts concerning the agreements made and exceptions granted—to be communicated further to the Conference in the form of an annual report.

5. SPECIAL COUNTRIES (Articles 9, 10 and 11)

It was recognized by the Conference that if Japan, British India and other eastern countries were to be included within the scheme of the Convention, allowance had to be made for the fact that in these countries industrial organization was still in the stage of early growth, and that existing industrial and social conditions in these countries differed vastly from those in Western Europe and the United States. Therefore, the Convention lays down a special régime for each of these countries, permitting them a period of transition.

In the case of Japan the scope of the Convention is diminished. The hours prescribed are fifty-seven for persons over fifteen years of age and forty-eight for persons under fifteen (under sixteen years after 1925) and for miners engaged in underground operations. This was in comparison with the then existing Japanese Factory Act which provided for a thirteen-hour daily limit without any provision for weekly rest. A weekly rest period of twenty-four consecutive hours is prescribed for all classes of workers (Article 9).

In the case of British India, the scope of the Convention is also diminished, and the limits of the working week are set at sixty. This was in comparison with the then existing limitation of seventy-two (Article 10).

Because of the industrial situation and lack of power machinery, the Convention was not made to apply to China, Persia or Siam, but it was provided that the question of formulating

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terms for these countries should be considered at a future conference (Article 11).

In the case of Greece, Roumania and Bulgaria, the time of application of the Convention is slightly postponed (Articles 12–13).

6. SUSPENSION IN CASE OF EMERGENCY (Article 14)

The Convention may be suspended by any country in the event of war or other emergency endangering the public safety. This last is obviously open to a variety of interpretations.

These are the main provisions of the Convention. They have been criticized in some quarters as rigid, in others as the very opposite. It plainly makes a difference whether one is regarding them as worker or as employer.

The Convention permits, it may be observed, a wider variety of exceptions and special arrangements than some of the national legislation that was in existence at the time of its adoption, as was entirely advisable in view of its experimental and international character. One feature of the Convention that may strike Americans is the fact that in the details of its application the Convention provides for regulation by public authority even to the point of limiting the terms of collective agreements. This feature was not willfully introduced by the Conference. It is in the very nature both of hours legislation and of a convention, which is, after all, a governmental pledge. Besides, practically all European countries, and some outside of Europe, already had hours legislation of the type provided in the Convention. Furthermore, this limitation of collective agreements in some cases may be managed so as to be, in practice, a matter of discretion with the government concerned. This is true particularly as to the agreements contemplated under the sub-heads 4 (*b*), 4 (*d*), and 4 (*e*) of the preceding summary, those which are likely to come into question most often. For it is to be noted that while these sections of the Convention require that public authority make controlling regulations, no definite limits are set to the regulations that may be established. The terms of the public regulations may be so

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wide as to give free scope to collective bargaining—may, indeed, be modeled upon collective agreements already reached, as is the present method under the French eight-hour law. The public authority might choose to control the details of the regulations only where no regular system of collective bargaining existed. In recent discussions with Great Britain concerning ratification, this possibility has been pointed out in an effort to overcome the British reluctance to interfere with the procedure or results of collective bargaining. It may be added that the lack of definite limits to exceptional overtime—as permitted under 4 (*b*), 4 (*d*) and 4 (*e*)—was the result of a compromise made by the labor representatives at the Washington Conference.

So much for the terms of the Convention. We can now turn to its subsequent history. Four years have passed since it was adopted; throughout that period the International Labor Office has carried on the work of obtaining ratification as was its duty under the Peace Treaty. From the beginning, it may be justly observed, it has been assiduous in its efforts. Its Director, Albert Thomas, has emphasized time and again that he conceived this task to be one requiring active and creative, almost aggressive application. But, nevertheless, the International Labor Office has been able to conduct it only by means of the friendly respect and courtesy voluntarily extended by the different Member States. Under its constitution and the Peace Treaty the International Labor Office has both the duty and freedom to endeavor to make sure that each Member State honors its signature to the Peace Treaty and gives official and prompt consideration to the measures passed by the Conferences; it has the further duty of reporting back to the Conferences the state of ratification and the obstacles met in each country; and it can enquire into the reasons for these obstacles. But only the good will of the different Member States and their sense of loyalty to the Peace Treaty has made its authority to do these things effective. When and if any government does not wish to discuss with the International Labor Office its action in regard to a convention that has been passed, that organization must rely on unofficial sources. It has had to do that now and

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again in regard to certain countries. Finally, the International Labor Office has no authority to bring outside pressure of any sort to secure ratifications. It may do everything possible to make sure that the measures passed are widely known and thoroughly understood, but that is all. When it uses its publications to discuss the conventions passed by a conference, it can do so to give information and not to create opinions. When interpretations are sought, it can also venture these, but it can not argue for them. The power of the International Labor Office to secure ratification, thus, does not derive from its constitutional powers, or from the possession of any material force. The terms of the Peace Treaty are its guarantee that each country will give due consideration to the measures passed. For the rest the International Labor Office moves only with and by the aid and sentiment of those elements in each country which are friendly to it and its work, and which are in support of the measures passed. Its work is essentially that of interpretation, interpretation of the action of the International Labor Organization, of the terms of the Conventions and recommendations passed, of the actions and policies and conditions of other countries. By its action in each and all countries the International Labor Office strives to keep alive the international character of the measures with which it is concerned; it strives to weave a fabric of international consciousness on these subjects, thereby getting each separate country to act in concert with or response to other countries.

The direct and visible result thus far has been that five states have ratified the Eight-Hour Convention—Greece in 1920, Roumania, India and Czechoslovakia in 1921, and Bulgaria in 1923. Various other countries, including British Columbia, have passed legislation carrying out the terms of the Convention in all respects, but have not yet ratified the Convention.

In British India the Convention is already in force, and in 1922 the Factory Act was amended in order to extend the scope of its application; furthermore, the Indian Government is now considering a new modification of its existing legislation which would involve more drastic regulation of the working day than

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that provided in the Convention. Even the legislation passed thus far marks a distinct bettering of the standards formerly in force, and India's example has had an influence upon other oriental countries.

In Greece, Roumania and Bulgaria the ratifications will not come into full force until 1924. Each of these three countries, if it honors the ratification, will have to make certain changes in its national legislation in order to bring it into agreement with the Convention.

In Czechoslovakia the Convention has already come into force and the national legislation conforms to it.[1] The remarks of the Czechoslovak Government delegate before the 1922 Conference are interesting in this regard:

> Therefore [he went on after explaining Czechoslovakia's confidence in her ability to improve her economic life under the Convention] we cannot conceal a feeling of disappointment at seeing that none of the other chief industrial states of Europe has yet followed our example and ratified the Eight-Hour Convention. What is the rôle of a vanguard? It is to lead the way, that is to say, that the others should follow behind it; it is not right that it should take its action alone and unsupported. I should like to say this . . . the eight-hour day in Czechoslovakia has not had any unsatisfactory economic result. On the contrary, the economic situation of Czechoslovakia is one of the most flourishing today and for our part we consider that this is closely connected with the ratification and application of the terms of the Eight-Hour Convention. But we think that the non-ratification by other important industrial states really points to a want of confidence on the part of those states in the general situation. . . . We see from this year's report that the idea of the eight-hour day is applied in the chief industrial states—Great Britain, France, Belgium and Germany —all of these states have shown their lack of confidence by not ratifying the Draft Convention. They do not do so because they do not wish to bind themselves for the long period of time laid down in the Convention, in the present uncertain circumstances.

This short statement of the position as regards ratification naturally brings up a direct question—if so small a number of

[1] *Report of the Director of the International Labour Office to the 1923 Conference*, pp. 959–63.

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ratifications have been secured during this period, is not the Convention, the attempt to establish the eight-hour day by international action, a failure? I am not particularly concerned to supply a short and definite answer to that question at the present time; my aim is rather to explain what has happened to the Convention during the realities of the last four years. For the Convention is still a living force under constantly renewed consideration in many countries. Furthermore, no balanced and just answer could be given without taking into account all the indirect and partial results of the Convention, as well as the direct ones, without studying the legislation which has been passed in the direction of the Convention, and without inquiry into the nature of the obstacles which have prevented ratification. It is more profitable and illuminating at the present time merely to try to present these other facts, and then let each reader draw his own conclusion if he feels the need of an immediate one. Even then, I think, his conclusion will depend largely upon his original expectations.

Simple and all-explanatory reasons of why such a small number of ratifications have been secured for this Convention are not lacking. The one most often heard is that which is felt and believed by most of the trade-union representatives; it is merely that labor movements in the important industrial states have suffered a severe loss of members, of strength and of influence over their governments since 1919. This explanation of the course of events is an over-simple one. A careful and detailed study of exactly what has happened in each of the important countries concerned, such as the Director of International Labor Office has made from year to year, shows that no matter how much difference the decline of trade-union power may have had in certain countries and in certain crises, it has not been the sole important factor in the course of events. It is as certain as such matters can be, on the other hand, that had trade-union strength and prestige remained at its 1919 level, some more ratifications would have been obtained by now —how many more it is impossible to know. The bearing of Mr. Albert Thomas's remarks in this connection are beyond question:

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When, in order to promote social legislation in each country there exist powerful organizations having the esteem of public opinion and the support of the government, the task of the International Labor Office is greatly facilitated. But when these organizations are more or less weak or when they have not the same vigorous spirit, when the employers who at certain times are moved by benevolent considerations feel that they are dealing with masses who are hard to influence in response, and who care about their monthly cheques more than anything else, the task of the International Labor Office becomes more difficult.

The decline of trade-union strength in most countries and its loss of unity gave an opportunity to all causes and influences that were opposing ratification to assert themselves more effectively and quickly than they could have otherwise; but that decline in itself cannot be considered the only important cause of non-ratification; other influences and circumstances must also be considered. We shall go on in an instant to these other matters. But here it is well to note that to believe that the complete explanation of events affecting the Convention since 1919 was the change in trade-union power, is to believe that all the governments concerned are but puppets of two opposing economic forces, and that all the sympathy and support given to the labor program inserted in the Peace Treaty by opinion independent of trade-union influence was entirely forced and insincere.

This is not the only all-explaining reason that is given for what has happened to the Convention. Another equally positive one is often expressed in employers' circles. The eight-hour-day régime, it runs, is thoroughly and totally impracticable, and therefore, it continues, as soon as a really serious attempt was made to put it into practice this impracticability became so evident that the idea had to be repudiated. Nothing can be proven merely by making an absolute and categorical denial of this simple explanation, any more than of the first one. It is only by reviewing the actual details of the course of events in each country that the relative importance of either of them can be indicated. It may only be observed here *à propos* of this second explanation that the employers' representatives

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at the Conference have never themselves expressed that view before the Conference. Repeatedly they have said in some form or other that they still remain loyal to the idea of the Convention and that only very grave definite difficulties have prevented them from using all their influence to secure ratification.

We have come to the point where we must undertake a short summary review of the exact response made to the Convention in the most important industrial countries. If, beforehand, a single retrospective glance is taken (a very unsafe business) it seems as if it were inevitable that the process of ratification should have been slow at the outset. For even if all special reasons are disregarded, there is the slow gait of parliamentary institutions to be considered—a gait even slower than ordinary when social legislation is concerned. Then there was the fact that the Convention touched such vital economic interests and that the results of its application would be affected by innumerable intangible and almost unforeseeable factors. It seems now that it must have been divined in 1919 that each country would require a considerable length of time to make up its mind as to whether the Convention could be adapted to its existing industrial system and needs. But what seems such a grave and difficult matter to us now in 1923 did not appear as grave in 1919. Other aspects of the matter were uppermost in men's minds, above all the importance of the results that would be achieved if the Convention were successful. The world then thought itself ready to take the step.

The action of Great Britain with regard to the Convention has been perhaps of more importance than that of any other single country. This has been so not only because of the industrial importance of Great Britain but for other reasons. It was in that country that the eight-hour day was most firmly and generally established before the passage of the Convention; the government, therefore, was most friendly to its international extension, and the British representatives at the Conference played a direct part in the preparation of its terms. Therefore, we may turn to Great Britain first, to see what action that country has taken in regard to the Convention.

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Great Britain

It has been estimated that in 1919 between eleven and twelve million industrial workers out of the fourteen million in Great Britain were on an eight-hour working-day schedule. This situation had been brought about by the course of collective bargaining and not by the passage of legislation. In only one industry, coal mining, were the hours of work for adult males fixed by legislation (the Coal Mines Act of 1919).

The British Government has explicitly set forth in several communications, particularly its letter of July 22, 1921,[1] to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the chief reasons which have induced it to refuse thus far to ratify the Convention—whatever the weight to which they seem to be entitled to the outside observer. The Government claimed that the Convention presented two important difficulties.

First, that it required that overtime arrangements should be directed by public authority, while at present they were usually settled by collective agreement without any governmental supervision. "In the opinion of His Majesty's Government," the letter runs, "a more rigid method of limiting overtime whether by legislation or statutory orders, will not prove as satisfactory as this elastic system of industrial agreement." Second, in the opinion of the British Government, the existing collective agreements on the British railroads were not in accordance with the Convention.

> By these agreements, [the letter runs,] to which the Railway Companies, the Railway Trade Unions and the Ministry of Transport attach great importance, the system adopted on the railways in the United Kingdom is an eight-hour day and a forty-eight-hour week, exclusive of the daily overtime (paid for at enhanced rates) which is necessary to the efficient working of the railways, and exclusive, in addition, of Sunday duty, which falls at regular intervals. It does not appear to His Majesty's Government that the maintenance of these agreements would be consistent with the terms of the Draft Convention, and having regard to the views of the parties interested in the agreements, His

[1] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1921 Conference*, pp. 981–2.

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Majesty's Government regret that they do not see their way to take steps to abrogate the agreements.

It is understood that Thomas, then head of the railway unions, now Minister for the Colonies, supported the government in this stand. The letter then continues at a later point:

His Majesty's Government understand that other countries are experiencing difficulties somewhat similar to those indicated in this communication, and they are of the opinion that it might be advisable that the whole question should be reconsidered at a future Conference, the aim of such Conference being to adopt a new Hours Convention retaining those provisions of the Washington Convention which have proved generally acceptable in the light of recent experience and omitting or modifying those which may appear to be too inelastic for the varying needs of the different industries in the respective countries.

It may be observed at this point that the British Government in its later discussion of this proposal took its stand upon the fact that Article 21 of the Convention provides that the question of the desirability of amendment should be considered at least once in ten years.[1]

In regard to the second difficulty expounded by the British Government, the International Labor Office raised the question as to whether the railway agreement was really in contravention to the Convention.[2] The Director, in his statements to the Conference, has tended to take the stand that this arrangement could be included under those provisions of the Convention which provide for exceptions—especially under Sections 4 (*b*) or 4 (*d*) of the preceding summary of the terms of the Convention. It has been impossible, up to the present, to get an official and authoritative decision on this difference of opinion between the British Government and the Director and Governing Body of the International Labor Office, nor upon other questions of interpretation that have been raised in discussions

[1] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, pp. 950–5.

[2] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1921 Conference*, pp. 983–4.

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subsequent to the communication quoted. For the Constitution of the International Labor Organization as it stands in the Peace Treaty provides no means of securing interpretation of a Convention previous to its ratification. The International Labor Office has in several instances ventured to give advice in the interpretation of conventions in a totally unofficial capacity and such advice has usually been accepted.[1] But the British Government has declared that it was unable to put dependence upon the interpretation given by the Director because it was unofficial. It has pointed out that once the British Government had ratified, irrespective of any unofficial assurance given it by the International Labor Office, it would become liable to complaints for non-observance by virtue of Article 412 *et seq.* of the Treaty of Peace, in which case the matter might eventually be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice; that body would not have to accept the unofficial interpretation of the International Labor Office.

Two other questions of interpretation that have been raised in informal discussion are, first, whether the Convention would permit an arrangement requiring a nine and one-half or ten-hour day for factories which work only five days a week, and second, what is the definition of the term "exceptional pressure of work" used in Article 6 of the Convention?[2]

The Director has repeatedly urged that the question of providing a procedure for the interpretation of Conventions before ratification be given consideration. But up to the present no definite steps have been taken. The discussions that have been held on this question will be touched upon at greater length at a later point.

Even if by process of interpretation it should be decided that the railway agreements were in accord with the terms of the Convention, and if all other questions of interpretation are

[1] *Report of Director, International Labour Office, to the 1921 Conference.* p. 991.

[2] The Convention contains no definition of many of the words or phrases used—hence the ease with which questions of interpretation of this sort may arise, and the corresponding uncertainty. On the other hand, the way is left open to secure the definition most reasonably suited to the multitude of different and varying conditions which are to be encountered as they arise in the course of actual application.

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settled to the satisfaction of Great Britain, the other obstacle to ratification raised by the British Government will remain. It is undoubtedly of a serious and puzzling character. The Director stated that question clearly before the 1922 Conference:[1] "Even should the Washington text be rendered more flexible and adapted to the innumerable conditions of British industrial life, as the demand has been made, would it be possible to do without the essential guarantee which consists in the intervention of the government, in order to determine whether collective agreements do or do not conform to the provisions of the international Convention?" The attitude of the British Government then in power was represented by Sir David Shackleton at the 1922 Conference: "The British Government has a clear and definite policy, which is that where employers and workers are fully and highly organized they should be left to manage things themselves."[2] It should be noted in connection with this final sounding statement of policy that Mr. G. N. Barnes, the chief British Government delegate to the Washington Conference, voted for the Convention as it stands under explicit instructions from his Government.

It has already been pointed out that some measure of government regulation even of collectivc agreements was unavoidable in the formation of this Convention. This applies especially to the main terms and principles of the Convention; international agreement between governments upon these terms was the object of the Convention. Therefore the British objection, if stated as an absolute general principle, and upheld as such, would obviously make ratification impossible. The Convention would certainly require that collective agreements be subject to the approval of public authority.

It is possible however that as a matter of actual fact it will be found that what is in question is not a general principle, but merely a desire on the part of Great Britain to avoid all danger of constant and minute government regulation and inspection.

[1] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 956.

[2] *Proceedings of the 1922 Conference*, p. 83.

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The difficulty may resolve itself into a question of the degree and type of control which is exercised over collective bargaining. The regulations made may be limited to main principles and tend to be modeled on the collective bargains already made—they may be of the contrary character. In short, there may be some way out of the apparent stalemate by working out a method of applying the Convention which will make for the observance of its terms, and yet not hinder collective bargaining in a distasteful and unwise measure. This possibility is still under discussion.

The Convention sets down a very definite check to collective bargaining in its main principles. It is almost as definite as regards the terms of some of the types of exceptional arrangements for which it makes provision—those summarized in Sections 4 (*a*) and 4 (*c*) of the preceding outline. Collective agreements which contravened these would have to be forbidden by public authority, it appears evident. That much control there will have to be to carry out the Convention. As regards the other types of exceptions provided in the Convention (those covered by Sections 4 (*b*), 4 (*d*) and 4 (*e*) of our summary), it is easy to see how all interference with the course of collective bargaining may be avoided if the government so chooses. The arrangements covered by these sections are likely to be the ones requiring the most flexibility, and involving the most detail—therefore the ones in which government regulation is least desired. In these cases the public authority is left free, under the terms of the Convention, to frame its regulations upon such collective bargains as are made—therefore securing freedom from interference and inspection. An eight-hour law which seemed to meet these requirements satisfactorily was drafted by the Ministry of Labor to carry out the recommendation of the British Joint Industrial Commission of 1918; it involved no elaborate system of state inspection of organized industries.

If efforts along the lines just dwelt upon come to nothing, there would seem to be no way out of this situation except by a reversal of the British stand, or by amendment of the Convention. The Governing Body of the International Labor Office has up to the present decided against holding a new Conference

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to reconsider and amend the Convention. It has given several cogent reasons for this attitude. First, that a certain number of states had already ratified the Convention, which was already in force. Second, that there was no way of being certain that a satisfactory solution of the difficulties could be reached by a second Conference, or that the other governments would ratify the altered Convention. Third, a fear entertained particularly by the trade-union representatives on the Governing Body that under present circumstances the terms of the Convention would be too greatly weakened if it were brought now before another Conference. The Governing Body and the Conferences have tended to hold the opinion that the difficulties encountered could be met by a liberal interpretation of the terms of the existing Convention.[1]

The dilemma faced by the International Labor Office in considering the question of amendment has been well summed up in the following words: "Shall the International Labor Organization wait quietly until public opinion in various countries has changed and political changes may afford hope that laws which have no prospect of being passed at present will be voted? Shall it until that time quietly retain the non-ratified Conventions in its archives, Conventions whose only merit will be that they have expressed that which appeared at a certain period in accordance with justice and equity? Or shall it at any price in the face of a thousand obstacles and disregarding all criticism, seek to ascertain under what conditions an international agreement can be effected on this subject?"[2]

Under the new Labor Government a fresh effort is being made to secure ratification. Mr. Tom Shaw, the Minister of Labor in that Government, was chairman of the Commission of the Washington Conference which drafted the eight-hour Convention. Miss Margaret Bondfield, the new Parliamentary Secretary for Labor, has announced before the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization that they intend to

[1] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1921 Conference*, p. 990.

[2] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 956.

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work for simultaneous ratification, and they have introduced an eight-hours bill into Parliament. The chances of passage of this bill, if it carries out the terms of the Convention, at the present time appear highly uncertain. If such a bill is passed (and perhaps even if it is not) Great Britain may decide to call an international conference to consider simultaneous ratification; conceivably such a conference would result in a move for amendment rather than for immediate ratification.[1]

This much appears certain—that Great Britain is contemplating an extension of the eight-hour day rather than the contrary. It may be assumed, therefore, that the new Government, if it remains in power, would not raise too many minor objections to any plan of ratification that would simultaneously establish the same conditions in the chief industrial countries of the Continent.

France

The eight-hour Convention adopted by the Washington Conference was modeled in many respects upon the eight-hour day legislation then in force in France.[2] The French delegation on the Commission which framed Part XIII of the Peace Treaty was, throughout the sessions of this Commission, in close touch with the French governmental body which was interested in the matter—the Interdepartmental Commission on International Treaties—on which the large organizations of employers and workers were represented.[3]

The eight-hour day was established in France by legislative act in April, 1919. This act, the passage of which was preceded by most thorough discussion by a special Commission appointed by Clemenceau, and by both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, merely states the general principle of the limitation of hours of work to eight in the day and forty-eight in the week. It leaves the questions arising out of the applica-

[1] See further discussion of this subject in the second part of this article.

[2] *Cf.* "Hours of Labour in Industry, France." *International Labour Office, Studies and reports*, Series D, No. 6 (1922), p. 12.

[3] *Journal Officiel*, June 25, 1919, p. 6522. See also Gaston Tessier, *La Journée de huit heures.* (Paris, 1923.)

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tion of this principle to be settled by public administrative regulations, after consultation with the employers' and workers' organizations concerned.[1] The administrative orders may be issued either on the initiative of the government or at the request of workers' or employers' associations; they have usually been based on collective agreements already in existence, especially in the metal trades. This is in essentials the method contemplated by the Convention. A system of administrative orders has been extensively applied under this act, new orders being constantly issued. In some industries the limitation of the working day has been left, up to the present, to collective agreement, no administrative orders having been issued. Two special laws have been passed for the coal mines and mercantile marine—the latter was abrogated in 1922 after the failure of the Genoa Conference of the International Labor Organization.

In April, 1920, a bill was introduced before the Chamber of Deputies for the ratification of the Washington Convention. But since that date it has not been directly considered. In the explanatory statement by which the Government introduced the bill, various discrepancies of large and small detail between the existing French legislation and decrees and the Washington Convention were pointed out.[2] Among these discrepancies may be noted the fact that the French legislation regarding the payment for overtime work on account of unusual pressure of work does not correspond to the provisions of the Convention. Nor does the legislation provide that the regulations laid down to cover the exceptions mentioned in 4 (*b*) of our summary outline of the Convention, must be agreed to by both parties. It provides only that accords must be given weight and that both sides must be consulted. This last question arose, for example, in regard to the decree for the railways of September, 1922.[3] Some of the latest decrees issued by the Government

[1] *Cf.* "Hours of Labour in Industry, France." *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D., No. 6 (1922), p. 89.

[2] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 996.

[3] "Hours of Labour in Industry, France." *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 6 (1922), p. 34.

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for particular industries show wider divergencies from the Convention than the earlier ones.

The French Government has not shown any positive disposition to revise its legislation or decrees so as to be in a position to ratify the Convention. But on the other hand, it has never in any official statement claimed that the Draft Convention is not sufficiently elastic to obviate the discrepancies between its text and the regulations. It has indeed tended to put a liberal interpretation on the articles of the Convention dealing with exceptions.[1] Nor has the French Government officially made any other objections to the Convention. The Director of the International Labor Office, in his explanation before the 1921 Conference, gave the following description of the situation in France as regards the Convention:

> It may be of interest . . . that in spite of somewhat lively discussion in the Press, in spite of attacks on the eight-hour day in the Chamber of Deputies . . . the principle of the eight-hour day has been maintained by the Government and has never really been disputed by the Chamber.
>
> Nevertheless because of . . . state of feeling, and of certain criticisms which were made, or of certain apprehensions which are felt only too naturally in a country cruelly affected by the war, perhaps from the fear of foreign competition which has been expressed in newspaper articles . . . perhaps because of the change in the relations between the Government and the working classes or of a fear of bringing upon Parliament and the country a social conflict which might be formidable —be the reason what it may, the French Chamber has not adopted the bill ratifying the Washington Draft Convention which was introduced by the Government in 1920.

The recent shift of French opinion, as indicated by the elections of May, 1924, may mark a significant change of attitude. It is too early to know.

Italy

During the radical socialist movement which followed the Armistice in Italy, the basic eight-hour day was established in

[1] *Cf. Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 1024. See also Gaston Tessier, *La Journée de huit heures* (Paris, 1923), p. 4.

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many important industries by collective agreements of national scope. By government decrees in 1921 it was extended to the private and state-owned railways.

A bill for the ratification of the Eight-Hour Convention was introduced into the Chamber of Deputies in July, 1920,[1] but no action was taken. The utterances of Mr. Navarro, the then Minister of Finance, tended to explain Italy's action by the fear of international competition and by the fact that the important industrial countries had not yet ratified.

The Mussolini Government has repeatedly expressed its support of the eight-hour-day principle. In March, 1923, it issued a new decree covering the industrial field which maintained all the collective agreements and regulations then in existence.[2] The provisions of this legislative decree cover each of the important industries separately; in their exceptions and provisions they are in most respects in accord with the terms of the Convention loosely construed. The one chief difference is in regard to the extra payment for overtime worked under special circumstances.[3] The decree requires merely a ten per cent additional payment while the Convention requires a twenty-five per cent minimum. In July, 1923, the Minister of Labor submitted a bill to the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the object of which was to convert the existing decree into a parliamentary act, and it is expected that that bill will become law. Nevertheless, the Mussolini Government has taken no definite steps towards ratifying the Washington Convention.

Belgium

Beginning with the year 1917 Belgium gradually adopted the eight-hour day in industry and gradually brought its legislation to agree with the provisions of the Washington Draft Convention. The act which was instituted in June, 1921, is judged to

[1] *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 760.

[2] *Industrial and Labour Information*, Mar. 23, 1923, p. 29.

[3] "Hours of Labour in Industry, Italy." *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 8 (1923).

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be in practical accord with the Convention.[1] In introducing it into the Belgian Parliament, the Minister of Labor described it as the fruit of the influences active in 1919. Section 12 of this Act is of sufficient interest to be quoted, for it gives the Government power to suspend the act: "Whenever, in the opinion of the Superior Labor Council and the Superior Council of Industry and Commerce it is a national necessity that the means of exchange indispensable for the importation of the requisites of existence be insured by the development of the export trade". This provision is generally judged to be within the limits of the Convention (section 6, foregoing summary).

In spite of the fact that the Belgian law meets all the requirements of the Convention, Belgium has not ratified it. In the report which the Central Section of the Chamber of Representatives submitted on this subject, it recommended that the Convention should not be ratified until the other great countries which are Belgium's competitors had given their ratification.[2] This report reads in part as follows: "This (our policy for delay) is to be sought in the fact that, after ratifying the Convention, we shall be bound for a period of eleven years. . . . Before assuming that obligation Belgium is entitled to enquiry into the legislation of other countries. . . . As regards the Washington Convention we find that the great producing countries who are our competitors in the markets of the world have not yet signed."

The suggestion was made in Parliament that a conditional ratification might be given—to go into effect only when certain other named states should also have ratified. But this suggestion has not been followed.

The 1921 bill, indeed, has itself been under serious and steady attack by the employers during recent parliamentary sessions.[3] Their criticisms have been in the main not against the principle of the bill but against the provisions made for

[1] Ministère de l'industrie, du travail et du ravitaillement, *Revue du Journal*, vol. 22, June, 1921, p. 679.

[2] *Report of Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 986.

[3] *Cf. Industrial and Labour Information*, Mar. 10, 1923, p. 23.

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exceptions—especially against that feature of the bill which states that various exceptions which are permitted shall be based upon agreement between workers and employers. The workers' representatives have staunchly defended the bill and its effects. They have been on the whole supported by the Government, which has claimed that the bill was sufficiently elastic in character for the needs of industry, provided that it was administered with careful regard for the actual operation of particular industries and unusual periods. During the 1923 session of Parliament, the Minister of Labor spoke as follows regarding the Government's policy in the administration of the law: "Breadth of view and the application of the act with due moderation better serve the interests of those who are in favor of its maintenance than too rigid application, which would be fatal to industry, injurious to the general interests of the country, and would justly give rise to so many protests that the withdrawal of the act would in a short time become necessary."[1] In accordance with this attitude the Government appears recently to have been permitting more numerous and more extensive exceptions to the general principle than at first.[2] Early in 1924, however, the Belgian Senate definitely turned down two bills modifying the existing legislation in the direction of longer hours.

For the immediate present there seems no chance that the Convention will be ratified. On the other hand if economic conditions on the continent become more stable and the larger industrial countries ratify, there is little doubt that Belgium would follow.

Switzerland

In Switzerland a constitutional procedure which requires the clear enunciation of decisions caused the Federal Government to define its attitude to the Draft Convention without delay. At the beginning of 1921 it drew the notice of the International Labor Office to several facts which made ratification difficult.[3]

[1] *Industrial and Labour Information*, Aug. 17, 1923.

[2] *Ibid.*, Apr. 6 and Apr. 27, 1923.

[3] *Official Bulletin*, vol. III, pp. 383-95.

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It pointed out several serious divergences between its legislation and the terms of the Convention. The length of the working day is regulated in Switzerland under a forty-eight-hour act of 1919.[1] This act does not extend to small industries (workshops), while the Convention does. Therefore ratification would have required legislation which the Government declared in its opinion to be too rigid for this form of small undertaking.[1] Second, the federal act merely laid down a weekly maximum of forty-eight hours and thus allowed the nine-hour daily limit, prescribed in the Convention, to be exceeded. Third, the Government called attention to the fact that the working day in Swiss transport and communication enterprises (federal undertakings) is regulated not under the general act but by a special act of 1920. This act contains numerous divergences from the terms of the convention; under it the daily period of time on duty might even reach fourteen.

Thus the Federal Council openly advised the legislature not to ratify the Convention and the legislative bodies agreed with its advice.[2] In its message on the subject the Federal Council emphasized not only difficulties of the type just enumerated, but also reasons of a more general nature. It dwelt particularly upon the fact that Switzerland has been in a period of severe economic depression since the end of the war and that most of its chief export trades were still suffering gravely from the conditions throughout Europe. The Federal Council's message to the legislature dealing with the Convention reads in part as follows: "The Federal Council, under the powers conferred upon it, should be entitled to ratify only if it is ascertained that other states in a position similar to that of Switzerland and, in particular, the great industrial countries, are also adhering to the Convention".[3] The accompanying argument is to the effect that Switzerland is almost the only country which is applying the eight-hour day conscientiously.

[1] *Report of Director, International Labour Office, to 1921 Conference*, p. 962.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 1016–18.

[3] "Hours of Labour in Industry, Switzerland." *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 9 (1923), p. 23.

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The present tendency in Switzerland is to make the legislation regulating the length of the working day less restrictive rather than to attempt a ratification of the Washington Convention. Recent decrees have extended the exclusions outside the scope of the factory act beyond the previous ones.[1] Furthermore, the Federal Government introduced in July, 1922, an amending act to the existing law. As a result there will be another referendum on the eight-hour day in February, 1924. The new Act deals especially with the question of the conditions under which exceptions should be permitted; it proposes that in times of grave economic crisis of a general character, the length of the normal working week may be extended to fifty-four hours—the daily limit not to exceed ten hours.[2] This proposal obviously was drawn up with an eye upon the current international economic situation. It could not even under a liberal interpretation be found in accordance with the Convention.[3]

Lastly the eight-hour régime in federal undertakings was in August, 1923, modified by the Federal Council under the powers granted it by Section 16 of the original act (temporary exceptions). The new decree extended the average working day from eight or nine hours for different classes of work to eight and one-half or nine and one-half hours.[4]

It seems fairly plain that until the economic situation in Switzerland becomes more favorable and some of the larger industrial countries ratify, Switzerland will not ratify; on the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that she will take part in any general movement of ratification that may come with the gradual establishment of a more satisfactory economic equilibrium.

[1] *Industrial and Labour Information*, Oct. 12, 1923.

[2] *Journal de Genève*, November 20, 1923.

[3] As a result of the referendum held in February, 1924, this new proposal has been defeated by a much heavier majority than was anticipated, showing that public opinion does not desire further change.

[4] "Hours of Labour in Industry, Switzerland." *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 9, (1923), p. 13.

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Germany

Germany was by special recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Allies admitted to membership in the International Labor Organization by the 1919 Conference.

The post-war revolution in Germany had immediately led to an agreement upon the eight-hour day. The joint central organization of workers and employers in November, 1918, reached an agreement that "the maximum regular daily working hours shall be eight for all undertakings". This agreement was given legal sanction and further definition immediately by means of a succession of government regulations respecting hours of work.[1] These regulations made numerous provisions for exceptions to the general régime. During this same period a great many collective agreements covering hours of labor also were brought into effect. It has been estimated that at the end of 1921 nearly ten million workers were covered by these collective bargains.[2] In July, 1922, a provisional act was passed for the coal-mining industry, establishing as the regular period of work the time fixed in the collective agreements valid October, 1921.[3]

The administrative orders issued were intended to cover only the period of economic transition after the war, and it was planned that they should be displaced by definite legislation. Therefore in 1921 the German Government placed a bill before the Federal Economic Council, which under the German constitution is the competent consultative authority on such legislation.[4] The introductory note which accompanied this bill pointed out that one of the main reasons for passing it "arises from the participation of Germany in the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations of which Germany is a member with full rights and obligations". The main provi-

[1] Leymann, "Eight-Hour Day and the Problem of Overtime in Germany," *International Labour Review*, Sept., 1922, pp. 8–9. See also "Hours of Labour in Industry, Germany," *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 4.

[2] "Hours of Labour in Industry, Germany." *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 4, p. 12.

[3] *Official Bulletin*, Vol. IV (1921), pp. 344–54.

[4] See Leymann, "Eight-Hour Day and the Problem of Overtime in Germany," *International Labour Review*, Sept., 1922.

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sions of the bill were in accordance with the stipulations of the Washington Convention but there were some minor divergences. Furthermore the Government placed the Convention itself before the Federal Economic Council. This consultative body reported favorably upon the bill submitted by the Government and also recommended the ratification of the Draft Convention. The bill was then submitted to the Reichsrat. The Reichsrat took no action, neither then nor since. It was not found possible to reconcile the marked difference of opinion prevailing among the different parties represented.[1] The regulations were continued in force. In 1922 the German Government in an official letter to the International Labor Organization drew attention to the forces which prevented ratification, among which was the fact that the Convention required governmental sanction and regulation of the process of collective agreement—the same difficulty mentioned by Great Britain.[2]

The process of ratification therefore has remained checked. The recent political troubles of Germany, the uncertainty, growing out of the Ruhr and Rhineland situations, the financial confusion, the weakening of trade-union influence and the further estrangement of different economic groups within the empire, all have tended to lessen the chance of immediate ratification. Indeed, as a result of these recent political events the bonds between Germany and the International Labor Office have been somewhat weakened. Germany has been taking less interest in the activities of the Organization than at the start.

It must be observed, however, that when, as a result of the political and economic crisis, the Stresemann Government was granted dictatorial powers by parliament, the power to regulate the length of the working day was excluded from among the powers granted, because of the determined opposition of the workers. Late in 1923 a provisional order was promulgated by the Government which maintained the principle of the eight-hour day, but permitted exceptions reached by collective agreement. It was presented as a temporary and emergency meas-

[1] *Report of Director, International Labour Office, to the 1922 Conference*, p. 981.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 982.

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ure—such an exception to the eight-hour principle as might be permitted under Article 14 of the Convention.[1]

Following this order, as a result of the disorganization of Germany's industry, the weakening of the trade unions, and Allied pressure, many industries, including the coal-mining industry, not only in the Ruhr and Rhineland but also in unoccupied Germany have returned to the nine and one-half and ten-hour working day. This fact is now being urged in other quarters as a reason against ratification by other countries.

The whole question of the bearing of German ratification upon the reparations question was given its first thorough discussion in the January, 1924, meeting of the Governing Body. The workers' representatives regarded the lengthening of the working day in Germany as a most serious threat to the whole prospect of ratification, and were united in the view that the necessity for paying reparations should not be made the reason for relieving Germany from the pressure of ratifying. The burden of reparations was not to be thrown upon the workers, it was argued; and furthermore it was not to be assumed that production under a ten-hour schedule would be greater than under an eight-hour one. French and German employers' representatives united in the declaration that the longer working day was necessary if reparations were to be paid. The Belgian Government representative showed strong sympathy for that view.[2]

Decision in the matter of ratification still remains only with the German people. But present events and this discussion both show how strong the pressure will be within and without Germany to prevent ratification during the period of reparations payments.

Holland

In 1919 the Dutch legislature passed an act limiting hours of work in industries in general to eight in the day and forty-five

[1] *Industrial and Labour Information*, Oct. 12, 1923.

[2] See *Official Bulletin*, Vol. X, No. 1, March 31, 1924, pp. 10 *et seq.* It is very likely that this question will be discussed again at the June, 1924, Conference.

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in the week. Its scope was far wider than that of the Washington Conference.[1]

This act was to have come into force October, 1920. But in the course of the year the Netherlands Government began to feel increasing apprehension of the competition of other countries which had not ratified the Washington Convention. That act gave the Minister of Labor authority to extend hours of work in factories and workshops by not more than two per day or ten per week for a maximum of four years. In virtue of this section of the act, the Minister of Labor for 1920 granted this exemption to the most important Dutch industries. Furthermore, in response to the same apprehensions, in May, 1922, the Netherlands Government revised and modified the original act, and substituted one providing for the eight and one-half hour day and the forty-eight-hour week.[2]

This latest act is out of accordance with the terms of the Washington Convention both as regards its main provision and its administrative arrangements.[3] But it has not been these differences which have prevented ratification of the Washington Convention, but more general considerations. The Dutch Government wrote as follows even before the passage of its most recent act:

> It is impossible for the Dutch Government to bind itself by provisions established internationally; although the legislation existing in Holland is in conformity with the decisions adopted in Washington and even goes beyond them in certain parts.
>
> The possibility of amending our own legislation in accordance with definite demands still exists, whereas by adhering to the Washington Draft Convention we should be bound for ten years by the provisions of that Convention. In the present uncertainty as regards economic conditions, we feel it essential to maintain entire liberty to modify our legislation. When draft conventions have been ratified it is exceed-

[1] *Report of the Director of the International Labour Office to the 1921 Conference*, p. 967. See also "Hours of Labour in Industry, Netherlands," *International Labour Office, Studies and Reports*, Series D, No. 11 (1923).

[2] *Legislative Series, International Labour Office, 1922 Netherlands*, 1.

[3] *Report of the Director of the International Labour Office to the 1922 Conference*, pp. 1007–08.

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ingly improbable that a general agreement can be arrived at with a view to their adoption, in view of the fact that different states have different interests. Moreover, the provisions of the draft convention go further than those of our legislation at certain points. . . . Under present conditions our industry cannot possibly bear such burdens. It is also to be feared that additional burdens would make competition more difficult as regards the export trade, both in our colonies and elsewhere.

Attention is also drawn to the fact that the most important states have delayed ratification, and this means that our country would place itself, by adhering to it, in a less favorable condition than those of our competitors.[1]

The Dutch Government thus seems to have insisted upon three difficulties, first, that ratification would prevent them from undertaking further amendment of their own legislation—which they feared might become necessary and which was in fact subsequently made; second, the fear of foreign competition; third, the prevailing economic depression.

Spain

The system of hours regulation in Spain is as a whole in agreement with the terms of the Washington Draft Convention. This regulation depends upon decree, not upon a legislative act. The divergences are of a secondary character. A bill for ratification of the Washington Convention was laid before the Cortes in 1921, but no action was taken. In 1922 the Minister of Commerce and Labor wrote to the International Labor Organization in part as follows: "The difficulties which the British Government has experienced, which find their echo in other countries, especially in Belgium, seem to render advisable the postponement of the ratification for which Parliament has asked, until a definite opinion can be formed from experts and from the decisions reached by the states which have raised objections."[3] This communication would seem to indicate not

[1] *Official Bulletin*, vol. IV (1921), pp. 152–6. See also *Report of the Director of the International Labour Office to the 1922 Conference*, pp. 1009–10.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 990.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 991.

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so much fear of competition as a desire to take only such action as conforms to the steps which may be taken by the other countries.

The De Rivera Government, since its assumption of power, has in various public statements confirmed its support of the eight-hour principle. But it has taken no steps towards ratification.

Denmark

In Denmark the hours of work are not limited primarily by legislation. In 1919 an act was passed regulating the length of the working day in continuous industries, a precedent for that country which as yet stands alone.[1]

The question of the length of the working day has been settled under joint national agreements for many industries between the Danish employers' federation and the confederation of trade unions. The fact that ratification of the Convention would mean a departure from this system seems to have been one of the chief reasons why the Danish Government has taken no steps to ratify.

This reason was given in a letter to the International Labor Organization by the Minister of the Interior in 1922 in explanation of Denmark's stand. In addition the communication expressed a hesitation to undertake the definite obligation of the Convention for a period of ten years in the face of prevailing economic uncertainty, and also instanced the fact that Denmark's industrial competitors had not ratified.[2]

More recently the Danish employers' federation has refused to continue the national joint agreements on hours of work, claiming that liberty should be given to individual industries and trades in this field. As a counter measure, the confederation of trade unions has been pressing for a bill, the terms of which are in accordance with the Washington Draft Convention.[3] But there is no certainty at this time that the bill will be

[1] *Legislative Series 1919, International Labour Office, Denmark*, 1.

[2] *Report of Director of the International Labour Office to the 1922 Conference*, pp. 989–90.

[3] *Industrial and Labour Information*, Jan. 6, 1923; Feb. 9, 1923.

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passed or that if it is, a ratification of the Convention will follow. In all probability, Denmark, like the other small industrial countries of Western Europe, will wait upon the action of the larger industrial countries before taking any decisive action.

Poland

The eight-hour day was established in Poland in 1919, and amended in 1922. The existing legislation provides for eight hours' work five days a week and six hours on Saturday, a weekly total of forty-six. In general the provisions of the Polish legislation are in close conformity with the Convention, there being only two minor points of difference. This legislation seems to be steadily upheld in Poland, although undergoing severe criticism of the employers' associations.

The Washington Convention has been submitted to the Diet and referred by it to the Commissions on Foreign Affairs and Labor Protection. The latter commission, in its report to the Diet, dwelt upon two difficulties of the same sort that other countries have pointed out. First, the uncertainty of ratification on the part of the great industrial powers; second, the fact that certain other countries, such as Switzerland, had decided not to ratify the Convention and had given reasons which apply equally to Poland.

Following this report the Commission on Labor Protection and the Diet postponed the consideration of ratification and the question still stands in that indeterminate state.

Austria

Under its new financial administration, Austria has put an eight-hour law in effect by decree. It has also signified its intention of ratifying the Washington Convention conditionally upon the ratification of Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and its neighboring states.

Japan

One of the great results expected of the Convention was the effect it would have upon the eastern industrial countries. Article 9 of the Convention, it will be remembered, deals en-

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tirely with the regulation of hours of work in Japan. Up to the present time, there is no law in Japan limiting the hours of work for adult males, such legislation applying only to women and children under 15. The Washington Convention was submitted to the Japanese privy council for consideration.

The Japanese Government, in response to a communication from the International Labor Office asking for information concerning the question of ratification, did not hold out any definite promise of immediate action.[1] It dwelt upon the difficulties of application and enforcement in the present stage of economic development and stated that an attempt to enforce the Convention without modification would cause on the one hand disrespect for the law, and on the other hand discontent among all the business men. It further stated that it feared that the application of the Convention would produce serious injury to the Japanese industry because Japanese labor was not sufficiently accustomed to intensive work. It also called attention to the advance of China in spinning, reeling and match manufacturing industries, pointing out that no provision was made in the Convention for the limitation of hours of work in China. In conclusion the Government stated that it would do its best to adopt such parts of the Convention as were judged immediately practicable and hoped to be able to adopt the whole gradually and eventually—provided sufficient flexibility was introduced into it. The Japanese Government representatives at the various Conferences have expressed the same sincere desire of Japan gradually to improve the situation in regard to hours of work.

In March, 1923, Japan passed an important amendment to its factory act, cutting down the actual working hours of women and children to ten a day, making clear that this was part of its general attempt to improve its industrial conditions along with the other industrial countries.[2] The question of ratification seems definitely postponed for the present.

[1] *Report of Director of the International Labour Office to the 1922 Conference*, pp. 1001–02.

[2] *Industrial and Labour Information*, April 27, 1923.

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Canada

Canada is like the United States, a federal state. Most labor legislation falls within the constitutional competence of the separate states rather than of the national government. This problem was foreseen in the preparation of the constitution of the International Labor Organization, and it is provided in Article 405 that "in the case of a federal state, the power of which to enter into Conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of that Government to treat a Draft Convention to which such limitations apply, as a recommendation only".[1] A government is left freer in its choice of means and methods in applying a recommendation than it is in applying a Convention, and no official act of ratification is required. The government is therefore not under the definite international pledge that results from ratification of a Convention.

The Washington Convention was submitted to the Canadian Parliament in May, 1921. Immediately thereafter the Minister of Labor sent a memorandum to the International Labor Organization stating that the Convention was considered within the competence of the nine provincial governments and outside of the competence of the federal government.

In 1924 the Province of British Columbia adopted a bill which gives full effect to the Washington Convention. No bill concerning the Washington Convention has yet been passed by the other provincial parliaments.

In 1923 a special Federal-Provincial conference was held relative to the obligations of Canada under the labor sections of the peace treaties. Representatives of all the provincial governments and the national government attended this conference. The question of adopting the eight-hour Convention was considered but no resolution was passed on the subject. It was

[1]The phraseology of the paragraph requires careful study. It has not been authoritatively established that it applies to Canada. The phrase "power of which to enter into conventions" is used—not "power to legislate on labor matters" or any similar one. Thus the whole question of the scope of the treaty-making power of the Federal Government is raised—as it would be in the United States, if this country were a member of the International Labor Conference.

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agreed that the Federal Department of Labor should proceed as promptly as possible to have made an up-to-date survey of the present situation regarding the length of the working day in industrial undertakings in Canada, and provided that the information obtained should be submitted to all provincial governments for their consideration.[1]

If the other Canadian provinces decide to put the Washington Convention into effect, new legislation would be required in all provinces.[2] In all of the formal discussions on the subject and in the various remarks of the Canadian employers before the Conferences of the International Labor Organization, the fear of American competition has been put well to the front. In Canada the fact that the United States is not a member of the International Labor Organization will certainly be a factor in the final decision regarding the Washington Convention.[3]

HERBERT FEIS

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[1] *The Labour Gazette of Canada*, Oct., 1923, p. 1109.

[2] See *Bulletin No. 6, Industrial Relations Series, Department of Labour, Canada*, entitled "International Labour Organization—Laws of Canada bearing on draft conventions and recommendations," Ottawa (1923), pp. 7–8.

[3] The concluding portion of this article will be published in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY for December, 1924.

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THE TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY IN DENMARK[1]

TAXES on real estate are a much more important source of revenue, and especially of local revenue, in England and the United States than they are in continental Europe. In the last few years, however, additional real estate taxes have been much discussed on the continent, and the situation in Denmark at the present time is of particular interest on that account.

Real estate taxes were once much more important in Denmark than they are now. A hundred years ago they furnished almost all the revenue for local expenses, and were an important source of state revenue. At the present time, however, taxes on real property in Denmark furnish only three per cent of the state revenue. (State taxation as used throughout this article corresponds to American state *and* federal taxation.)

The causes of the development away from the taxation of real property have been in part positive; that is, other taxes have superseded real estate taxes. The power of the government to tax personal incomes has increased to such an extent that it is now natural to raise a large part of the public revenue directly from its ultimate source, the personal income. Furthermore, real estate taxes are not in accord with modern, democratic principles of taxation, especially when they are borne by tenants as an addition to their rent. Modern principles require that taxes should be graduated according to the income of the taxpayer, and house rent represents a much smaller proportion of the total income of a rich man than of that of the average, or poor man. Further, according to modern ideas, the state ought to encourage the poor. Finally, the taxation of real property under modern conditions is actually less just than it was in the past.

[1] Revised as to phrasing by Faith M. Williams.

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This is especially true in the larger towns. In the smaller towns of the past there was a certain correspondence between a man's income and his real property; the great merchant was the owner of much real property for the use of his business and his family; the smaller master-mechanic owned his shop and a little home or perhaps nothing; the official and the retired business man often owned their own homes, and so on. But now the lease system and the mortgage system have spoiled this harmony; now we have great business men without real property, and many other well-to-do people living as tenants; and on the other hand there are owners of large tenement houses so heavily mortgaged that their ability to pay taxes is very small. Ordinary dwellings in Copenhagen (which are nearly always of brick and are rather durable) are mortgaged on the average up to seventy-nine per cent of their total value, and many house owners are retired business men with very little income aside from that received from the houses they own. Accordingly the ownership of real estate, which was in the past a rather good indication of total tax-paying ability, is now a very poor indication. Owners say (and rightly), "If the community wants better schools, cheaper hospital service, public baths, old-age pensions, and so on, then everybody should help to pay for them; we landlords cannot afford to pay new taxes; we can shift them to our tenants only in part, and that slowly; we shall have no way of estimating the cost of maintaining our property if taxes are going to vary up and down and especially if they are going to rise beyond our control."

There has been therefore a tendency to change the rates on real property as little as possible. They have remained constant either as a certain percentage of the value or as a certain amount per square meter. If a town has inherited high real estate taxes from the past, it is glad to have them, but it does not raise them. The revenue from real estate taxes may increase because of new buildings or because the value of land and buildings has risen, but not because of increased rates, no matter what the financial needs of the town may be.

In the rural districts and the smaller towns the situation as to the ownership of real estate is quite different from that in the

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large cities. Statistics available on the subject show that in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants only seven per cent of the total number of flats and houses are occupied by their owners; in towns with from 15,000 to 100,000 inhabitants the proportion increases to twenty per cent; while in the smaller towns with from 4,000 to 15,000 inhabitants, and in those with less than 4,000 inhabitants the proportions rise to thirty-five and fifty-one per cent respectively. It is thus clear that in the smaller places, there is still a good deal of the old parallel between income and the possession of real estate; one half the inhabitants live in their own homes, and as they are, of course, chiefly the more wealthy people, they have the ability to pay taxes as well. Only in the larger cities is the connection broken.

In the country real property taxes are even more satisfactory than they are in the small towns. They amount, in fact, to a kind of progressive taxation. If one farm is twice as large as another, its taxes are also twice as large, but the net income from the larger farm is not twice as great, since the large farmer must share the income from his land with his laborers. The small farmer who can manage all the work himself keeps all the income. If the farmer has one laborer he does half the work himself, if he has four laborers one-fifth, and so on, and even if his own labor is more valuable than that of his helpers, and he alone keeps the land rent, and the interest on the capital invested in the farm, still it is clear that the larger the farm the smaller the net income per acre for its owner. Accordingly the large farmer pays the taxes his laborers would have to pay if they worked on farms of their own, and his real estate taxes have the effect of a progressive tax.

Even in the country, however, the trend is away from taxes on real property. The tendency is clearly seen in the case of parish taxes, which under the Danish tax-system are regulated by the parish councils. These councils choose between real and personal taxes, settling the proportion between them every three years; for instance, of the total amount to be raised, they may choose to take two-fifths in real estate taxes and three-fifths in personal income taxes. When this choice is

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made, they do not have much freedom, since the law provides in detail how each tax shall be assessed; but the councils are at liberty to decide the proportion between them, and without any theoretical discussion of principles, but simply because of their feeling for what is just and practical, they have chosen year after year to increase the proportion to be furnished by taxing personal incomes, and to decrease that to be furnished by taxing real estate. They have felt that it was unjust to make property owners bear the greater part of the cost of the development of the district. Fifty years ago 75 per cent of the parish revenues came from taxes levied on real estate, twenty-five years ago 60 per cent, ten years ago 50 per cent, and at the present time only 43 per cent. The share of the personal income taxes has thus increased from 25 to 57 per cent, as the result of the decisions of more than 1000 parish councils.[1]

The development away from real estate taxes has been especially pronounced in those parishes where a railroad depot has caused the growth of a small town. The situation of these parishes was somewhat improved in 1903 by the passage of a law which provides that taxes on real property shall be assessed on the total value of the property, not as under the old, purely agricultural system, according to the area and the fertility of the land. Under the old system the assessment rates for land in the new towns were the same as those for the farms on which they had been built. As the expenses of the community increased rapidly with the growth of the town, it was necessary to rely more and more on personal income taxes. The law of 1903 was passed to relieve this situation, but the change in assessments was not large enough to make any great difference in the return, and the figures show that the relative decline of the real estate taxes has continued. At the present time the advocates of the single tax are pressing for a return to a tax on land alone, which shall disregard buildings but take into account both the fertility and the situation of the land. This

[1] It must be admitted that this result has some connection with the fact that farmers constitute a majority in the parish councils, but in the opinion of the writer they have not misused their power in local taxation.

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would of course be more acceptable to the parishes with towns than the old fertility system, but it would not be as satisfactory as the method inaugurated by the 1903 law. Such a change would only hasten the movement toward personal income taxes and it is just these that the single-taxers condemn. At the general valuation of 1920 the land value of all Danish farms was fifty-eight per cent of their total value, while the corresponding figure for all other property in the rural districts was only twenty-four per cent. Accordingly a change by which taxes should be assessed on the basis of land value instead of total value, would be injurious to farmers in the parishes which include towns on the railroad lines. Such towns have heavy expenses for schools etc., and a single tax on land values would not provide enough revenue to meet them, even though land values per square meter are much higher in the towns than in the country. Furthermore, the land tax as a single tax would not adjust tax payments according to the personal income of the various taxpayers.

Even as a link in a system taxing all the sources of income (as in the old English state taxation) real estate taxes are unsatisfactory from the modern point of view. Taxation cannot be made progressive when taxes are levied, not on the total amount of the individual's income, but on its separate elements. There are, however, some very special, though restricted fields where taxes on real property persist in varying forms, and where they may be increased without a new assessment, that is, when a particular piece of property has received some especial benefit. For instance, in Copenhagen there is a tax which is increased by raising the rate, when a private street becomes public and the city pays for repairs, lighting and so on. And throughout Denmark, there is an elaborate system of sewerage taxes and of taxes to be paid by those who profit from the regulation of rivers, from irrigation, dike-building and so on. This is really a compulsory form of cooperation in which the division of expenses among the owners concerned is made according to the benefits they have received. The boards in charge of this system have great freedom in their choice of the basis for division and their methods vary according to local condi-

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tions.[1] They take into account the original value of the land as well as the increased value, and the value and extent of the building affected. For instance, they have ruled that since a sewer intended to serve a high building with many living apartments must be larger than one which serves a smaller house, the number of floors shall be considered when figuring the rates. Danish advocates of the single tax are of the opinion that such adjustments would come about automatically if land-value were used as the basis for tax-assessment, assuming that land values will be higher where one can build tall buildings than in restricted districts where flats are not allowed, or in districts where only low houses are profitable. As a matter of fact, however, there are often both high and low buildings on land of equal value. If the advantages which an owner receives from a public or cooperative enterprise depend more on the size of the buildings than upon the amount of his land, it is only just to apportion the expense according to the size of the buildings. In the case of sewers, water-works, fire-houses and so on, the social bookkeeping of the commonwealth would be misleading if the expense were divided according to land values, since whatever is part of the cost of building or using a house should be borne by the tenants in addition to the other costs of construction. In such cases where individual properties have received especial benefits, real estate taxes are still retained in varying forms, but in general the tendency has been to dispense with them as much as possible.

Meanwhile, however, taxes on income and on wealth have increased and increased. The progressive state income tax exceeds twenty-two per cent in the case of the largest incomes; city taxes in Copenhagen reach a corresponding height and the state progressive capital tax reaches one and five-tenths per cent for the largest fortunes. Accordingly, if a man of large wealth receives only a low rate of interest on his investments (for instance, four per cent) and if he has no income from

[1] Such problems were at one time regarded as being wholly within the province of the law, but as they actually depend upon the application of the principles of taxation, it is only natural that they were discovered first by the single-taxers and later by the economists.

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any other source, there is a theoretical and temporary[1] possibility that his taxes will amount to eighty per cent of his income. And even if the great majority of the population pays at a much lower rate (the writer, for instance, pays only twelve per cent), it is clear that the tax system has become one-sided. Every tax has its defects and the higher it becomes the more they are felt. Especially in the case of the progressive income tax there is the danger that many of the most wealthy will escape the tax through removal, through passive resistance against the assessment, or through positive fraud. The question has therefore arisen whether it is not possible to find new forms of the real-estate tax that will accord with modern principles of taxation.

It may perhaps be wondered that Denmark, having been neutral during the war, should need such high tax rates, and must look about for new forms of taxation. It is, of course, natural that the countries which took part in the war should be in financial straits, but the neutral countries even gained from the war. There have been, however, important changes in Danish public expenditures since the beginning of the war period.

During the war it was necessary to keep a large part of the army in readiness to defend Danish borders, and this caused additional expense, aside from the extraordinary civil expenses which resulted from the increased cost of living, the housing shortage and the war-time unemployment. The annexation of the Danish-speaking part of Slesvig—thanks to the victory of the Allied Powers—also occasioned large extraordinary expense. A more permanent effect of the war and of the social changes which followed it was the inauguration of the eight-hour day. This change has added greatly to the regular government expenditures, because there are so many railroads, gas plants and other public works owned by the government in Denmark. There has also been a democratic revision of the salary system, by which a great number of lower officials have had increases in salary larger than those which the rise in prices

[1] Next year it will be less, as it will then be possible to subtract taxes from income.

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made necessary. The system of paying equal salaries to men and women officials is also very expensive, especially in the case of teachers.

Finally, Denmark has a large number of benevolent institutions which entail heavy expenditures, more perhaps than any other country in the world. She was able to afford them before the war because her military expenses were then very small; the expense *per capita* being only half that of the Great Powers. Danish laws provide for old-age pensions, widows' pensions, sickness and accident insurance, unemployment clubs and sanatoriums, and the state or the towns bear a large part of the expense—in the case of old-age pensions, the entire expense. The cities have large hospitals which are very cheap and much used, even by the middle class; thus in Copenhagen citizens can use the hospital for thirty cents a day, although the cost to the city is four dollars. The city is regarded as a great "sick-club" to which each member's dues are paid through taxes. To all this there must be added the expenses of the schools and colleges, although in the opinion of the writer the expenses of the University of Copenhagen should be regarded as productive, since the university enables the government to get officials at salaries lower than those paid in neighboring countries. Nearly all the courses at the university are free and the government grants many scholarships to poor students. University education has become so common that its "marginal utility" is low in business and professional life, as well as in government service. Officials and civil engineers and physicians are cheap.

But to return to the results of social legislation—the system developed since 1891 costs large sums of money. The state has taken care of all kinds of need and some critics are of the opinion that it has weakened the general feeling of responsibility among the population. To the expensive system of state aid inherited from normal times is now added the burden of the extraordinary expenses which are the result of the war, and it has been necessary to adopt new forms of taxation to meet them. The state has already agreed on several new taxes, most of them indirect. There are new taxes on the turnover

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of restaurants, the consumption of chocolate and the sale of shares in limited companies, in addition to higher taxes on beer, spirits and tobacco.

But in increasing local taxation the authorities have, up to the present time, been forced to content themselves with raising income-tax rates. The towns and cities have their share of the expense of relieving sickness, unemployment and poverty in old age and they have no power to levy indirect taxes and are unable to increase the rates of their real estate taxes. They are especially eager, therefore, to find new ways to tax real property, either on the basis of increase in value, or of total present value.

In Germany there is a tax on increase in value (the *Wertzuwachssteuer*), which is collected when property is sold, and England has a similar tax which is sometimes levied on other occasions. At the present time the German government receives a large revenue from this tax because of the rise in prices. In Denmark, unfortunately, there is no such tax. There is a small tax on increases in value caused by railroad building, but it is difficult for assessors to distinguish between the increase brought about by the railroad and general increases in value, and the tax is unsuccessful. There are besides the sewerage taxes mentioned above, but they are a kind of assessment for improvements.

Ever since the end of the war there has been much discussion of a tax on that nominal increase in property values which is in fact only the result of the decreased value of money, of the inflation, and which affects the land as well as the buildings. (Houses in Denmark are built in a much more durable fashion than houses in America.) As this increase in value is only nominal, one might think that real-estate owners are receiving no taxable profit, for, although they receive more money in rents, they have to pay higher prices when they spend it than they did before the war. Nevertheless their ability to pay taxes has increased, and for two reasons. In the first place, interest on mortgages has increased little, if at all. The resulting advantage to property owners is balanced by the loss to creditors, and from the point of view of absolute justice, a tax

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should be levied in favor of the latter. Since this would be impractical, the debtor's advantage represents a large tax reserve for the benefit of the towns. (The fact that most real estate in Denmark is heavily mortgaged has been mentioned before. The mortgages have been in the past a sufficient reason for not utilizing real estate taxes.) The other reason why the rise in prices suggests a tax on real property is that building costs have risen more than prices in general. Therefore, when house-rent has reached the level of present building costs, the receipts of the house-owner will have a greater purchasing power than before the war and he will accordingly have a taxable profit.[1] This increase in building costs is partly a war phenomenon, as the wages of builders and the prices of building materials rose more than other wages and prices during the war period, but there is reason to expect that it will persist, since there was a movement in that direction before the war. Technical progress in the building trades has been slower than in most other branches of industry and it has been necessary to add wage increases to the cost of building, although in many other trades wage-increases have been made possible by the progress of the industry and have not necessitated increases in the price of the product. Further, there is the landlord in the small town which has grown large. The older houses in such places were built at the price-level of the small town, but their value at the present time has risen to the higher price level of the large town (with its higher wages, its raw materials from longer distances, and so on) and there is in consequence an unearned increment for the property owner of the early period.

There has been a strong sentiment in Denmark and in the neighboring countries for a tax on this increment. There have been a great many proposals to equalize house-rents in old and new houses through a tax on the old houses in favor of the new. During the war, when it was extraordinarily expensive to build new houses, the rent of older buildings was kept low through legislation which established "House Rent Boards".

[1] Professor Warming evidently refers here only to owners of houses built before the war. The man who builds a house at the present time is not receiving the profit of which he speaks.—F. M. W.

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It would be practical, therefore, to attempt some sort of equalization and in the long run it will be necessary, for we cannot have "House Boards" forever. It is just this point, however, which has been fatal to any such tax proposal, for an equalization tax must be accompanied by the repeal of some of the house-rent legislation. The Tenants' Union was not able to understand that in the long run this tax would be borne by the owners. They regarded it as a house-rent tax and started an agitation against it as an undemocratic measure, harmful to general living standards. This alarmed the politicians and, in spite of the financial needs of the towns and cities, they have not utilized this exceptional tax reserve up to the present time. Perhaps it may be used as an excuse for other taxes on real property.

As a rule the basis for an increment tax is the land and not the buildings, and a land tax probably gives a more uniform public revenue. The land tax is also more satisfactory to tenants, because, if the generally-accepted theory is correct, it cannot be shifted to their shoulders. It must be borne as a capitalized loss by the owners of the property at the time the tax is enacted into law. It is even possible that such a tax would be of positive advantage to tenants if lower rents should be the result of its checking land speculation. Speculation raises prices by artificially withholding land from use, especially in European cities where the flat system prevails. The limit of the speculative price rise is the ability of the public to pay the increased rates, and when six families live one above the other in flats, it is possible to extort more money from them in the form of ground rent that it would be if only one family were occupying the site.[1] The speculator who erects high buildings is able to economize in the items of road, sewers, foundations and roofs, because they are used in common by several families. As a matter of fact, the flat system ought to lower rents, as it decreases the total demand for land, but as it affords the above-mentioned opportunities for speculation, it

[1] This also applies to the natural and legitimate site rent. The difference in rent between two locations will be greater when several families utilize the good position and only one family the poorer.

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has been found that European cities with flats have higher ground-rents than cities of the same size with private dwellings only. It would, therefore, be a great advantage to tenants if an increment tax should check speculation.

There is, however, the possibility of shifting the increment tax to the tenant. Generally accepted theory denies that this is possible, holding that the rent given by a tenant for a good location represents its value to him, and that nothing will induce him to give more for it. This is quite true, but the consequences of such a tax may amount to a shifting of the incidence. The hope of profit through an increase in land values is an important motive in many useful transactions, and if buyers did not have this remuneration, then the ordinary profits of such transactions would have to be much larger in order to induce business men to undertake land improvement. In all stages from that of a farmer owning land in the neighborhood of a town, to the landlord having flats to let, the hope of increased profit in the future makes the proprietor contented with a smaller normal profit than he would otherwise require. This also applies to the speculator who holds land for many years without building on it. This practice is often overdone but to a certain extent it is useful, as there might otherwise be erected on land that should have been kept idle, a type of building quite unsuited to the nature of the site. This hope of profit through the increase of land values also animates the speculator for a shorter period, who builds sewers and roads so that prospective house-builders may find grounds ready for their use. This sort of speculation entails quite a good deal of risk and must, therefore, be rewarded by a good profit. This same hope influences builders of houses and owners of flats. All these expect profits through increases in land values, and if they are deprived of such profits by taxation they must be compensated in some other way.

This might be thought of as a kind of shifting of the tax and a good deal of the benefit which should come to tenants from the checking of speculation might thus be lost, but probably not all of it would be. It might even result in discouraging private business from laying out grounds and building houses,

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and in forcing the community to take up such matters. A long time ago the towns began to buy up land in order to regulate town development and to secure increases in land values, and in the last few years many European cities have also been building houses because of the housing shortage. Nevertheless, it would be a strange thing if a tax reform in the spirit of Henry George should advance the movement toward government ownership and state socialism. Much will depend on the rate of the tax. If only half the increase is taxed, a good deal of private business would probably still go on. There are two possible forms of the increment tax. It may be levied when the property is sold (as in Germany), or on the occasion of periodic valuations. Conservative people in Denmark prefer the first as the less objectionable. The ordinary non-speculative land-owner might keep an increase in property values untaxed for years, but unsound speculation would be checked in this way. The conservative element fears the possible inaccuracies of the valuations. Probably the majority, however, prefers the system of periodic assessments as more just and equitable in its principle. It would give the government a more uniform revenue and if the value of property should decrease, it would be easier to reduce this tax. This tax would take the form of an annual payment, while the German form becomes a capitalized tax. The annual payment may be diminished but with the capitalized tax a real repayment must take place, which is more difficult. As to the method of valuation, Danish single-taxers recommend the system of the American, Mr. Somers, and the Central Board of Assessors has conducted some experiments in that direction, but they have been unsuccessful. The tradition of Danish assessors is so high that a mechanical system is unnecessary. The decentralized Danish system may well be continued, modified a little in accordance with the centralized system of Mr. Somers. Of course, the matter of the valuations does present a difficulty. A high tax on a small part of the value of a piece of property may more often be unjust than a low tax on the whole value. There will more often be a disproportion between the tax and the personal fortune of the owner, and if the capitalized value of a piece of

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land has increased only because the rate of interest has fallen, while the real income has remained the same, there will be no increase in the tax-paying ability of the owner. On behalf of the conservative point of view it must be admitted that it is often hard to require a man to pay an increment tax, who has difficulties of a personal nature or of any other sort in making use of the new value of his property. Such a tax may compel a man to sell the home where he would have preferred to live in quiet for many years. A proposal for a rather high increment tax prepared by the Copenhagen City Council has, therefore, included several paragraphs intended to smooth out these difficulties.

The advocates of the single tax desire a tax on the whole value of the land, not only on the unearned increment, but on the old value as well. In a country like Denmark where real estate taxes are very low, it would be possible without causing too great harm to alter existing taxes so that an assessment of the land value only would yield the same amount as that now paid on both land and buildings. Two years ago the writer served on a Copenhagen committee which prepared the above-mentioned proposal for a tax on increases in land values and which considered taxes on total land values. In order to test the effect of taxes on land values only, the committee had a table prepared showing the taxes then in force and the taxes proposed on about one hundred estates situated in all parts of the city and representing all types of land and buildings. A careful consideration of this table showed that if the old real estate taxes (which averaged six-tenths of one per cent of the value) were to be replaced by a tax on land values only, to yield the same revenue as the old tax, or even a little more, few would suffer any considerable loss.[1] Legislators must have the right to bring about reforms even if some few lose in the transition period, for otherwise they would have no freedom at all. Furthermore, special provisions can be made to facilitate the

[1] Owners of property in the center of the city (with high site values) and in the most distant suburbs (with low building values) would lose; the nearer suburbs (with apartment houses) gain; but in the center of the city the ability of owners to pay higher taxes would be, in general, good.

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change. (It must be admitted that I have considered here only the immediate effects of the change in the basis of assessment. The chief loss to owners is that house-rent decreases when taxes on buildings are abolished and they must bear the new land taxes as a capitalized loss. The decrease in rent would not, however, appear immediately and during the present housing shortage the transition would be made very easy by the fact that no decrease in rents would occur. Indeed, the Rent Boards would be obliged to allow an increase in rents with the increase in taxes.)

It may, therefore, be possible to transfer the present low taxes from buildings to land, and last summer a small step was taken in that direction by the state, when the land tax was raised from 1.1 per mille to 1.5 and the building tax lowered accordingly.[1] But even the good effects of such a change are

[1] The building tax was not lowered by diminishing the rate, but by subtracting 10,000 Kr. from the buildings on each piece of property. This made the change more acceptable to the farmers than it would otherwise have been. Especially to the small farmers, a 10,000 Kr. difference in assessment is important, although it seems relatively small to the owners of the large tenement houses. Fifteen years ago many Danish farmers, even those of the middle class, were very much interested in the single-tax movement. They expected that the major part of the tax would be borne by the central districts of Copenhagen, not realizing how small these areas are and how high building values are in the tenement districts. However, some sample valuations in selected districts showed the farmers that they would have to pay more of the proposed taxes than of those then in force and many lost sympathy. At the time of the general valuation in 1920 the total value of the land was divided as follows: fifty-eight per cent in farms, twenty-four per cent in other lands in the rural districts and thirty-four per cent in towns and cities. The Wisconsin legislature has discussed (in connection with the Grimstead bill) another modification of the land tax in favor of the farmer, that is, the subtraction of fertility. Danish single-taxers have made no attempt to deny that fertility is a gift of nature as well as the land itself, and it is of course impossible to estimate the value of fertility with accuracy.

The Danish law of 1922 requires that assessments represent the actual value of the land; under certain conditions, however, expenditures for improvements, such as drainage, are subtracted. The surplus value of the small farms presents an especial difficulty. If it were to be taxed, the state would get a share of the surplus value and the small farmer would suffer a special loss. The law has decided that all farms shall be assessed according to the value per acre of the average-size farm ("equal land—equal tax") and accordingly the surplus value of the small farm is left untaxed. It exists, nevertheless, and nobody can protect the small farmer against the high value of the small tracts which is caused by their own competition for the land.

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relatively unimportant. Danish single-taxers often refer to the prosperity resulting from corresponding reforms in Canada and Australia. It is obvious, however, that the removal of the high building taxes once in effect in those countries would have many more important consequences than the removal of the low building taxes in force in Denmark. It was the removal of the old taxes that brought about prosperity, not the adoption of new ones. I fully agree with the single-taxers that building taxes are bad, but I am not, therefore, bound to admit that land taxes are good.

The question is: "Can new high taxes on land cause prosperity even if they do not replace older bad taxes?" If they can, the change ought to be made, and everything possible done to assist property owners in the transition period. It is not evident, however, that any great prosperity would result from high land taxes either in the cities or in the country. In the cities a high tax on land values would give good results immediately after its adoption, because speculators having large holdings would abandon them and sell the land, and land prices would decrease in favor of building. This would only be the temporary effect, however, and later on the effect would be like that of the increment tax. All stages of the business of supplying the population with houses and grounds would become unattractive to enterprisers.

Danish single-taxers expect that their reform would bring great prosperity to the country. They claim that after the tax had abolished the value of land as such, it would be easier for those who have little capital to get land, and more difficult for people without ability to hold land. It is the opinion of the writer that they are right in both these points, but that the difference would be so small that it would not counterbalance the injury done to the present owners by depriving them of the value of their land.

It was also the expectation of single-taxers in Denmark that

If the surplus value should be taxed, the state would get the "rackrent", and if not, it still exists, and one purpose of the land tax (that land shall be cheaper), is thus not attained. Only an artificial supply of land, like that created by the land laws of 1919 can assist the small farmers in this situation.

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a great number of large estates would be subdivided in favor of small farmers and their sons, should land taxes be increased. It is probable that some large proprietors who are farmers simply because they have inherited their property would be compelled to leave agriculture, but all those who are really able to manage a large estate would try to continue to do so, even if deprived of their fortunes. Their work is more valuable in estate management than it would be in anything else, and without their aid it would be impossible to get all the land of the country utilized. Therefore only some few estates would be sold, and those not only in small farms but in tracts of all sizes. It is certainly true that it would be easier to get land without large capital after a tax had taken away land value, and only the improvements must be paid for; but it would be easier to get farms of all sizes, large and small. If the man who could formerly buy ten acres, can buy fifteen after the enactment of such a tax, then the man who could buy fifty acres, can buy seventy-five and the man with one hundred acres can take one hundred and fifty and so on. In buying up the estates, the small farmers would have to compete with many others, and the social consequences of the reform would be small. More far-reaching effects in the direction can only be expected from a progressive land-tax like those in force in some Australian counties. If the tax-rate is higher for the estates than for the small farms, of course subdivision will be accelerated. But Danish single-taxers are men of principle; they advocate equal taxes for equal lands, and condemn all artificial means for equalizing land holdings.

There is finally a point in which the writer finds himself in complete agreement with the single-taxers. They claim that the tax on increases in land value should be a local tax, and that on the total value a state tax. This division would be very advantageous for towns and cities since it is there that increases in value are of the greatest importance, but it would also be just, since the burden of high house-rent is borne chiefly by the townspeople, while the burden of land-rent is borne by the whole population through the medium of grain prices. But the fact that the interest of farmers in the single-tax movement has

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decreased greatly since it became evident that the burden of the land taxes would be heaviest in the country, has already been mentioned.

The single-tax movement has been criticized from several points of view in the course of this article, but it must be admitted that something has been learned from it, and that there will probably be moderate reforms in the future in the spirit of the single-taxers.

Postscript. During my visit to California I found that the price of water in some of the irrigated districts was only two or three dollars an acre, while its value was about thirty dollars an acre (corresponding to capitalized value of $600 plus improvements). This provides a clear basis for a land tax on the unearned increment, but it seems to me that it would be better to tax the water, the earlier the better. If the water really has such a high value, the price should correspond with the value, to make the "social bookkeeping of the commonwealth" accurate, and to stimulate the economical use of the water. It is, of course, taken for granted in making this suggestion that there will in the long run be a scarcity of water in proportion to the land suitable for irrigation. If there is sufficient water for all the land, then the scarcity value is on the side of the land, and it is correct that the land should be high in price, and should be the agent taxed. But if the scarcity is on the side of the water, then its price should be high, and it should be taxed, as its increase in value is unearned.

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THE ENGLISH WORKINGMEN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

THE attitude of the British workingmen to the parties struggling in the American Civil War has, of course, been frequently described. Authorities of the day, as well as writers of a later period, have pointed out repeatedly that only a small minority of workingmen favored the cause of the South at a time when the great majority of Englishmen of social influence were ardently hoping for the failure of the Federal attempt to reestablish the union.

The workingmen kept a favorable attitude toward the North in spite of the blockade, which, according to the reports of the time, was accepted as the principal cause of the Lancashire cotton famine. The assumption has been that an outcry on their part might have led to intervention, that intervention would have meant the reestablishment of trade relations with the South, and that cotton importations would have been revived. Even if it had been argued with the workingmen that it was wiser for their cause in the long run that the North be upheld, immediate needs were pressing. Labor, within the memory of the living generation, has not always thought in terms of a distant future. What were the motives, then, that led the workingmen to stand so firmly for the North in the face of the Lancastrian distress concomitant with the Civil War?

Even a brief description of conditions among the workingmen of Lancashire—who were destined to lose more than the English working class in general by the continuation of the Civil War—must tell of sorrows borne with little murmuring. Lancashire had within its boundaries 310,000 of the 440,000 persons employed in cotton factories in Great Britain in 1860. Cheshire and Derbyshire had 38,000 and 12,000 respectively.[1] The three counties thus engrossed upwards of eighty per cent

[1] Arnold, R. Arthur, *The History of the Cotton Famine* (London, 1864), pp. 36, 37.

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of a trade which itself claimed nearly half the factories in the United Kingdom.[1] Of the cotton which they used, eighty per cent came from the United States. The blockade therefore made unemployment a problem so serious that early in 1862 the *Saturday Review* compared conditions with those of 1848 —a year of bad repute in English annals because of distress.[2] Unemployment was bound to come in the early sixties—if the economists of the period are to be believed—owing to over-production. Unemployment as it *did* come, however, could be ascribed to a very definite cause. The crest came just before Christmas, 1862, when 284,418 were in receipt of poor relief,[3] but even late in 1863 the mills at work were barely sufficient to give occupation to three out of the five workers who had been employed in 1860.[4]

Scenes from the *Illustrated London News*, letters to the London *Times*, descriptions in the volumes of Arnold[5] and Watts,[6] furnish details of suffering and loss which Richard Cobden compared to that endured by the inhabitants of those towns and districts in America which had been traversed or occupied by the hostile armies.[7] Especially pitiable were the circumstances of many who did not belong to the lowest scale of society: respectable artisans in many cases were stinted in the necessities of life, but suffered in feeling as well as in bodily privation.[8] They were obliged to sacrifice the savings of years and realized that many of their number would be faced, long after middle life, with the almost impossible task of securing for themselves the means of passing a respectable old age.[9] But they were above starvation: the Registrar General's report

[1] *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, vol. XXVI, p. 32; article by Leone Levi.

[2] *Saturday Review*, May 17, 1862.

[3] *Accounts and Papers*, 1863 (100-1), lii, 157 *et seq.*

[4] *Saturday Review*, October 24, 1863.

[5] *Cf. supra.*

[6] Watts, John, *Facts of the Cotton Famine* (London, 1866).

[7] *Times*, December 17, 1862.

[8] *Frazer's*, September, 1863, p. 317 *et seq.*

[9] *Saturday Review*, June 7, 1862.

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showed that the history of the distress was not written in the death registers.[1]

This greater calamity was averted through the aid given to the distressed regions. Not only did the Government pass legislation in an endeavor to alleviate suffering, but funds raised by voluntary effort were acceptable to many who (at first at any rate) thought it disgraceful to get relief from the rates.

Despite the suffering, however, disturbances were unimportant and scarcely a single voice was raised in favor of breaking the blockade.[2] Yet to break it appeared to the *Saturday Review* "as justifiable an expedient for the cure of the calamities of the Lancashire operatives as, and one far more likely to be successful than, the breaking of machinery in days gone by".[3] A pamphleteer of the day[4] points out that a full-fed community, threatened with actual want and given uninterrupted leisure to listen to all manner of sanguine and exciting suggestions for obviating that want, had not very often in the world's history been found proof against temptations to intimidate. Lancashire operatives might well have been pardoned for believing that "did they only make themselves sufficiently troublesome, Lord Palmerston would not have scrupled to disallow the blockade of the Southern ports, and to recognize the Southern Confederacy". But the distressed operatives of the early 'sixties, in spite of the fact that many of them thought that intervention would bring relief,[5] were not playing the riotous part of their fathers in the old times of Toryism and Corn Laws.[6]

Why, then, were the workingmen unwilling to cry out against the North, or (to make it a double question) why at least did they not demand intervention? The query is more easily put than answered; writers of the day were not wont to discuss the subject in its entirety but merely to acknowledge that the work-

[1] *Times,* February 2, 1863.

[2] *Saturday Review,* May 17, 1862.

[3] *Ibid.,* June 7, 1862.

[4] W. T. M. Torrens in *Lancashire's Lesson* (London, 1864), pp. 20, 21.

[5] Arnold, *op. cit.,* p. 113, and Morley, John, *Life of Richard Cobden,* 2 vols. (London, 1881), vol. II, p. 392.

[6] *Times,* February 13, 1863, editorial.

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ingmen suffered in silence, "whatever may have been the motives that restrained them from giving way to clamor, or entering into political combinations".[1]

One of the reasons which can be advanced as an explanation of the workingman's attitude is his hostility to slavery. Slavery was, doubtless, an institution which he abhorred. Mr. Gilpin, M. P. for Northampton, declared in January, 1862, that:

> he knew that if there was one principle which had thoroughly permeated every class in this country, it was an unmitigated hatred of the trade in human flesh. He knew that there was not a man of sufficient eloquence or ability to carry in any fairly gathered meeting of the workingmen of this country, in any part of the kingdom, a resolution in favor of slavery.[2]

In the *Life of Charles Francis Adams* the common folk of England, Lincoln's "plain people", workless and hungry, are depicted as those who recognized that the cause at issue was "the right of the workingman to his own share in the results of his toil. That cause, they instinctively knew, was somehow their cause, and they would not betray it. So no organized cry went up to break the blockade which, while it shut up cotton, was throttling slavery."[3] Louis Blanc gave a similar version of the feelings of the working class in 1862:

> To little purpose have these unfortunate artisans been repeatedly assured that their own distress, and that of their brothers, had its source in the cruel obstinacy of the North; that the evil proceeded from the want of cotton, and there was no cotton because the North pretended, *per fas et nefas,* to subdue the South. A sure instinct has prompted them to reply to all: "We cannot be for slave-labour, we men of free labour".[4]

[1] Torrens, p. 21.

[2] *Times,* January 15, 1862.

[3] Adams, Charles Francis, *Charles Francis Adams* (Boston, 1900), p. 273.

[4] Blanc, Louis, *Lettres sur l'Angleterre,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1866), vol. II, lettre cxii. Use has been made of James Hutton's translation (London, 1866) of the first series of the letters (letters i-cxxiv); quotation from the second series of letters has been made, in all cases, from the original.

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Many of those well-known political leaders whose opinions had weight with the working class proclaimed from the first that slavery was the cause of the struggle. John Bright, following in the footsteps of Quaker predecessors, saw the interest of humanity at large involved. His was a resolve publicly stated that "if all other tongues are silent, mine shall speak for that policy which gives hope to the bondsmen of the South, and which tends to generous thoughts, and generous words, and generous deeds, between the two great nations which speak the English language and from their origin are alike entitled to the English name (loud cheers)".[1] Richard Cobden expressed the hope that the slave would get his freedom in spite of the *Times* and the devil.[2] John Stuart Mill upheld the North on account of the slavery question.[3] And W. E. Forster, whose friendship for the North was esteemed highly by Mr. Adams,[4] told an audience in the theatre of the Bradford Mechanics' Institute that it was puerile to state that slavery was not the cause of the conflict. He pointed out that *De Bow's Review* —chief organ of the South—had said that "the social condition of England would be infinitely better if the laboring classes were domestic slaves"; he quoted Southern statesmen to show that they stood for slavery and he wished success (amid applause) to the North, "because he loved freedom and hated slavery".[5]

The *Spectator* early in the struggle agreed with these opinions: "Politicians may chatter about State prerogatives and the declaration of independence, protective tariffs and the value of cotton, but the cause of the war is slavery. The South supports the institution, the North denounces it, and as the contest widens to the full breadth of that great issue, we cannot doubt on which side victory will remain".[6]

[1] Robertson, William, *Life and Times of the Right Hon. John Bright* (London, 1883), p. 397.

[2] Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, vol. II, p. 410.

[3] *Economist*, February 8, 1862.

[4] Mr. Adams was minister to England from 1861 to 1868.

[5] *Times*, October 3, 1861.

[6] *Spectator*, May 4, 1861.

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Yet, in spite of the enthusiasm of Bright and Forster and in spite of the statements of the *Spectator*, the issue in 1861 and 1862 probably was not clear to Englishmen so far as slavery was involved. The *Economist*, although against slavery, did not think it was, in 1861, as yet a question of slavery: "let the conflict once become avowedly and honestly and irretrievably a war for the extinction of slavery, and we suspect the enthusiasm and excitement of Great Britain would rival that of the Americans themselves".[1] In September, 1861, Louis Blanc wrote that the English did not believe that it was against slavery that the Northern States had taken up arms.[2] Cobden feared that intervention would be possible because of the seeming indifference of the great mass of the population.[3] Mr. G. M. Trevelyan in his *Life of John Bright* calls attention to the fact that such explanations had been given by Northern officials as to the cause of the war that Englishmen had an excuse for their failure to understand or believe that it was a question of slavery.[4] An editorial of the *Times* (the newspaper of most influence in England) asserted that it was expressing the general opinion of the nation in its statement: "We think that the conflict is really for empire on the side of the North, and for independence on that of the South, and in this respect we recognize an exact analogy between the North and the Government of George III, and the South and the Thirteen Revolted Provinces".[5] *Blackwood's* told its readers that slavery was an issue for an occasion, that so far the North had protected it.[6]

But there was a great change of sentiment in favor of the North after the Emancipation Proclamation had pronounced the doom of slavery; a ground-swell of public opinion arose

[1] *Economist*, September 14, 1861.

[2] Blanc, *Lettres sur l'Angleterre*, vol. I, lettre xxx.

[3] Hobson, J. A., *Richard Cobden the International Man* (London, 1919), p. 368.

[4] Trevelyan, G. M., *Life of John Bright* (London, 1913), pp. 304, 305. *Cf.*, also, *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865* (Boston, 1920), vol. I, p. 14.

[5] *Times*, November 7, 1861.

[6] *Blackwood's*, July, 1861.

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which showed itself in public meetings and organizations. More and more it came to be understood that workingmen did not feel "quite satisfied about slavery not being at the bottom of the whole business of Southern Revolt".[1] Mr. Baines, well-known for his advocacy of Parliamentary Reform, congratulated the workingmen of Leeds that their brethren in Lancashire had never, for an instant, asked for any recognition of the Southern States.[2] A deputation from the executive committee of the Emancipation Society to the United States ministry was glad to report that no meetings had been called by the working classes in support of slavery, while those meetings that had been held against it had been of the most triumphant character. Mr. Jacob Bright, brother of John Bright, spoke, as a member of the deputation, for distressed Lancashire where "a strong, warm, and earnest feeling in favor of emancipation" had been displayed.[3] Trade unionists by 1863 had come out for human freedom as against slavery.[4] Letters to William Lloyd Garrison tell of the operatives' growing enthusiasm in that year against slavery.[5] Mr. Forster speaking at Leeds in September, 1863, could declare:

> For every nobleman, for every man who has a title before his name, who has taken the side of the South there have been 10, 20, and even 100 hard-working men who have taken the side of the North and freedom . . . and I do say it will be ungenerous of

[1] *Illustrated London News,* February 7, 1863.

[2] In an anti-slavery meeting at Leeds (February 3); *cf.* London *Times,* February 5, 1863.

[3] London *Times,* January 17, 1863. The same journal of January 19 makes fun of this deputation represented in "a few struggling obscurities, usurping a great name". Its argument follows: "If this nation had really believed that Mr. Lincoln was labouring for 'freedom, justice and mercy', and not for conquest, oppression, and massacre, all the chivalry of the old slave-trade agitation would have led this movement."

[4] *Vide* the London *Times,* March 27, 1863, for address to Lincoln, and *ibid.,* May 4, 1863.

[5] *Vide Life and Times of William Lloyd Garrison,* 4 vols. (N. Y., 1885), vol. IV, p. 72, letter from Mr. Chesson, dated January 9, 1863; and also a letter from George Thompson, dated February 5, 1863. Public meetings addressed by Henry Ward Beecher helped to stir up enthusiasm in 1863.

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America to remember anything against England when we can point to that large meeting of half-starving workingmen of Manchester in the Free Trade Hall, when they took the lead in saying, "no matter what the suffering we may endure, no matter what the sacrifices we may have to undergo, we will not allow our Government to depart from the strict principle of neutrality on behalf of the slave-holding Confederacy.[1]

But that change of sentiment probably was not effective until after the worst of the crises in unemployment had been met. Doubtless the working class early sympathized with the Northern cause on account of the slavery question, but whether they would have stanchly adhered to the North when the issue was none too well understood seems somewhat doubtful, had there not been contributory factors which made firm their intent. Dr. Watts in *Facts of the Cotton Famine* is so sure that slavery was not *the* decisive factor in determining opinion that he boldly affirmed that had the annihilation of slavery depended upon the people of England paying knowingly one farthing per yard extra for free-labor calico, slavery would have gone on forever.[2] In the *Times'* opinion "any feeling as to the question of slavery had as little to do with the endurance of the cotton-spinners in their distress as it had with their conditions when they were prosperous. Then, like their employers, they cared little whence or how the material of their industry reached them, and would gladly flock to the mills tomorrow, if supplied on precisely the same conditions as before the war broke out."[3]

In fact the workingmen's attitude is usually not mentioned as a negative reaction only, i. e. one against slavery, but as a positive feeling also, i. e. one for free labor etc. Arnold speaks of them, for instance, as "firm in their hatred of slavery, and firm in their faith in democracy".[4] Louis Blanc says they are *against* slavery and *for* the dignity of labor.[5] The *Economist*

[1] *Times*, September 23, 1863.

[2] Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[3] *Times*, September 24, 1863, editorial.

[4] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[5] Blanc, Louis, *Lettres sur l'Angleterre*, IIe série, lettre cxli.

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believes that a considerable portion of the Democracy of Britain wished for the triumph of the North "because they dread the discredit of Republic institutions, because they fancy that Federal success would be the shortest way to peace, and because they believe that negro emancipation would be its sure though not its originally designed result".[1] One[2] of their class, in speaking for the North, is quoted as saying, "as the cause of labor and liberty is one all over the world, we bid them God speed in their glorious work of emancipation".[3]

The workingmen, then, had an immediate interest in the North in that it stood for free labor in their minds. The workingmen themselves, their political allies in the person of the Radicals, and their opponents understood this situation. Mr. Adams, in receiving a trades' deputation on May 2, 1863, acknowledged their presence and speeches as meaning that they upheld and advocated the rights of labor. He agreed with them in perceiving that an attempt was being made by one party in the American struggle to establish a government on the destruction of the rights of labor. A question was before the world which was one not of a local right but one of a general principle and one upon which the workingman might justly express opinions.[4] The trade unions, of course, were interested in this interpretation of the struggle.[5]

John Bright did much to make the workingmen throughout the country see in the Southern Confederacy the men who would degrade labor to a chattel of the capitalist.[6] It was in the North and in the West that laborers had met with plenty.[7] In those regions was to be found the home of the workingman:

> "For her free latch-string never was drawn in
> Against the poorest child of Adam's kin."

[1] *Economist,* October 31, 1863.

[2] Mr. Tremor, a joiner, at a trade-union meeting.

[3] *Times,* March 27, 1863.

[4] *Ibid.,* May 4, 1863.

[5] *Ibid.,* March 28, 1863.

[6] Trevelyan, *Life of Bright,* p. 306, and *London Times,* June 17, 1863.

[7] *Times,* December 6, 1861.

[8] Robertson, *Life and Times of John Bright,* p. 399.

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Never ought the workingmen to look with jealousy upon a country which, "among the nations of the globe, is that one where labor has met with the highest honor, and where it has reaped its greatest reward".[1] An argument by Henry Ward Beecher, America's propagandist against slavery, in his addresses before workingmen, was that the Southern cause was the natural enemy of free labor and the laborer all the world over.[2]

Opponents of the North understood the appeal which was being made to the working class through the question of free labor, and agreed that there was a real basis for the appeal. The *Times*, for instance, declared that:

> nobody can doubt that the institutions of the late United States operated directly to the advantage of the laboring classes in Europe. Any workingman in this country who found the struggle of life too hard for him could carry his labor to a better market on the other side of the Atlantic. In that new home he might rely on finding good wages, constant employment, and cheap living. He could become a voter and a land owner together. His only possession—labor—was the most valuable of all possessions, and held in as much honor as property. The existence, too, of such a country within easy reach reacted on the state of things at home. America was not merely a workingman's Paradise in itself, but it made England a better place for workingmen than it would have been otherwise. Emigration to the States relieved the labor market, and laborers at home found their position sensibly affected by the position of their brethren in America.[3]

To the workingmen, however, freedom meant more than economic betterment; it meant also political privilege. They were interested in the North because it represented democracy.[4] They saw that democracy was on trial,[5] and in taking sides with the North they were taking sides with themselves in their

[1] *Times*, March 27, 1863.

[2] *Ibid.*, October 21, 1863.

[3] *Ibid.*, March 28, 1863, editorial. *Cf.* also *ibid.*, January 4, 1861.

[4] Blanc, *Lettres sur l'Angleterre*, lettre cxli.

[5] *Ibid.*, lettre xlviii.

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struggle for the reformation of political institutions.[1] Had the question been one of cotton alone, says Arnold, they would have been in favor of getting it; had it been a question of slavery and cotton together, they would have acquiesced. But they believed that in this war the cause of democracy, of individual improvement, of freedom of every kind and of all that is understood by "progress", was contending against slavery, against the institutions of aristocracy and despotism.[2] Mr. Cremer, a joiner, in speaking as a member of a trades' deputation to Mr. Adams, said that English workingmen

> felt an especial interest in America, as it was the only country where workingmen had the free use of the franchise. Their own societies were based upon broad democratic principles, every member having a voice in making the laws by which he was governed; they were, in fact, so many small Republics and feeling sympathizers with the large Republic across the Atlantic, which he hoped would never be broken up.[3]

Many others, as interested as Mr. Cremer in the elevation and political enfranchisement of the common people, were with the North. Cobden and Forster were firm friends of the government across the Atlantic which represented democracy.[4] Even in 1861 Bright's advocacy of the North was interpreted as being a result of his belief in democracy.[5] Of him, the *Saturday Review* cynically said: "no doubt a simulated sympathy with the negro is as good a weapon as any other for Mr. Bright to snatch up in his eagerness to do battle for his pet democracy".[6] And Gladstone, even while forecasting a victory for the South, perceived so keen an aspiration by the working class to political privileges that in complimenting them on their behavior in dis-

[1] Villiers, B., and Chesson, W. H., *Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1865* (London, 1919), p. 128, quoting from Beecher, "A Welcome to Goldwin Smith by Citizens of New York".

[2] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

[3] *London Times*, May 4, 1863.

[4] *Cf. ibid.*, September 23, 1863, and *Saturday Review*, November 28, 1863.

[5] *Times*, December 7, 1861.

[6] *Saturday Review*, February 7, 1863.

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tress he expressed the hope, "that whenever the time arrives when the subject of the elective franchise shall again come under the consideration of the Executive Government and of Parliament the conduct of the men of Lancashire in the year 1862 may be favorably remembered . . . both by the middle classes and by all who may have a share of political power".[1]

The workingmen, then, were favorable to the North because of their hatred of slavery, and because of their advocacy of freedom, economic and political. Any careful perusal of the writings and speeches of the day, however, will show that there were other reasons for their interest in the welfare of the North. How intense their feelings were is rather difficult to gauge, since, as Cobden complained, they had no extremely important organization or organ of the press by which they could make their existence known.[2] The leadership which they were accepting in the 'sixties, however, shows where their sympathies lay and the acceptance of that leadership in itself explains in part why they acted in such way as to benefit the North. The London Trades' Council, for instance, resolved in 1862 to collect funds to assist the distressed brethren of Lancashire. Assistance was pledged by Mr. Potter who was editor of the *Beehive*, the organ of trade unionism, and by Mr. Applegarth who was an important member of the Junta, the council of five members which guided the policy of trade unionism of the day.[3] Violence was not a part of the trade-union program of the period[4] and there is no suggestion that it be used in demanding intervention even for the sake of obtaining the material which would put to work the unemployed and distressed. In fact the trade unions sympathized with their Northern brethren in the American continent, as has been pointed out, as well as with their Northern brethren in England. Early in 1863 the trade unions and Mr. Bright were working together on an

[1] *Times*, October 9, 1862.

[2] Morley, *Life of Cobden*, vol. II, p. 417.

[3] *Times*, November 26, 1862.

[4] Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, *The History of Trade Unionism* (London, 1911), chapter v.

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American platform, thanks in part to Professor Beesly.[1] And Mr. Bright in introducing the deputation of trade unions to Mr. Adams on May 2, 1863, made great point of the fact that this was the first occasion on which they had stepped out of the sphere of their ordinary discussions to express an opinion publicly on a political question.[2]

Of the leaders of the workingmen outside of the working class John Bright was the most effective. Bright enjoyed much popularity throughout the 'sixties and his influence, especially upon the workingmen, was a matter of comment.[3] From 1861 he had proclaimed that the American struggle was of the very highest interest to England and to humanity at large.[4] The unenfranchised masses followed his arguments with sympathy[5] and his propaganda aroused public opinion which reacted on the House and on the Government.[6] So effective was his advocacy felt to be that members of the New York Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution:

> That this Chamber desires to place on its records an expression of grateful sense entertained by its members of the intelligent, eloquent, just, and fearless manner in which Mr. John Bright has defended, before the people of England in the British Parliament, the principles of constitutional liberty and international justice for the maintenance of which the American people are contending, and that the proceedings be communicated to Mr. Bright.

And a wealthy merchant from New York, in an address before scholars of Gravel Lane Ragged School, Salford, said: "If you were to ask in the schools of America, 'Who are the three

[1] Adams, Henry, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York, 1918), p. 189. Mr. Beesly was professor in University College, London.

[2] *Times*, May 5, 1863, editorial.

[3] *Cf. Spectator*, November 7, 1862.

[4] Robertson, *John Bright*, p. 396.

[5] I do not agree with Villiers and Chesson, *Anglo-American Relations*, p. 102, who hold Bright and Cobden's advocacy to have been uninfluential upon opinion outside the House.

[6] *Cf.* Trevelyan, *Life of John Bright*, pp. 296 and 306; Hammond, M. B., *The Cotton Industry* (New York, 1897), p. 267, etc.

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men, whom as a country, we love the most?' they would reply: first, Washington, because he was the father of his country; second, Abraham Lincoln, because he was the savior of his country; third—and this with cheers—John Bright, because he is the friend of the workingmen."[1]

Cobden and Forster likewise were skillful in stirring up sentiment for the North. Mr. Forster, for instance, acknowledged that the South was fighting for freedom—the freedom to enslave and oppress.[2] Christian Socialists like Tom Hughes and J. M. Ludlow helped to lead the working class to favor the North.[3] And the *Liverpool Daily Post*, espousing the side of the North, found its sales little affected, showing, a commenter says, "that the mass of the people took a different view from that of the wealthier classes".[4]

On the other hand, the Southern cause lacked preeminent able leadership. Mr. Roebuck appealed with some effect to mass meetings, pleading that "if we had war with America, we should at once put an end to the cotton famine",[5] but he lacked the ability of the leaders of the Northern operatives.[6] No propagandist, capable of producing the response and applause of a Beecher appeared in England as representative of the South.

And not only was good leadership lacking to the South but a noisy agitation against existing conditions, which might have been utilized by it, was never stirred up. There was little turbulence;[7] there was no clear voice of an Orator Hunt. The happiest accident of the cotton famine, says Arnold, "has been the scarcity of demagogues, and the best title of the suffering

[1] Robertson, *John Bright*, pp. 403, 404.

[2] *Times*, January 31, 1863.

[3] *Macmillan's*, vol. IV, and *Times*, January 30, 1863.

[4] Muspratt, E. K., *My Life and Work* (London, 1917), p. 38.

[5] *Cf. Times*, May 27, 1863.

[6] Adams, Henry, *The Education of Henry Adams*, pp. 186-188. Mr. Spence of the Manchester Southern Independence Association thought that the workingmen really favored the South. Agitation, however, was not deemed expedient by the friends of the South. *Cf. Times*, October 7, 1863.

[7] *Saturday Review*, January 17, 1863.

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operatives to the political estimation of their countrymen is, that there has been no demand for these pests of society".[1]

Another reason for the interest of the operatives in the welfare of the North, for their eagerness for the latest news from America, for their speeches against war with America,[2] is worthy of considerable emphasis, since Bright and Forster both perceived the force of its appeal very early in the struggle. As Mr. Forster put it in 1861—there is hardly a street in our towns in which there are not families from which members have gone forth to reside in the United States. War between England and America would be like civil war.[3] Mr. Bright used statistics: during the fifteen years from 1845 or 1846 to 1859 or 1860 more than 2,320,000 left the shores of the United Kingdom as emigrants for the States of North America.

> At this very moment, then, there are millions in the United States who personally, or whose immediate parents, have at one time been citizens of this country, and perhaps known to some of the oldest of those whom I am now addressing. . . . There may be men who dislike democracy, and who hate a Republic; there may be even those whose sympathies warm toward the slave oligarchy of the south. But of this I am certain, that only misrepresentation the most gross, or calumny the most wicked, can sever the tie which unites the great mass of the people of this country with their friends and brethren beyond the Atlantic.[4]

A year later Bright was using the same argument:

> But, Sir, the Free States are the home of the workingman. Now, I speak to workingmen particularly at this moment. Do you know that in fifteen years two million five hundred thousand persons, men, women, and children, have left the United Kingdom to find a home in the Free States of America? . . . Speaking generally, every man of these two and a half million is in a position of much higher com-

[1] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

[2] *Cf.* speech of Mr. Conolly (mason) in the *Times*, May 4, 1863.

[3] *Ibid.*, December 4, 1861.

[4] *Ibid.*, December 6, 1861.

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fort and prosperity than he would have been if he had remained in this country.[1]

And while family ties bound many humble homes in England to the men who were fighting under Grant and to the women who were praying for their victorious return, intermarriage of English aristocracy with Americans was less common than it has since become.[2]

Such are the reasons which can be given in explanation of the favorable attitude of the English workingmen toward the North. The North was much benefited by the workingmen's support, but also (to discuss the other part of the question) benefited by the fact that they did not lend their voices to a cry for breaking the blockade. Doubtless they did not demand intervention partly because they favored the North, but incidentally some of the reasons which can be given for their refusal to ask for intervention are not reasons which show necessarily their espousal of the Federal cause. By a slight discussion of these reasons, however, the entangled circumstances which helped the Northern cause may become more nearly apparent.

Sympathy with suffering and well-organized relief were important factors in keeping the masses from boisterous demands for a governmental activity which might have led to intervention. "Had it not been for extraneous aid and the large expression of soothing sympathy, the Lancashire magistrates would have had to deal with a starving and mutinous population".[3] Cobden thought that the expression of sympathy had done more to keep the people of Lancashire

content and quiet and pacified during that ordeal than anything else. . . . If the people on the spot were not doing their duty, and the working classes knew that those around them had not been suffering

[1] From a speech of December 18, 1862, given in Robertson, *Life and Times of John Bright*, p. 399. Before a meeting of the trade unions on March 26, 1863, Bright expressed the same idea, *cf. Times*, March 27, 1863.

[2] Trevelyan, *Life of John Bright*, p. 306.

[3] *Illustrated London News*, November 22, 1862.

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as much as themselves, you would not have had this quescence. . . . If these men felt that they were neglected—if they felt a just discontent because they were neglected, they would call their own public meetings, and you would have 100,000 men assembling on Kersall Moor, near Manchester, to proclaim to the world their grievances.[1]

Periodicals were unstinted in their praises:

This misery is endured without murmuring, for the sake of a great principle. A blockade is respected which could be broken through like a cobweb, and a great moral example is set to all powerful nations. If the dreaded winter now close upon us should show half the endurance on the part of the poor which is hoped for, and half the liberality on the part of the rich which is sought for, the force of this great moral example will be increased a hundred-fold. The cloud, as usual, will have a silver lining, and starving Lancashire will be as impressive in its misery as it has ever been in the days of its greatest prosperity.[2]

And Mr. Gladstone congratulated them on their conduct: "He must compliment the workmen of the North thrown out of employ. He doubted if any class of the community would have borne any similar calamity with equal fortitude and self-denial."[3] The sufferers for their part felt gratitude for the kindly attitude taken toward them as can be seen from the words of the petition of the unemployed of Staleybridge addressed to Sir George Grey, Minister of the Interior.[4]

But helpful as sympathy was, material assistance did much to make distress sufferable. The poor law guardians played an important part in keeping England from bloodshed, in the opinion of one authority,[5] but the poor law of itself could not cope with the startling increase of pauperism which first became noticeable in the autumn of 1861. Relief committees distribu-

[1] *Times,* December 17, 1862.

[2] *Good Words,* 1862, p. 593.

[3] Speech at Newcastle, given in the *Times,* October 8, 1862. *Cf.* also Arnold, *op. cit.,* p. 244.

[4] The petition with comment is given by Louis Blanc, *Lettres sur l'Angleterre,* lettre cxliv. *Cf.* also the editorial of the *Times,* September 24, 1863.

[5] Arnold, *op. cit.,* p. 145.

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ted sums voluntarily given which literally came from the four corners of the earth. Many who could not bear to bring themselves to request aid from the guardians, accepted the assistance of local relief committees as honorary pensioners of the nation, justly praised because they had not forced the Government by riots to a violation of the righteous policy of non-intervention. Some of the manufacturers,[1] enriched by a rise of prices, used their gains to keep their mills going longer than their capital would have otherwise rendered feasible. Others paid three days' wages for two days' work.[2] Soup kitchens were established in many places, where cheap food might be procured not only by those with relief tickets but by those having a few pennies. Schools, too, were opened, with an "education test"—of attendance—taking the place of the usual "labor test", demanded by the guardians for granting relief. In these schools were to be seen youths side by side with their fathers and grandfathers, all learning to read and write in the same class. Lectures and concerts were arranged in Manchester and vicinity. And there is little doubt of the correctness of the opinion of a committee "that these schools for men and youths have been eminently useful in maintaining order, in promoting cheerfulness, and preventing the contraction of evil habits during a period of unwonted leisure, as well as in communicating rudimentary knowledge".[3] The women and girls were given instruction in sewing schools. They learned, we are told, how to darn a stocking, how to cook a potato properly, and also how to read and write and how to conduct themselves mannerly from having "been instructed for months by wealthy and refined ladies".[4] The number in attendance on the sewing classes in March, 1863, exceeded forty thousand.

To many, of course, the relief granted as a result of the tests appeared to be hardly a reward based on exertion and accom-

[1] Whether or not the manufacturers gave a proper share to relieve distress has remained a disputed question.

[2] *Economist,* March 15, 1862.

[3] Arnold, *op. cit.,* p. 385.

[4] Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 205.

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plishment but rather a disciplinary work, granted even to those listlessly waiting, like tired children at school, for the hour of dismissal. Therefore public work for the purpose of providing employment at ordinary wages for the able-bodied men who were in receipt of relief came to be discussed early in 1863 and a bill passed in the middle of the year authorized the execution of public works in the cotton districts on an appropriation of public money secured at a low rate of interest with repayments spread over a number of years.[1] The act did not, however, benefit the factory worker to the extent anticipated.[2] Another act—the rate in aid act—first passed in 1862, enabled guardians of a union to assess neighboring parishes for the sake of a single parish where the poor rate was excessive, and to borrow, in case of need, for the union. And the poor-law board might call upon the unions of a county to assist a needy union.

Moreover, in the midst of the Civil war the Americans of the North helped to alleviate the distress to the extent of £1,330 in money and £27,000 in provisions.[3] Relief ships[4] from New York came laden with gifts which some Englishmen looked upon as a bribe to induce England to take sides with the Federals in the struggle; but the International Relief Fund Committee had requested "that corn be forwarded with the generosity that becomes a people who have undergone the greatest trial that can befall a nation, and who know the value of sympathy promptly tendered in the moment of misfortune".[5] The spirit in which the aid was received is seen from a memorial adopted by the distressed operatives of Blackburn and sent to the New York Relief Committee and the inhabitants of the United States generally: It not only hoped that the war would terminate favorably for the cause of freedom but also expressed the opinion that "the subscriptions raised in New York for the relief of Lancashire distress have done much to undeceive many

[1] Watts, *op. cit.*, pp. 312, 313.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[4] Adams, *Charles Francis Adams*, p. 277, and Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 390, 391.

[5] *Times*, December 23, 1862.

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who had been misled by the enemies of popular government as to the exact state of public feeling in the United States towards their brethren in England".[1]

Doubtless the assistance and sympathy offered to the distressed regions was very effective toward quieting a needy people and restraining them from demanding intervention. Sources agree that the suffering was terrible and that the distress continued too long for the moral health of the people.[2] But the work of the relief committees and of the guardians was so well done that the *Times* in 1864 declared that not one person was known to have died by hunger in all Lancashire during the whole period of the cotton famine.[3] Dr. Watts stated that food, clothing, bedding and fire were supplied in sufficient proportions to maintain life and health, and that the three years of severe suffering passed over the cotton districts without any sensible increase of disease, and without increasing the frequency of the death toll.[4] The *Saturday Review* declared that Lancashire starvation was starvation in the sense in which we talk of a curate's starving on £100 a year.[5] And *Frazer's* asserted that the impression which sympathizers from a distance entertained of conditions

> was an altogether exaggerated one; their ideas seemed to be that Lancashire was in a state of starvation—that if they ventured into our manufacturing towns they would be confronted with the appalling scenes of families dying in the streets. If the truth must be told, the lowest class of our population were never better fed or better clothed in their lives: even on Christmas day, by the liberality of the Mansion House Committee, each poor family had the means provided for a good old-English dinner.[6]

Indeed the old rhyme has the workmen sing:

[1] *Times,* January 31, 1863.

[2] *Spectator,* March 21, 1863.

[3] *Times,* October 12, 1864.

[4] Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 232.

[5] *Saturday Review,* November 22, 1862.

[6] *Frazer's,* September, 1863, p. 316.

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> Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees are the cause.
> But we will let them fight it out and stand by English laws;
> No recognizing shall take place, until the war is o'er;
> Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for more.[1]

Certain it is that the "lowest classes" in towns like Manchester were more apt to be riotous than the skilled hands,[2] and the committees in their early anxiety not to let any person die from neglect, had gathered in their nets, among the proper and deserving objects of charity, many of these who were hardly proper or deserving.[3] Perhaps it was this situation which led the *Times* cynically to remark that the manufacturing population had not "borne the distress the war has inflicted on them more by reflections on the blessings the negro is to derive from it than the subscriptions and the relief given by the District Committees".[4] At any rate there was no outbreak except that at Staleybridge and those anxious for intervention could never point to any popular uprisings as signs made by English workingmen in favor of the recognition of the South.

According to the evidence of many writers of the period the development of moral qualities explained the absence of rioting and of a demand for intervention on the part of the workingmen. Professor Stanley of Oxford University, for instance, in talking of the suffering of the Lancashire workingmen declared that "there were no traces of discontent, no complaints against the Government, nor the mill owners, nor against America, nor the particular agency by which relief was administered".[5] He asserted that there was no debauchery, nor crimes against property as in the days of Chartism, and explained the situation by the expression—"the high moral qualities" of the working class.[6] Much of what was said or written on the subject was, it may be assumed, mere preaching for an anticipated effect upon the class praised; and certain it is that a loss of "high

[1] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

[2] Torrens, *Lancashire's Lesson*, p. 36.

[3] Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[4] *Times*, September 24, 1863, editorial.

[5] This speech was made in November, 1862.

[6] *Times*, November 15, 1862.

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moral qualities" would hardly explain every riot and cry of this class for government intervention in either domestic or international affairs since the 'sixties. But those who read the writings of the day can pile up almost at will extracts to show the expressions of opinion that political insight and the use of reason caused the workingmen to recognize that the Government was not responsible for their ills and ought not to be forced to intervene. Mr. Torrens writes in *Lancashire's Lesson*: "As nobody here had had aught to do with the causes of the great Civil War, so nobody could fairly be held accountable for the consequences these might entail, or for the want of preparation to meet them".[1] The *Economist* was of the opinion that the privations had been borne with singular calmness because neither law, nor government, nor employers could be held responsible for a bad situation.[2] Mr. Milner Gibson, great friend of the North, said that the working class had acted like men who knew the cause of trouble to be beyond the control of their government and country. He suggested that their behavior might well be remembered in days of agitation for Parliamentary Reform.[3] The *Illustrated London News* believed that "nothing could be more noble than the way in which our brethren of Lancashire sacrificed their own interests in their desire to support the peaceful foreign policy of the Government".[4] And the *Saturday Review*, at an early date, realized that the sufferers bearing their sorrows with a touching and generous patience, were "sustained in their tribulation by the proud consciousness that they are assisting to uphold a great national principle and are helping the Government of the Queen in pursuing the difficult path of right at a very critical moment". A great advance in the political education of a country had occurred, "when thousands of poor people, who are enduring the pangs of hunger, or the sickening apprehension of a worse tomorrow . . . are sustained in their misery by

[1] Torrens, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[2] *Economist*, April 12, 1862. *Vide*, also, *Frazer's*, September, 1862, *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol. CLXX, 803, and Trevelyan, *Life of John Bright*, p. 309.

[3] *Times*, January 22, 1863 (speech at Ashton).

[4] *Illustrated London News*, January 16, 1864.

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the thought that, as it is the duty of England to be neutral, they are helping their country by bearing patiently the bitter consequences of neutrality".[1]

The control shown, we are told, was the result of the influence of certain agencies such as day schools, penny newspapers, cheap literature,[2] and other facilities for obtaining political knowledge.[3] For although the schools hardly touched the lower strata of the manufacturing poor, there were starving factory laborers who had made themselves masters of the issues involved in the relations with America.[4] Moreover training in forbearance had come from the self-impósed discipline of strikes[5] and from the mill discipline.[6] Sobriety, itself produced by the famine, led further to self-control.[7] Absence of turbulence was due, according to one article in the *Saturday Review*, "to the collective power of civilization which modern enlightenment, but, still more, the moral and religious feeling of this age, has brought to bear upon society".[8] Gladstone himself thought the patience of the sufferers due in part to religion and declared that those ministering largely of their substance to the suffering population of Lancashire, aiding them in temporal things, might, "by taking a lesson from the conduct of these poor operatives, themselves become better men, and so receive from Lancashire, in return for their alms, some benefit in spiritual things".[9]

Moreover, another kind of appeal was freqently made to the workingmen, and was effective perhaps in restraining a zeal for intervention: it was the economic argument and could be used in favor of a policy of neutrality, whether or not it promoted a pro-Northern policy. Intervention would mean war and war

[1] *Saturday Review*, February 8, 1862.

[2] Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[3] *Saturday Review*, June 7, 1862.

[4] *Ibid.*, February 8, 1862.

[5] *Ibid.*, June 7, 1862.

[6] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[7] *Times*, July 3, 1862.

[8] *Saturday Review*, January 17, 1863.

[9] *Times*, November 18, 1862.

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would mean cotton. The argument was subtly put, for it was known full well that the British cotton-spinner's mind was in perpetual anxiety about the supply of the raw material, and keenly sensitive to May frosts, October storms, and rumors of a servile insurrection or an American difficulty;[1] and it was equally well known that the slave states of America practically monopolized the supply of cotton.[2] It "was thought by many of the operatives",[3] it was "a universal impression"[4] that participation in the struggle by England would open the Southern ports and bring relief, but the cotton will cost in that eventuality, said Cobden, much more than keeping Lancashire several years;[5] the cotton will cost, echoed Bright, not one shilling per pound, if cotton be now one shilling per pound, but not less than five.[6] And many of the merchants, most of the Radical politicians, and "considerable portion of the Democracy of Britain" came to think that Federal success and not victory for a South bolstered up by England would be the shortest way to peace[7] and the restoration of prosperity. *Frazer's* stated that in the meetings held by the distressed workingmen to discuss the question of intervention between the American belligerents "the predominance of opinion among them" appeared to be "that premature interference would have rather an injurious than a beneficial effect upon the general interests of trade."[8]

Certain it is that terrible suffering for *all* England was frequently forecast in the event of a war with the North. "A dearth of corn would be added to the dearth of cotton in England", said Louis Blanc.[9] What would we have done, if the United States had warred against us, asked Milner Gibson, in

[1] *North British Review*, 1861, p. 569.

[2] *Spectator*, January 19, 1861.

[3] Hammond, *The Cotton Industry*, p. 267; *cf.* also Roebuck's speech given in the *Times*, May 27, 1863.

[4] Hobson, *Richard Cobden, the International Man*, p. 349.

[5] Speech at Rochdale, given in the *Times*, October 30, 1862.

[6] Speech at Birmingham in February.

[7] *Economist*, October 31, 1863.

[8] *Frazer's*, September, 1862.

[9] *Lettres sur l'Angleterre*, lettre lxxviii (July 21, 1862).

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pointing out to an audience that there came from the United States one-third of the wheat imported in 1862 and large supplies of butter, bacon, ham, and eggs.[1] The *Manchester Guardian* declared in 1863 that "whatever injury America has inflicted upon this country by the blockade, we must count the enormous supplies of grain which she has poured into our ports last year as some compensation", and gave as data:[2]

	Wheat—quarters	*Wheat meal and flour—cwt.*
1860	1,499,385	2,154,231
1861	2,507,744	3,794,865
1862	3,724,770	4,499,534

The *New York Times* was quoted for its statement of belief that England would not want war with the North because she was not self-sustaining. If cotton, it argued, was needed for clothes, Englishmen might wear old clothes; but they could not eat last year's food, and "we shall send to that country the present year $100,000,000 worth of grain and provisions, and meet a want which can be supplied from no other source. With the loss of cotton, we still remain her best customer. We shall take this year her products valued at $100,000,000".[3]

Even the bitter opponents of the North spoke at times against war. In 1861 the *Saturday Review* believed that "the sufferings which a rupture would entail upon England would far outweigh any benefit which could be derived from a supply of cotton".[4] The *Times* came to write editorially against war and suggested that public opinion was for neutrality.[5] And Mr. Roebuck acknowledged in 1864 that Englishmen were unwilling to risk war though of every twenty men he met nineteen were sympathizers with the Confederate States.[6]

[1] *Times,* January 22, 1863.

[2] *Journal of the Statistical Society of London,* vol. XXVI, pp. 201, 202; *cf.* Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 123, on importance of grain imports, and also the *Spectator,* November 1, 1862, p. 1213.

[3] *New York Times,* December 8, 1861 (extract appearing in the London *Times,* December 28, 1861). It will be noted that the opinions of the day and not final economic data are herein given.

[4] *Saturday Review,* December 7, 1861.

[5] *Times,* May 5, 1863.

[6] *Ibid.,* August 19, 1864.

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Indeed, if the cotton districts suffered, nevertheless other portions of England were prospering. Birmingham forged, at large profits, the very arms which maintained the strife in America. The woolen looms of Yorkshire drove such a trade as they had never known before, and the flaxen industry of Belfast was experiencing an unusual prosperity.[1] Heavy as was the loss occasioned by the depression in the cotton industry, the general prosperity of Great Britain was affected but little.[2] In fact, says the *Edinburgh Review*, the disastrous effects of the American Civil War were counterbalanced by the general prosperity of the country: "The Return of the National Income for the past year (1862) establishes the fact, that without any additional taxation the revenue has increased by the enormous sum of £2,392,578; and that in spite of the losses to the country arising from the American war, the general result is one of rapidly-increasing prosperity."[3]

Such is a list of the more important motives—as gleaned from the writings of the day—which caused the workingmen to behave as they did on the question of Northern policy and intervention. To fix the degree of emphasis which should be given to each, would be most difficult except for the nicest of judgments; rather is it easier, in this matter, to give approval to the statement of the *Saturday Review*:[4] "Whether their course has been governed by political insight, sympathy with the North, or respect for the decision of Parliament . . . whatever may have been its motive, the unselfish consistency with which it has been pursued entitles them to immortal honour."

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[1] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

[2] Bernard, Montague, *A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War* (London, 1870), p. 470.

[3] *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1863.

[4] *Saturday Review*, May 17, 1862.

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EUROPEAN POLITICAL BOUNDARIES[1]

The Map

THE boundaries between fully independent nations of Europe, from 1500 A.D. to the present, are the subject of this study, which is based on the map on page 460. We shall try to learn definitely why some boundaries have been but ephemeral, while others are comparable in permanence to the eternal hills on which they are often drawn. Thus perceiving from the world's actual experience what principles make abiding limits, we can learn to judge in advance the fate of the Versailles boundaries and of any others, making a fair guess as to how long each may last.

Those borders which have lasted longest are shown on the map by very black lines, and others are lighter in proportion to their duration; broken lines are employed for the most ephemeral, while boundaries existing today are marked by little tags (see the key). The duration of a line has been reckoned only since 1500, or since some later date at which contiguous nations became fully independent, and discontinuous periods, like those of the Alsatian Rhine border, have been added to give the total duration. The lines and their thickness are fairly accurate;[2] but in the earlier centuries considerable uncertainty inheres in the available sources, due to frequent changes, scanty cartography and the oblivion of the centuries, especially in Eastern Europe. Nor have the boundaries been carried back to 1500 in cases where the feudal geographic conditions lasted longer: the tiny states, the interlaced, worse than zigzag, boundaries, isolated provinces, uncertain or double sovereign-

[1] The writer is indebted to Dr. Ellsworth Huntington for the commission to make the accompanying map, and for suggestions on the article.

[2] The sources used were the historical atlases of Freeman and Bury, F. J. C. Hearnshaw, Vidal Lablache, Spruner-Menke, Andree, the *Cambridge Modern History* and others.

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ties, constant changes and lack of any true national power or spirit, would discourage any attempted representation of feudal boundaries here. This condition lasted in the Germanic and affiliated countries until 1866; hence the lines separating these are not shown before then. But where foreign sovereignties held lands of the Holy Roman Empire, as in Holstein, Hanover, Swedish Pomerania and French Baden, the foreign enclave is shown with a dot-and-dash line. Similarly in Italy, divisions between purely Italian states have not been heeded, but only the borders of foreign sovereignties, which none the less show fairly well too the chief Italian divisions which have existed. And similarly in the Low Countries and elsewhere, our map counts only boundaries of the completely modern, nationalistic sort. And we have omitted all lines which lasted less than two years.

Nor has the sovereignty of islands been shown. None have been independent in the period of the map, save Great Britain and in the Napoleonic period Sardinia and Sicily, and the rest have almost always been attached to the land nation nearest them. No island, save Britain, Ireland and Oesel, has been scarred by a partition line.

The mesh of boundary lines on our map shows striking differences in its various parts. The blankest region is that of Central Europe, where feudalism originated and lasted longest, so that there have been true national boundaries to map only for the last half-century. Blank also are all the western extremities of Europe, where feudal conditions were ended before 1500 when our map begins, and where marine and mountain boundaries have protected the nations from annexations. In the east of Europe a moderately close mesh appears, for there the physical barriers are relatively few, save in the Balkans. From Italy to the Strait of Dover extends a belt of close mesh, black on our map, red in history, a weeping zone of wars and annexations, where differing culture languages confront each other—the Kingdom of Lothaire, over feudal fragments of which the neighboring nations fought.

In Italy one would expect less division, for Italy never developed feudalism strongly, and has a peripheral position in

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

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

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Europe, a corner that could be quiet. But she bore the curse of Lothaire's house, and a modern curse too, commercial rivalry. Any state built around a city, as were the Greek, the North Italian and the Australian, tends to be jealous of neighbor city-states, because they compete commercially; each could grow at the cost of the other. But civilized agricultural states are less rivals and more willing to federate, because none can get much from another, except military strength by union.

The influences which have made and unmade boundaries, the factors which govern their permanency, we shall consider in the following order, which seems to be that of their importance: physical features (seas, mountains, swamps, rivers, lakes, forests and climate); language; culture (religion, political traditions and general civilization); political accidents and imperial tendencies; national sentiment; and race. The order of importance commonly believed to prevail is about the reverse of this.

Physical Boundaries

Seas are quite the most important of all the physical influences for permanency of frontier. If the modern borders of nations be measured (taking 1914 as a more convenient year than the present), drawing a rough line from point to point in zigzags of about 75 miles, we find that the marine borders, not reckoning small islands and bays, were 2⅛ times as long as the land frontiers of Europe.

To the great maritime nations, however, the seas over which they held naval command have been rather a road than a barrier. Venice long held the Dalmatian coastland, and at first some promontories of Greece; Denmark has possessed many portions of the Baltic coasts, from Reval to Norway; later we find Sweden in Pomerania and even ascending the Oder; while England still holds a part of France, the Channel Islands. But a landlubber nation like Montenegro or Lithuania is capable of touching the sea and yet not even creating or taking a seaport.

To most nations the sea is a barrier, and it is largely Europe's wealth of peninsulas and large islands, of about the right size for a nation in the stages of civilization characteristic of the

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14th-19th centuries, that has made Europe develop strong national states, only too sharply differentiated from each other, and each making its peculiar contributions to civilization.

After seas, mountains divide most. It will be seen from the map how durable are the lines that follow the Pyrenees, Alps, Kjölens, Carpathians, Transylvanian and Dinaric Alps, and other lower ranges that have been less effective barriers.

Yet in primitive times mountains did not always separate, and the effects are with us yet, in that the same races, and the same languages, are often found on both sides of a mountain chain. In the days of barbarism and primitive civilization there was even a tendency for both sides of a chain to be held by the same tribe, a simple, hardy and warlike people, who liked the hard living of the mountains, or at least were used to it. We find late traces of this condition in Andorra, Montenegro, San Marino and Switzerland. Now a mountain tribe often had insufficient power to resist a great and more civilized horde of migrating plainsmen, superior in arms, numbers and organization. Nor would the mountaineers have a motive for resistance, if it were evident that the plainsmen only wished to pass through the mountains and make a surprise descent into the far richer plain beyond, not to settle down in the mountaineers' poor and few goat-pastures. Hence it comes that India has been invaded again and again *via* the Khaibar pass, which in modern times would be easily and surely defended. And the Pyrenees range, the best and stablest land boundary of modern Europe, was not often a political border in the Dark Ages, nor were its lower, seaward ends until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is gunpowder, telegraphy and modern organization which have given mountains their present great defensive value, although the heavy-armed horseman of the Middle Ages, indeed, was inefficient in mountains.

Swamps rank next after mountains in impassability, but only locally, for there is but one case, the very stable eastern border of Holland, where they form a long enough line to contain a modern nation. The importance of marshes as barriers is decreasing, as they are drained and traversed by roads and railroads.

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Rivers are very often used for borders, especially amid the East-European plains, where they are broad, long and navigable. They are convenient for delimitation and administration, but, save the largest, they have been of scant defensive value in any but contemporary warfare. The only ones that have been very lasting boundaries are the upper Rhine and the lower sections of the Dniester, Po, Save and Danube. But the latter two are bordered by swamps, which along the Danube below Yugoslavia expand to a ten-mile belt of marsh and water, a great obstacle. Even here, however, the Rumanian popular tongue spreads over both banks; and no other river has had any apparent influence on the spread of languages or races. Geographers are prone, indeed, to speak of river basins as historic units, and there does seem to be a slight tendency toward this, e. g. in Silesia, which is distinctly the Oder basin, whose bounding watersheds are comparatively barren uplands.

Forests ranked among the greatest of land barriers, in the days before iron axes and the need for fuel and fields had cut them down. But today European forests and their value as barriers are almost gone, save in mountainous regions, where the forests persist and add largely to the defensive power of the relief, as in the Ardennes, Vosges, Carpathians etc.

Climate probably contributes overwhelmingly to the differences between nations, but its direct effects on boundaries are hard to trace, since its zones fade in a continuous transition, except where there is a mountain ridge that affects the winds, like the Alps, Dinaric Alps and Kjölens, and here the mountains themselves provide an alternative explanation for the boundary. Climate also combines with language to make the sharp divisions which establish boundaries; for climate seems to affect language greatly, through its effects on character and occupation. On the north and south sides of the Alps, where the climatic and language zones are both sharply divided, there is great contrast between the German speech, so consonantal, and the vocalic Italian (albeit the Northern Italians drop many final vowels of the written Tuscan, and there is found also the phonetically intermediate Rhaeto-Romanic). The consonantality of languages seems to vary in correlation with the vigor of the

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peoples who speak them, which in general varies with the temperature and other energizing qualities of their climate. This is, however, partly concealed by the crudity and standardization of spelling. Russian would have no more consonants than German, if both were written with a phonetic alphabet. The average American negro writes English with Noah Webster's spelling, as nigh as he can come to it, but when he speaks he forgets half the consonants, and lengthens half the vowels.

Climate, along with the mountains which cause a sharp variation in it, would seem chiefly to account for the long political separation of warm, temperate Dalmatia from its cold and rigorous hinterland. And scarcely any other explanation can be found for the most stable land boundary of all, that of Portugal, which since the thirteenth century has never moved, though it was once suppressed for sixty years. It follows, indeed, scattered mountain ranges and rivers, but could have been drawn as well almost anywhere else in the peninsula, so far as these are concerned. Nor can language account for the separation of Portugal from Spain, for Spain includes four languages, one of them the Galician branch of Portuguese, besides dialects almost as distinct. Along the whole common border, indeed, there is a language difference between Spain and Portugal; but what caused that difference to grow up, from the undifferentiated Roman speech? We find that this boundary closely coincides with the limit of abundant rains brought by the Atlantic winds, so that Portugal has a moist, warm and temperate climate and fertile fields, in strong contrast to the dry and rigorous upland of Spain. The oceanic condition, but with the presence of mountains, prevails also in Galicia, that square northwestern tip of Spain which appears, at even a casual glance, so much like a northward prolongation of Portugal. This province of Spain, belonging climatically with Portugal, *speaks a dialect of the Portuguese language*, although it has not been politically connected with the southern country since the twelfth century (save when all Spain was). It does look, therefore, as if climate helped to determine the splitting of Romance dialects into the Portuguese and Spanish languages.

The character of the Portuguese is called lazy, and their

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language has a like pronunciation, the vowels being largely slurred or nasal, final consonants sometimes unpronounced, short words run together, and no consonants difficult save the strong *r*, in contrast to the closely related Spanish, which is sonorous, phonetically precise, and possesses that *r* and the difficult Arabic sounds *th* (zeta), and *jota*, a deep guttural fricative. (It must be added, however, that Spanish has the same proportion of consonants as Portuguese, also much fewer sounds, a lazy trait.)

Language

Having discussed some influences of physical geography, we come to language in general as a very important determinant of boundaries. A language cannot be considered an ultimate, independent fact, for its secular splitting is affected by climate, as we have just seen, and its evolution, spread and disappearance by many political and other factors. But these changes take centuries of time, so that in the stresses and collisions of passing politics language everywhere operates like a prime force. In the European popular mind the fact of speaking a language determines not only the rightful political affiliation of a people, but also reveals race and ancestry, although this may be entirely an error.

Now the first lingual condition to note in Europe is bilingualism, the fact that the same people generally know two or more languages or dialects. It is a condition that is not conspicuous in America or England, hence we are apt to lose sight of it. Yet many an American in his home is apt to speak Norwegian or German, or some rustic or negro dialect which is so different from the literary language, in its grammar, pronunciation and especially in the limitation of its vocabulary, that for the ordinary child to go to school is to learn, in time, almost a whole new language. He reads, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might;" but he speaks, perhaps, "Wateva you got t' do, jus wŏk hahd at it." Now such a parallel pair of languages, of which in America we usually ignore the lower one, might in Europe be French and Basque, or German and Lithuanian, the lower tongue totally different, a subject of phil-

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ologic study, and unlikely to be overlooked. Or the vernacular will be some sister dialect of the literary language, and be known to have an ancient and slightly honorable history, like the Yorkshire or Neapolitan dialects. Now the point to note is that nationality until recently generally followed the *upper*, not the lower tongue. The French country people *speak* French rarely, more often some dialect of it, or Provençal, Catalan, Basque, Breton, Flemish or a dialect of German or Italian. They are united into an exceptionally homogeneous people not by this diversity of speech, certainly, but by the fact that they almost all *read*, write and understand one single language, French.

The bilingual condition is easily explained by history. The armies of the Romans, and the Germanic, Slavic and Turanian invaders in the *Völkerwanderung*, spread their tongues over Europe in broad sheets of undifferentiated speech. Then in the Middle Ages, with few migrations or distant wars, and very little traveling about for any purpose, these spoken languages split into hundreds of dialects, a little different in each county, each village even, since the people of each region hardly ever spoke to anyone from outside it. The modern unifying force of written language (writings travel more easily than people) was almost wholly lacking, since little writing was done, and that chiefly in the international culture languages, Latin and Arabic, while there was of course neither post-office nor press to spread writing broadcast. After the tenth century, however, with the growth of civilization generally, and of the royal authority, we find in each inchoate nation one dialect obtaining a superior position over all other dialects and languages in a wide area, as the language of administration, literature, commerce and noble society. It may be but the dialect of a capital city, such as London, Paris or Florence, or the Mandarin dialect of Peking in China, but it may spread far beyond the political domain of that capital, as Tuscan spread among the upper classes of the dozen countries of Italy, and the High German speech of the Imperial Chancery and Luther spread as the culture tongue of hundreds of principalities all over central Europe, from the Baltic coast with its Low German vernacular affiliated

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with Dutch, over German and Slavic tongues to the shifting edge of the Turkish empire in the southeast, and from Alsace in the southwest, with its competing French culture tongue, to Esthonia in the northeast. The three greatest of these culture tongues, French, English and German, have latterly spread their influence over the whole world, as languages at least one of which is read by almost every educated person alive, and each predominantly in one region, as French throughout the Mediterranean lands, and English in North America and the Far East.

At the same time village colonizations added hodge-podge to the local variation of the vernaculars, carrying Provençal into Spain and Sardinia; planting Rumanian, Albanian and other eastern languages in scores of isolated areas, dotting Europe to the Urals with German colonies, and making most lingual frontier zones so hopelessly intermixed that an accurate lingual boundary cannot possibly be drawn.

So the bilingual condition was established—a few higher cultural languages, widely spread, overlying a swarm of little provincial vernaculars, some of them sister-dialects to the culture speech, and others almost or quite unrelated, spoken in their own provinces to the quasi-exclusion of the cultural languages, especially among the peasantry, but despised and unformed to high uses, and rarely written.

These vernaculars, where derived from recent common sources, were not sharply distinct from their neighbors, as are culture languages, but shaded into each other, so that in walking from village to village today, across a border between France and Italy, France and Spain, or Germany and Holland one finds few sharp linguistic frontiers. Yet the cultural and vernacular languages, used by much the same people in the same area, necessarily influenced each other greatly in time lending words, pronunciations and grammatic elements, even where the languages were unrelated, until the vernaculars have taken on much of the character of the culture language of their nation, and have fallen into national groups, somewhat distinguished from each other, even along the borders.

In the Slavic countries this process has not gone so far, be

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cause the culture tongues have never obtained such unrivaled overlordship; hence to decide whether some Macedonian village speaks a dialect of the Serbian or Bulgarian group is only a matter of opinion, or rather of national prejudice. Moreover all the Slavic languages have diverged so little that an intelligent speaker of any one can manage, more or less, to understand any other.

In every country of the world the two languages, upper and lower, divide their field according to the same principles, save that instead of two tongues there may be several. The culture language is spoken in the towns rather than in the countryside, and is used habitually by the upper classes; it is the medium of the official administration, and the speech of the schools; it is the language of writing and printing, the normal vehicle of commerce, science and the fine arts, save for a few folk tales and songs. It alone has been so developed through centuries by great writers that it can express with easy dignity all high or difficult ideas, outside the scope of a peasant's thoughts (imagine a book on rhetoric or physics, written in a negro dialect!). The culture tongue is widespread or worldspread, while its vernacular rival is of no use for travel, commerce or study; in short a culture language is the only medium for leading the larger or the higher life. No wonder then that it is beloved by the upper classes who need it, and that they always seek to make it the language of the state, and to define their state as the territory in which that language is known.

The vernacular, on the other hand, is a homely, humorous, comfortable sort of tongue, that never needs to be studied, and is as good as any other for "cussin' the critters" or for chatting with one's neighbors about the ancient lore of farm and family, or possibly for reading a catechism or calendar. It is not written unless the upper language is so different that it has not been acquired by the peasants; it is rarely printed in newspapers, tracts, songs etc., less yet in serious magazines, rarest of all is a book published in it, especially a book on science or any other advanced subject. Yet it is good enough for a peasant's felt needs, even though it helps to shut him off from the higher life, and save where he has mastered the culture tongue

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he will try to make his vernacular the language of the state, and build the state on that language, if a democratic régime gives his voice a chance.[1]

Nationalism

This brings us to nationalism, a tremendous force in the making or unmaking of the map and the world today. By nationalism we mean an ardent patriotism with a program of making or preserving a nation up to certain boundaries. It is a force which we find growing in the Middle Ages, being strengthened by the decay of feudalism and the rise of the merchant class, by books and by infantry armies, and becoming a passion, almost the modern religion, in the nineteenth century. Everywhere its efflorescence has been coincident with the industrial and agricultural revolutions; and we perceive nationalism as a natural accompaniment of democracy and commercialism. When the common man has been lifted from the slough of medieval poverty, ignorance and illegal oppression, given a summons to the colors, a newspaper and a vote, he begins to feel pugnaciously proud of his country, and his native instincts for war are revived and given the nationalistic direction, where someone feels a need of them. Moreover the whole movement of nationalism has been sedulously fostered for a hundred years, by the upper classes among the lower, especially through the public schools and the conscript armies, as a means of preventing any more French Revolutions; for as the Socialists bitterly complain today, the citizen who is patriotic, or a nationalist, anxious to defend or extend his own nation against others, lends a poor ear to the Social Revolution, or to any propaganda of discontent with the existing internal political arrangements.

But nationalism is a force which we shall not treat as primitive, for all its strength, because it is usually connected with

[1] It may be well to repeat here that there are sometimes three or four languages instead of two, with a similar division of functions, — e. g., in Latvia one finds, going upward, first the Lettish dialect of the village, then the written, official Lettish, then Polish, the language of the local nobility, then Russian, the recent official language, and lastly German, a world culture language.

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language; the country that nationalism struggles to preserve, extend or establish is often linguistically defined; it is the territory wherein a certain language prevails, although occasionally, as in the case of Ireland, those districts may be added where the language *used* to be spoken. And national covetousness may add others forming a supposedly advantageous frontier, as Italy took Tyrol to the Alps, or as some Frenchmen have spoken of the "natural frontiers" of France as the ocean, Alps and Rhine.[1] But the truest spirit of nationalism always defines its nation as a territory in which a certain language is spoken, or written.

It makes a great difference whether a written or a spoken language, a great culture tongue or a vernacular, has been chosen as the basis of a nationalism. For a culture tongue will frame a great nation, being widely spread, and a vernacular a small one. Before 1880, with the upper classes in complete control of the state and its thinking, nationalism tended to build great states or empires, the unifications of Germany and Italy being among the last fruits of this movement of aristocratic nationalism with its large-language basis. Since 1880, with the lower classes gaining some political power, nationalism has tended increasingly to break up the empires into small states, on the basis of vernacular languages. The proper language for one's nation is such a simple and often discussed question that it is one of the few on which the lower classes can really form their own opinion, in defiance of propaganda from above. Vernacular nationalism may be seen today struggling in Catalonia, Vizcaya, Ireland, Iceland and Belgium, but most clearly in Eastern Europe, where it not only struggles but wins for these last ten years, establishing small independent countries. Eastern Europe with its worse climate and hence more backward civilization had never attained such a stage of wide extension and thorough domination of a single culture tongue over all the vernaculars of a region, as had Western Europe; hence

[1] These are her natural borders only in the sense that it is natural for a patriotic nation to claim everything it has a chance of getting. Under the Grand Monarch and the first Emperor the French limits were extended *beyond* the Rhine.

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its peasant languages can lift their heads and win by the modern democratic movement, whereas the peasant tongues of Western Europe, as of America, had been reduced generally centuries ago by the culture tongues to a position of utter inconsequence. Eastern Europe, having less of physical barriers and of feudalism, though lower in civilization, early developed large states, but these states did not firmly establish single culture languages as in Western Europe, largely because there was not enough culture to demand the rise of a widely used literary language. Another reason was the competition of culture languages among themselves. In Europe east of the Oder and the Adriatic seven imperial languages, German, Swedish, Russian, Polish, Turkish and latterly Hungarian and French have competed for cultural employment, two or three in the same area, so that, e. g., Finnish students divided their attention between Swedish, German and Russian. Hence none of the imperial languages won full domination. But in southeastern Europe the cultural poverty of the former imperial language, Turkish, and the physical barriers in the region, which had preserved side by side almost unrelated vernaculars, enabled the populations in the nationalist century to set up little nations on vernacular bases, adding a cultural language borrowed from afar, known only to the upper classes and politically safe as yet. Rumania and Greece took French, and Serbia and Bulgaria used French and German, while Montenegro and Albania felt no need of a second language for cultural purposes.

So in Eastern Europe, including Austria-Hungary, as a result of the competition of one culture language with another, and of recent colonization, three or more tongues are to be found in most areas, and nowhere but in Great Russia has any language won an unrivaled domination, as in Western Europe. Nationalism was hence divided against itself, with everyone inclining to favor a nation based on his own favorite language; and this divided the populations roughly along class lines. The peasant Finn desired a Finnish nation, Suomi, for Finnish was the only language he knew, and its poverty in literature and inconvenience in commercial and intellectual life bothered him little. The upper-class Finlander, on the other hand, speaking

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Swedish, Russian or German, desired union with some one of those countries. So the language struggle parallels the class struggle. It does not, however, fully coincide with it, for all classes of townspeople are apt to use the greater language, and there are always some vernacular enthusiasts among the upper classes.

And now, in this East-European struggle between upper and lower tongues and their corresponding nationalisms, e. g., Russification *vs.* Ukrainianism, the victory has been suddenly awarded to the smaller languages by the World War and the Russian Revolution.

Anyone knows that one of the more effective means of defeating the German-reading empires in the War, and of keeping them impotent, was to organize the secession of all their provinces of non-German vernacular. Of course the deed was accompanied by a world of mealy-mouthed talk about the rights of small nations, the groaning of the Poles under the German yoke (in behalf of which they fought strangely well), the gallantry of the Czechoslovak deserters etc., but it is hard to see in the dispositions of Versailles much more than military measures for the defeat of German power.

Scarcely was the Allied program well under way, of crippling the Central Empires by detaching all their border provinces of non-German vernacular, when it was thought advisable to do the same to the Russian Empire, now gone Bolshevist. So all around the rim of Russia, wherever an invasion could be made or aid brought, in Finland, Arkhangel, Siberia, the Caucasus, the Don country, Crimea, the Ukraine, Poland, White Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, new little nations were organized; the *cordon sanitaire* was created. And wherever a vernacular could be found that was at all different from Russian, its nationalist followers were enrolled and the new state was meant to be permanent. Most of them have already crumbled away, leaving behind them only some paper money, postage stamps and bloodstains. But they have been very effective as war measures against the Russians. . . . All these statelets were set up, of course, not simply by the Allied Powers, but chiefly by the upper classes in the regions concerned, who

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sought by any means, even secession and the support of the vernacular of their farm-hands, to save themselves from the Bolshevik at Moscow. When the well-established trend of Bolshevism toward capitalism and the return to power of the intelligentsia has proceeded further, say in five years, we may see more vernacular statelets tumbling back into the arms of Great Russia, if they have not previously joined some league of a Western culture language. Many of them, we have said, have disappeared already, and our own government long refused to recognize any save Poland and Finland.

In sum, we see that nationalism has had opposite effects on the European map. Before 1880, when the upper classes ruled, nationalism created big, efficient states or military empires, around cultural languages. Since 1880, feeling the increasing force of democracy, nationalism has tended to break these up into small states, based upon petty languages. And the World War and the Russian Revolution have made Western Europe seize on this movement as a first-rate military weapon to smash their enemies in Central and Eastern Europe. Happy those regions, today broad and peaceful, where single cultural languages had won wide and complete domination before the advent of democracy with its political enshrinement of divisive, petty tongues!

Culture

Differences in regional culture, among which we include all differences of wealth, customs, beliefs, and political and other ways of doing things, aside from language and national sentiment, seem to affect the shaping of nations only in the case of three of the most important sides of culture—religion, political habits and degree of total culture. For minor customs, such as the style of peasants' dress, or the folkways of table or ballroom, have their regions of vogue sometimes restricted to a village or province, too small for a nation, sometimes spreading in one class of society over half or all the continent, too vast for a nation. Such customs are so numerous and have such overlapping frontiers that were these drawn on one map it would become a solid black, and their competing influences

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would neutralize each other. But when a certain area has long been united by one national government and culture language, its customs also become somewhat unified by stronger centripetal influence within the communicating group, and as a result the nation must gain increased cohesion and durability. Thus culture fortifies boundary lines, though it does not make them.

In the case of the major custom, religion, a divisive or a unifying, nation-making influence is often clear. This seems to be strongest at about the degree of civilization of sixteenth-century Europe, and to be unimportant between Christian sects in the most cultivated regions today. The Albanians on the other hand are not civilized enough to be bigoted, even having Christians and Mohammedans within some of their clans, their strongest organization. But religious differences have been largely responsible for the separation of Belgium from Holland, of Orthodox Serbia from the mainly Catholic Croats to the North, of mainly Protestant Latvia from Catholic Lithuania and of all the Baltic states from Russia. There is too the case of Ireland *vs.* England, but here the fiercely developed nationalism of a small people is the result of five divisive factors coinciding on that "most distressful country," to wit a sea barrier, religion, the vestiges of a language, race and the usual European agrarian struggle of tenant *vs.* large landlord. In the middle grade of civilization, religion tends to fall in with and intensify geographical divisions.

Political customs, meaning the sort of governmental institutions which a people prefer, can be identified as a real nation-making influence in the case of Switzerland. In the early Modern Age the system favored by the Swiss, of popular assemblies, like town meetings, governing little and federated cantons, was in sharpest contrast to the feudal despotisms all about, and doubtless contributed to make Switzerland a separate country. Today, however, under the needs of modern civilization Switzerland is increasingly abandoning its popular assemblies and its federalism, or cantonal autonomy, and approaching the ordinary model of the modern centralized republic. And the surrounding nations have now all approached

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close to the same model. Since Switzerland is thus losing her chief *raison d'être*, while great forces, especially lingual, militate against her existence, it is possible that her independence may not survive another half-century.

Where one region is markedly superior to the rest of the nation in general culture, it will dominate the whole if it can: examples are North Italy, Bohemia in Czechoslovakia, and the Atlantic and Lake industrial regions of the United States. But if the more cultivated region is somewhat marked off by other means, and if it has nowhere nearly half the population of the nation, so that it can nowise obtain domination, then it will seek autonomy, while still desiring some connection with the backward regions needed as markets for its manufactures. The examples are Bohemia when in Austria-Hungary, Catalonia, Vizcaya, Ulster in Ireland, Croatia in Yugoslavia, and the Polish and Baltic provinces of old Russia. The desire is to have liberty for progressive measures, and to escape some of the taxes on wealth and industry, which would be expended in the poorer agricultural provinces.

Political Accidents

By political accidents we mean boundary changes through conquests which we do not attempt to ascribe to any general principle, e. g., boundary shifts between purely Balkan powers. Such alterations of the map have been astonishingly few. Practically all boundary changes have been part of one or more of the four following movements: (1) The needful agglomeration of the old feudal patch-work of petty sovereignties, isolated possessions and interlocking boundaries. The nations have been learning (until 1880) to eliminate custom-houses over wider and wider areas, to amalgamate nations, to respect language and to gain short, continuous and defensible frontiers: for these aims the medieval crazy-quilt had to be made over in many places. (2) The liquidation of the kingdom of Lothaire between France and Germany has occasioned many a war and boundary alteration, and the process is not complete yet, witness notably Luxemburg. (3) Democratic nationalism, building small states on a vernacular basis, first made itself visible

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geographically around 1830, in the creation of the Balkan states and Belgium, next split off Norway in 1905, Albania in 1912, and numerous nations since 1918, some of which have already collapsed. (4) The rise and fall of empires, the Polish, Danish, Swedish, French, Prussian, Turkish and Russian, generally in a single cycle of expansion over unaffiliated peoples and subsequent contraction, account for most of the boundary changes on our map. In the East almost every line on the map represents a stage in the flood or ebb tide of Poland or Turkey.

Aside from these imperial movements it does not appear that brute force has been any great factor in changing the map, for some of the most stable boundaries have been those of the weakest nations—Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland and Montenegro. Each has had its special helps to existence, Portugal's including a position at an extremity of Europe, remote from the paths of armies. The continued integrity of their borders is a demonstration of the strength of geographic influences and of international honor as contrasted with military power. Two have been called buffer states, but while the great nations have reasons for maintaining these, they have motives also for annexing them; for example, Louis Napoleon and recently Germany sought to take Belgium. There is little evidence of the establishment of buffer states as such; however, the natural operation of all the nation-making principles that we have discussed would create states both large and small, and the small would often lie in between the large, there being little other place for them.

Historical Traditions

Memories of national unity, independence or hostility appear to be potent forces in the shaping of nations, and are always intensely present in the people's mind when crises occur. That word "always" reveals the really secondary nature of the national tradition. The propagandist historian, thumbing the records of many centuries, can invariably find some nation with about the same boundaries or people as the one he aims to create, and find ancient grievances against any country that he

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dislikes, and an unlimited quantity of heroic actions, great patriots, picturesque incidents and all the other matter that, whether false or true, makes up what is essentially each nation's mythology. How much talk there is of "when Ireland was a nation", though she never was, or in America how much of Captain John Smith and Pocahontas, the Pilgrim Fathers, Paul Revere's ride and other equally unimportant but picturesque incidents, which serve well to make Americans out of school-children. Yet we would never think of studying the corresponding heroes of Yugoslavic or French mythology. The national traditions can be directed toward any purposes favored by a section of the ruling class which controls sufficient means for spreading its ideas, e. g., the schools, church, state or press. The national tradition must always be true in appearance, but, true or false, its establishment is essentially an advertising proposition, like the launching of a new brand of cigarette, or the protection of an established brand. History is truly a great science, indispensable to him who would either understand the real nature of situations, or befog them for other men, moulding opinion to what purposes he will. Historical tradition, in short, is a derived and artificial, not an original force; back of it lies the will of the classes in each nation who control publicity, and whose will reflects the physical-geographic, linguistic and other forces of which we have been speaking.

Race

We come at last to a force commonly held one of the most potent in defining frontiers, race. It has had little effect on them, that the author can discern,[1] in the last four hundred years in Europe, if by "race" we mean race and not nationality, language or customs. The peoples of Europe are all so composite in their origin, after centuries and millenniums of migrations hither and yon, by hordes, armies, village colonies and individuals, that a people is often about the same as its nearest neighbors, in physical and presumably mental type. Of course a Northern Frenchman and a Bavarian think them-

[1] One of the possible exceptions in Europe is Ireland.

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selves of different races, separated by a gap like that between man and beast. But after all the real difference is that they think nonsense in different languages, and adhere to somewhat different cultures and competitive fatherlands. They could learn this from any recent book on European prehistory or ethnography, but they rarely read such books. They do read newspapers published for various purposes other than ethnographic science, and hence still swallow the idea, fifty years out of date, that language defines race. So the world goes on assuming that a Milanese is the same as a Palerman, because both can speak Italian, that a Rumanian belongs to the "Latin race" because he speaks a Latin language, and that a Pole is innately different from a Prussian.

When two different nationalities come in contact in a market town, a thousand differences are obvious, in speech, dress, *tenue*, actions and selfish interests. "Nationality" seems an insufficient term for so many differences, hence differing "race" is ascribed. But *native*, truly racial differences, whether physical or mental, are hard to find, between *neighboring* peoples. Where an army comes from far, as did the Avar and the Moor, or the Spaniard in Holland and the German in Italy, a true recognition of racial difference must have been a factor in the repulse of the invader. Yet we seek in vain for much proof of racial influence on boundaries. With race as with climate, provinces almost always so blend, that no dividing lines are visible. A mountain ridge between plains will sometimes make a climatic break, but never a racial one, because in earlier times migrating hordes, and at all times traveling individuals, have crossed any European mountains with ease. In the few cases where we do find a fairly sharp racial cleavage, we find no political frontier. The Highland and Lowland Scots are of widely different races, and formerly of diverse languages too, yet they joined hands many centuries ago; and so did the differing Welsh and English; and the Mediterranean Sicilian, with the mainly Alpine and Nordic Piedmontese; Russia includes many areas of Mongolian speech and partly Mongolian race; northern Scandinavia is largely Mongolian; and the Magyar was always allied with the Teuton. Boundaries are not based on race.

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Since the European nations do differ racially, especially in their percentage of Mediterranean, Nordic and Mongolian blood, it is likely that race has some effect in antagonizing the nations. But differing race does not prevent mutual understanding, as do language and religion. American blonds and brunettes do not shun each other; they frequently show a tendency to prefer each other as mates, and any artist will paint both in an ideal group. The comparatively slight differences between the races of Europe do not prevent sympathy, even if they diminish it.

The Changing of Forces

In the foregoing discussion we have often spoken of a factor in the definition of nations as becoming more or less important with the centuries. The significant and dangerous result is that a boundary which was scientific and good when established, may become bad in the course of time. In the Middle Ages, for example, little attention was paid to language, and much to conquest and dynastic inheritance, with such results as the assignment of German Holstein to the crown of Denmark: when language became important the natural outcome was a war and an annexation. A considerable number of European wars in the modern age can be partially traced to these two facts, that in earlier days language had not mattered much, and monarchs had. We have seen too how when language came to matter it was first the great culture tongues that welded nations, while in the latest, the democratic century, the determination of nationality has gone increasingly to small and humble tongues, vernaculars or little better.

Compactness and contiguity of territory, again, we have seen to be prime essentials according to the modern way of thinking; yet in earlier ages it seemed natural enough that the district of Charolles, in the eastern center of France, should belong to Spain, and Belgian districts to Spain or Austria. Many wars were encouraged by the change from this accepted condition to the modern requirement of short boundaries, by which the model state is a circle, and the ideal collection of states is in hexagons.

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Mountain chains, swamps and forests have been effective barriers in the past, but now the road and railroad cross them easily in time of peace. By aëronautics we are learning to cross them easily in time of war also, and rivers, lakes and even seas likewise. Every military barrier in Europe, howsoever approved by ages of history, is likely soon to become as useless as the Great Wall of China, as war takes wings. And while mountains and seas lose effectiveness, trench warfare has made any line fairly defensible today. All the rules of defensibility in boundary-drawing are rapidly changing.

Creed is becoming a less divisive influence, we have said. National traditions are probably becoming more important, as the masses become readers and school-attenders, thus coming within the reach of a developing art of propaganda. Ideas of European race differences are probably being intensified by propaganda among the masses at the same time that the ethnographers, while studying the differences more, are assigning them a diminished importance in questions of nationality.

Modern National Requirements

Again, the rapidly altering economic life of Europe is making important changes in the sort of boundaries needed for each sort of nation. A modern state needs a seaport, if not two or three on different seas. The new Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are gravely defective in this regard, while in earlier days of small commerce they could have done well enough. And in the future, if the seacoast nations will learn to deal in honest helpfulness with those of the hinterland, or if much traffic should go by air, the possession of seaports may again become unessential.

Today a nation needs not only seaports, but trunk-line railroads leading to them, as to Fiume, and railways are located to fit such needs. When the map was redrawn by the Treaty of Versailles the whole railroad scheme was disorganized, in spite of some attention being paid to this need, at the cost of other needs. For a railroad to run into a national boundary is something like running into a stone wall, thanks to the customs duties, exchange fluctuations and passport harassments with which the new nations contrive to pass the time between wars.

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Furthermore a nation in such a world needs within its own borders supplies of coal, food and if possible iron, petroleum and any other necessaries of economic life. And if there be a metropolis as large as Vienna, there must be a large tributary region to buy the products of its workshops, both things and thoughts.

Finally, if one would adapt a nation to modern civilization, it must be large. The Baltic States, with their populations of two or three millions, are like the states of the Dark Ages, but not of today. The progress of modern civilization has seen a growth in the size of nations, and a spacing wider and wider apart of the customs barriers. The great backward step of creating many new little nations since 1918 suggests, in addition to the lingual and military considerations previously expounded, two significant developments: (1) That the growing industrialism of modern metropolitan areas is making them separatistic like the Ancient Greek, North Italian and Australian city-states, because jealous of each other's trade. Every industrial nation is dominated by its factory owners, and these often wish the customs barriers to be only so far away as the limits of their own sales, say only two hundred miles, so they may be freed from as much competition as possible without losing valuable sales territory. The old agricultural states, *per contra*, were non-competitive, imperialistic and large. (2) One might think that the menacing decline in European civilization, from the War and post-War folly, was really anticipated and invited further by the diplomatists at Versailles. When civilization has advanced in the past it has always built itself larger homes, because advancing arts of transportation, communication, education and government make a larger nation possible, with all its large-scale advantages. As much as biologic life depends on water, civilized life depends on the division of labor, which means *specialization* in the functions of each worker, tool and farm, and *centralization* upon each of the work of one kind from an ever-wider area, e. g., of the cameras to be made or the bacteriology to be taught. The more we have of centralization and specialization, this Spencerian integration, the more we can have of civilization; this is a salient reason why a city

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is more civilized than a country-side, and New York more efficient and cultivated than Hankau with its small handicraft factories and limited exterior trade and communication. Only large markets permit large-scale, efficient production of goods; and so is it likewise with the production of ideas. Almost all inventions come from five great countries—the United States, Germany, England, Italy and France. The proverb says that necessity is the mother of invention, but the reverse is our truth. The most necessitous countries, like Amazonia or India, are the least inventive, America the most. The true mother of really prolific invention is existence of wealth, abundance, a production already immense, salable to millions of consumers, and hence justifying the overhead expenses and capital investment incurred in contriving and installing a slight improvement in a productive plant. Small countries, small-scale producers, can copy some inventions from the great, but rarely originate many.

And hence Esthonia has a large national library, but hardly any books in Esthonian. It does not pay to write or print them. The smaller scale of production is almost always attended with inferior efficiency. Progress in the world's ideas, so gravely needed, depends on the large nations left, and on the facilities for international commerce in ideas, just as in things. Ideas must be able to travel abroad by mail, by freight cars, by publications, by electricity, by travelers, by international languages (whether great culture tongues or Esperanto), by sympathy and by the possibilities of payment for services rendered by the scientist or other originator. For all the advances of civilization, then, there are these three instruments—larger nations, or confederations, or world cooperation. "The rights of small nations", when analyzed to their final effect today, include fatal rights to run amuck and commit suicide. Versailles at least extinguished two of the smallest countries in Europe—Montenegro and Moresnet-Neutre—but set up many others, which time and reason must unite, or harmonize by some superior authority.

Even had the treaties of the last few years established every nation of Europe in its proper boundaries, on the best possible compromises between all the conflicting demands which we

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have discussed, still in a generation or two some of these will have changed, and in a century or two probably change utterly, so that the good boundaries will become bad ones, and have to be readjusted. For coercing a nation to yield home territory to a neighbor state, only two means have been found effective, viz. war, or the compulsion of a higher authority. Furthermore, in this century of nationalism and democratic ideas, the will of the provincials concerned must be consulted; besides, any alienation of home territory, however justified, raises an abiding and fierce irredentism in the nation losing. To adjust a boundary is to start a dozen new troubles; to leave it unadjusted is to face a dozen old ones, which clamor increasingly. And if civilization advances farther and faster, changed boundary needs that we cannot even foresee may be expected to arise everywhere. The boundary readjustments of the past have been worked out through a series of gruesome wars; those of the future contain elements of still greater difficulty.

Altogether the problem of just and proper boundaries is hopeless and growing worse, on the basis of the old statecraft —that of moderate-sized, centralized nations, designed to support themselves in peace or war, and fully independent within rigidly defined frontiers. The only hope hangs on a new statecraft, which on the basis of wide confederations or general and strong international authority would regulate the boundaries, commerce, tariffs, transportation, war preparations, propagandas and other means by which today nations nominally at peace inflict upon each other such grievous wrongs that open war is the inevitable outcome. The progress of civilization involves a growth, not a shrinkage, in the size of the cooperating groups.

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ELECTORAL REFORM AND ORGANIZED CHRISTIANITY IN ENGLAND I

"Where there is no vision the people perish".—*Proverbs*, 29: 18.

THE influence in the realm of politics of the various bodies of organized Christianity in Great Britain has been appreciable in varying degrees, and for varying periods, from the early days of Methodism to the general election of December, 1910, since which date the influence of religion would appear to be diminishing. There is no doubt, however, that in a matter which affected the people of the country so profoundly as the social-political movement which resulted in the extension of the franchise, organized Christianity played an important part. Inasmuch as the electorate has increased from 839,000 in 1835 to 21,392,322 in 1918, the importance of the subject is manifest. If it be true, as Mr. Ponsonby says, that "there is no political question that has not a religious aspect",[1] the question naturally arises: What has been the attitude of organized Christianity in regard to reform of Parliament, or more particularly, in regard to proposals for the extension of the franchise?

Professor Dicey has shown[2] that during the nineteenth century there were three main currents of public opinion, viz: 1. The Period of Old Toryism or Legislative Quiescence (1800–1830); 2. The Period of Benthamism or Individualism (1825–1870); 3. The Period of Collectivism (1865–1900). It will be observed that the churches seem to have reflected or reacted to the political or psychological atmosphere of the day. It is significant, for instance (the precise signification thereof is a matter of acute theological interest), that the religious revival of 1869 was preceded by the Reform Act of 1867 and was followed by the Education Act of 1870, both of which measures were revolutionary.

[1] *Religion in Politics*, p. 27.

[2] Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England*, Lecture IV.

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The investigation involved in the preparation of this study has revealed the fact that, while almost all of the various sections of the Church have some sort of central organization, it has been difficult to ascertain in many instances from the official records of the proceedings at conferences what views are held, or have been held, by the majority of the members of the different organizations. This difficulty is particularly marked in the case of the Church of England; for, except in comparatively recent years,[1] the Church Congress has given little or no time for the discussion of electoral reform and kindred matters, which had received much consideration by the principal Nonconformist bodies.

In view of this difficulty, it has been necessary for the purposes of this article to rely upon the opinions expressed from time to time by the accredited leaders of the various sections of the Church in their writings and speeches and in the denominational press.

One of the most important movements in connection with the agitation for Parliamentary Reform in the last quarter of the eighteenth century was that which was led by the philosophic Dissenters, Price and Priestley. Pitt's attitude in regard to religious freedom led the leading Dissenters to agitate for Parliamentary Reform as a step necessary to their own civil enfranchisement. The more progressive members of the Whig Party, including Fox and Grey, were at one with the philosophic Dissenters in acclaiming the dawn of world-wide political enfranchisement and religious equality, while Burke opposed Price and the Unitarian Reformers with all the power which he possessed. The Reform Movement in particular towns and villages was largely an effort of Dissenters; and the counteracting "loyalist" movement of 1792 was set on foot by Churchmen and clergymen, "in a panic of the old Dr. Sacheverel type, intensified by the news from France".[2] There seems to be no doubt that the destruction of Dissenting Chapels and of Priest-

[1] *Cf. Official Reports of the Church Congress* held at Carlisle in 1884 (pp. 579-588) and at Barrow-in-Furness in 1906 (pp. 235-258), when papers were read relating to "The Church and Politics".

[2] Trevelyan, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill*, pp. 31-3.

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ley's house during the Birmingham Riots of 1791 was due to the direct incitement of the "Church and State" Party.[1]

Partisan Churchmen believed that it was contrary to the interests of the Established Church for Dissenters to be enfranchised, or to be granted any form of political emancipation. In other words, Churchmen felt that they had much to lose and Dissenters everything to gain by Reform of Parliament. One of the effects of the French Revolution was to postpone for more than a generation the triumph of the Reform Movement in England, and the Church of England lent its support to the policy advocated by Burke and by other statesmen who feared that the excesses committed by the French revolutionaries would be repeated in England.

The influence of Methodism on the politics of the early part of the nineteenth century was profound. The strength of the Methodist Movement lay in its appeal to those religious emotions in the masses of the people which in a carefully organized form were the strength of the mediæval Church, and which even today are not so obscured by rational considerations as to be insensible to the appeal of a "General" Booth or of a Spurgeon. The appeal of Wesley, as a protest against the "soulless, high and dry, formalism of the Church of England" was essentially popular. "He re-established the notion that even the agricultural labourer had a soul—a fact which tended to be obscured by the social arrangements then coming into force. He taught, and his followers taught, vigorously and effectively, the existence of a God Who cared for all the dwellers upon earth, Who would not let even a sparrow fall, and Who went to the extreme sacrifice to purchase from the evil adversary the souls of all His Children."[2] According to the authors of a *New History of Methodism*, John Wesley has found his true place in current history as "a pioneer of social revolution, but he had no great scheme for social reconstruction or economic Revolution."[3] His Tory optimism, it must be admitted, was

[1] Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-7.

[2] Hovell, *The Chartist Movement*, p. 88.

[3] Townsend, Workman and Eayrs, *New Hist. of Methodism*, I, p. 224.

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quite inconsistent with the appalling accounts which he gives in his *Journal* of the wretched social conditions which prevailed in the England of his day. Wesley said, of himself, however, that politics were beyond his province. That Methodists did not regard the office of a politician as incompatible with Christianity, is to be seen in the fact that two active Methodists, Thomas Thompson and Joseph Butterworth, entered Parliament *circa* 1800. Both these men were Tories; both were philanthropists; both died before the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832; and there is no evidence that they were in favor of Parliamentary Reform.[1] Michael Thomas Sadler was another gifted Methodist preacher who entered Parliament in 1829 as Member for Newark.[2]

The attitude of the Church of England in regard to the First Reform Bill may be summed up in a single sentence. "There was but one class opposed to the Bill with anything like unanimity—the clergy of the Church of England."[3] It was generally expected that Reform of Parliament would, if carried, lead to a revision of all ecclesiastical privileges—Church rates, the Church monopoly of Oxford and Cambridge, perhaps tithes, and possibly the Establishment itself.[4] The Church in those days leant heavily on the secular arm for the support which she today seeks in her own legitimate influence. In the opinion of Sir George Trevelyan, she had, to a very large extent, left the population of the new industrial districts to Dissent, to anti-clerical secularism, and to an ignorance more debased than any form of belief or unbelief. The Church had lost very largely her former hold on the masses. Men thought that she took too much and gave too little.[5]

On the other hand nearly all Dissenters were Reformers. They were forced to contribute, in the Church rates, to the upkeep of fabrics where they and all their works were de-

[1] *New History of Methodism*, I, 395.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 400.

[3] Trevelyan, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill*, p. 289.

[4] "These parsons, it seems, have fears for the property of the Church."—Grey to Wellesley, May 5, 1831 (*Add. MSS.* 37311).

[5] Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

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nounced: they were excluded from Oxford and from Cambridge. They looked to Reform to remedy these inequalities, and, more generally, to give them a direct participation in the government of the country.

Popular indignation was aroused when it became known that a majority of the bishops in the House of Lords had voted against the Reform Bill. The unenfranchised parishioners were enraged above all against the bishops. The cry to exclude them from Parliament rose loudly not only from the workingmen, but even from the middle-class *Times* which was strongly opposed to ultra-Radicals. The Bishops of Durham and Exeter dared not go about their work in their diocese. At Worcester the parishioners chalked on the walls of the Cathedral the words "Judas Iscariot, Bishop of Worcester."[1]

In view of the fact that by 1838 the disappointment occasioned by the Reform Act of 1832 had become general in the country, the attitude of organized Christianity in regard to the great social and political movement known as "Chartism" is dealt with early in this article, as Chartism claimed to be, and in fact was, a working-class movement. Inasmuch as the special mission of the churches is to the poor, their attitude towards Chartism may be regarded as indicative of their general attitude at that period toward all political reform.

The attitude of organized Christianity, as represented by the Church of England and by the Free Churches, in regard to Chartism was manifested early in the history of the Chartist Movement. The population, in less than a hundred and fifty years after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, had been more than quadrupled. The effect of this extraordinary increase of the population could not fail to leave its mark upon the religious life of the country. In 1750 the Established and Non-Conformist Churches were unable adequately to minister to the spiritual needs of the population, and seventy-five years later there were great numbers of the people, especially among the working classes, who were outside the pale of the influence of organized Christianity.

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 308, 316, 317.

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Although the Church of England had taken on a new lease of life as a result of the enthusiasm engendered by the Oxford Movement, only a beginning had been made in reclaiming the lost multitude. The Non-Conformists also seem to have been unable to take advantage of the great opportunities offered, for, according to Church statistics, by the second quarter of the nineteenth century the majority of the Non-Conformist denominations were drawn almost entirely from the middle classes. Even the Wesleyan-Methodist Church, which in the early days of its foundation had been preeminently the Church of the manufacturing and mining poor, and, but for its mode of government would have earned the name of the Church of the Industrial Revolution, had, by the beginning of the Chartist Movement, also suffered from the blight of respectability, and consequently had lost the confidence of the intelligent worker, owing to the conservatism of its political policy, the Tory affiliations of its leading ministers, and the undemocratic form of its government. All the evidence goes to show that British Christianity was confined almost entirely to the middle classes, was fast decaying, and was totally devoid of efficiency.[1]

There appears to be no doubt that between the masses and organized Christianity up to the first half of the nineteenth century there was a great gulf fixed. Some notable exceptions will be referred to later. The causes of this alienation are not difficult to ascertain, for it was generally believed among the workers that organized Christianity was, as a whole, opposed to their social aspirations, and that it was destructive and reactionary in the matter of social and political reform. The workers turned disgustedly away not only from an Establishment which sought to perpetuate the existing system of misgovernment, but also from the Non-Conformists who, after they had carried the Reform Bill of 1832, were believed to have betrayed the workers.

To take the place of religious enthusiasm, the workers found an outlet for their feelings in Reform Clubs, Chartist gatherings, and in political debating circles. The reaction from the

[1] Miall, *Life of Edward Miall*, pp. 151-2.

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religion of the Churches developed along two lines. The first was infidelity, and the second was either a feeling of stolid indifference or absolute hostility to the Church and ecclesiasticism, although this attitude was accompanied by loyalty to the tenets of Christianity.

The movement towards free thought or rationalism aroused the determined opposition of such writers as Kingsley and Disraeli. Kingsley has expressed his opinions in his correspondence, and in *Alton Locke*, where he complains "that the cream and pith of working intellect is almost exclusively self-educated and therefore also infidel."[1] Disraeli in *Sybil* describes St. Lys as an "ideal clergyman who came among a hundred thousand heathen to preach the Word of God."[2]

This spirit of infidelity was naturally distressing to Churchmen, and it was chiefly a desire to win the workers back to Christianity which moved Maurice and Kingsley to their philanthropic efforts among the poor of London.[3]

The growth of infidelity was accentuated by the influence of the Socialist movement, which, up to that time, had been affected profoundly by the well-known views of Robert Owen. The fact that many of the Chartist leaders and a great number of the rank and file were Socialists and infidels, constituted a ground upon which the enemies of the movement were able to base their accusations.

The Englishmen of the upper and middle classes had learned from French history to associate political radicalism with infidelity, and the development in England seemed to prove that there existed an inalienable connection between the two ideas. The expansion of the infidel press in England during the heyday of the Chartist Movement is remarkable. The most popular papers were *The Movement*, edited by Holyoake and Ryall, *The Reasoner and Herald of Progress*, supported by many leading Chartists; *The Union*, edited by G. A. Fleming; *The Oracle of Reason*, edited by Charles Southworth and

[1] Kingsley, *Alton Locke*, p. 275.

[2] Disraeli, *Sybil*, p. 125.

[3] *Church of England Magazine*, vol. 23, p. 20; *Christian Guardian*, 1847, p. 325.

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Thomas Patterson; *The Model Republic* and *Cooper's Journal*. At the same time the works of Paine, of Holyoake, and of other Radicals were advertised regularly in many of the leading Chartist journals, including the *Northern Star*.

The charge of infidelity naturally took its place as a leading stock argument against Chartism, and was held up continually before the eyes of the horrified bourgeoisie in sermons, in pamphlets and in speeches, to such an extent that the two ideas became synonymous. A critical examination of the current literature seems to suggest that while the majority of the Chartists were decided believers in the principles of Christianity, their attitude towards organized Christianity, as a system, was one of indifference, if not of hostility.

The Chartist leaders were drawn from all denominations. Among the infidels were numbered Hetherington, Watson, Holyoake, Walter Cooper and others. The Church of England contributed Charles Westerton, Dr. Arthur Wade and the Rev. Thomas Spence; the Church of Scotland contributed the Rev. Patrick Brewster. John Ritchie belonged to the Secessionists, Giles was a Baptist, Miall a Congregationalist, and O'Malley a Catholic. Sturge and Pierce were Quakers. The Rev. J. R. Stephens had been expelled from the Methodist ministry owing to his activities in promoting the separation of the Church from the State.[1] He became the pastor of three chapels near Ashley which were built by the workers of the district. Thomas Cooper, as a young man, was a Methodist local preacher; Joseph Barker was brought up as a Wesleyan-Methodist; Lovett was an unsectarian Christian who had been associated in his youth with Methodism; O'Neill and Vince became Baptist ministers; Vincent leaned towards the Quakers; Solly and W. J. Fox were Unitarian ministers.

The Chartists claimed that the ideals involved in a concession of the "points" of the Charter were identical with practical Christianity. How any professing Christian could remain indifferent to the miserable conditions prevalent among the manufacturing and agricultural poor was a mystery to the zealous

[1] Holyoake, *Life of J. R. Stephens*, p. 51.

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Chartists. Not only were the Churches alleged to be indifferent to this state of affairs, but they were accused of joining hands with "bloodthirsty and deceitful men to render their misery complete and irremediable."[1]

The Chartists demanded that the Churches should prove the reality of their Christianity by assisting the workers to get rid of their burdens by securing the success of the Charter. The idea of the existence of a connection between the matter of the franchise and Christianity not only gripped the worker, but it was one influence, if not the chief influence, in winning for Chartism what little aid the movement eventually received from the middle classes.

It was claimed by the Chartists that universal suffrage was "based on the revealed Word of God."[2] Attempts were made to prove the "Divine origin of liberty" from the laws of nature ordained by God, and to show from the Scriptures that "a simple democracy was the only order of Government" instituted by God.[3]

The view commonly held by the Chartists that it was the Christian's duty to do all in his power to promote the success of the Chartist Movement, brought the Chartists into direct antagonism to the Church. The process of reasoning which led the Chartists to come to their conclusion as to the duty of a Christian in regard to politics had no weight with many Christians. It was taught among many bodies of Christians in England in the early part of the nineteenth century that it was "wrong for a Christian to meddle in political matters."[4] It was maintained that for a Christian to concern himself with politics was the inevitable prelude of spiritual trouble, and was almost sure to result in contamination on the part of the participant.[5]

There was a remarkable carefulness on the part of the denominations to disavow any political affiliation, and the Church

[1] In a sermon by Stephens on Kennington Common in 1839.

[2] *Chartist Circular*, p. 9.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[4] *Reformers' Almanack*, p. 284.

[5] *Epistles from the Yearly Meetings of Friends* (II), pp. 303 and 332.

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member who was least concerned with the "affairs of this world" was considered to be the most saintly and most worthy of emulation. In other words, to be indifferent to political interests was considered to be the hall-mark of piety. This doctrine, that there was something fundamentally and essentially antagonistic between Christianity and politics, was held generally in all of the Churches, but the doctrine was held most tenaciously among the Wesleyan-Methodists,[1] whose treatment of Stephens illustrates clearly their attitude at the time towards party politics. The Rev. J. R. Stephens was a member of the Wesleyan itineracy, but was also on the staff of *The Christian Advocate*, a newspaper which spent most of its strength in violent assaults on the Church of England. Early in the year 1834 Stephens spoke at a meeting, and became the corresponding secretary of a "Church Separation Society". In defiance of his superintendent, he introduced his politics into the pulpit and into church meetings. His case was brought before the Wesleyan Conference, who held that by adopting party politics he had "flagrantly violated the peaceable and anti-sectarian spirit of Wesleyan-Methodism."[2] The Conference, therefore, required him to resign his secretaryship, and to eschew party politics: whereupon he asked and received permission to withdraw from the itineracy.[3]

In 1836 the question of the Scriptural attitude of the Christian towards politics again was raised at the Methodist Conference, and it was then affirmed "that it is no business of ours as men of God who have dedicated ourselves to a Kingdom which is not of this world to be very eager or prominent in drawing out these great principles to what we deem right political conclusions."[4] It was agreed also that for a Methodist minister to engage in political controversy was to act "contrary to his peculiar calling and solemn engagement."[5] In view of this

[1] Lovett, *Life and Struggles*, p. 244.

[2] Holyoake, *Life of J. R. Stephens*, p. 51.

[3] *New Hist. of Methodism*, I, p. 423.

[4] *Minutes*, VIII, 105.

[5] *Minutes*, II, 185.

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declaration of policy, it is instructive to find that Hagenbach held the opinion that Methodism represents Christian Democracy within the Church: "with aristocratic blood in his veins and a tendency to autocracy in his will, Wesley founded one of the most democratic churches in Christendom."[1]

By the end of the nineteenth century Wesleyan-Methodism had become a great national force. It had entered into public life, and was beginning to bring its form of religious influence to bear directly upon the settlement of great moral questions. The principle of keeping clear of party politics, however, was accepted as a counsel of wisdom by the various classes of members as a whole, though occasionally some exceptions were made.[2] There is no doubt that Stephens and Ostler in their day turned the theology and the methods of Methodism to the purposes of political agitation. It is not too much to say that Stephens went a long way towards making the reform of the laws a kind of religious revival. To these orators the Bible was the source, not only of all religious teaching, but also of all political propaganda.

The Methodists were not the only Christians who held the opinion that Christian ministers should abstain from participation in politics, for an ecclesiastical historian has recorded that at a Conference held in 1841, the Congregational Union discussed this difficult problem at great length, and the opinion which seems to have been shared by all was that Christian ministers have no especial concern and Christian Churches, as such, no proper concern at all, as regards the redress of civil grievances.[3]

In spite of the fact that many leaders of organized Christianity felt it their duty to abstain from participation in any form of political activity, a number of clergymen of the Church of England and Non-Conformist ministers supported strongly the demands of the Chartists. It is felt by some writers that it was the attempt to associate with practical politics which was re-

[1] *New Hist. of Methodism*, I, p. 226.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, p. 477.

[3] Waddington, *Congregational History*, 1800-1850, p. 553.

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sponsible chiefly for the extraordinary popularity of the few preachers who were willing to brave the storm of abuse and calumny which was associated with the term "political preacher." The Rev. J. R. Stephens, to whom reference has been made above, was the most famous of these preachers. The effect of his discourses upon the multitudes, who would stand for hours in the rain to hear him speak, was remarkable. Gifted with great eloquence, his intense bitterness in regard to the factory system and the new Poor Law led him frequently into extravagant statements of an inflammatory nature which, when printed in *The Northern Star* and distributed in pamphlet form, won for him an influence on the Chartist Movement in its early stages which was exceeded only by that of O'Connor himself.[1] It is remarkable that in his speech at his trial in 1839, Stephens said that he thought that the suffrage was too much extended.[2]

The attitude of the Chartists towards the Churches and ordained ministers, especially those of the Church of England, was one of great bitterness and of uncompromising hostility. Chartist periodicals and pamphlets and the reported speeches are full of the severest condemnation. The Established Church is described as "ungodly and plundering", and as "villainous as old mother hypocrisy". Some Chartists went so far as to describe the Established Church as "a system of vile priestcraft encouraged by the aristocracy for the plunder of the Church revenues and for the keeping of the people in a state of ignorance and suitable slavery and debasement", and as "the most corrupt and oppressive institution in Europe."[3] "More pigs and less parsons" was the significant motto on some of the banners carried by the Chartists in the northern counties of England during 1838–1839.[4]

Although the Non-Conformist Churches were not the recipients of such wholesale and unqualified abuse as was the Church of England, they did not wholly escape. The Wesleyan-Methodists were regarded with particular disfavor by the re-

[1] Gammage, *History of the Chartist Movement*, p. 55.

[2] Holyoake, *Life of Stephens*, p. 168.

[3] Leach, *Working Man's Argument in favour of the Charter*, p. 8.

[4] *Life and Letters of Holyoake*, I, p. 41.

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formers. Gammage asserts "that if there is a body of men in England who are in the service of and uphold the principles of despotism, that body is the Wesleyan Conference," which he describes as a "solemn hypocritical conclave".[1]

The attitude of the Chartists towards the Churches was so deeply rooted and so uncompromising that at the Chartist Convention of 1851 the following propositions were recommended to give expression to the Radical doctrines which had been informally set forth many times in the Chartist publications in regard to ecclesiastical reform:[2]

(i) Complete separation of Church and State.
(ii) All Church temporalities to be declared national property, except such individual endowments as have been voluntarily and legally made.
(iii) Tithes and Church Rates to be abolished.
(iv) The State not to interfere with the national policy of any Church.
(v) Ecclesiastical licences for the purposes of education unnecessary.

Of all the methods adopted by the Chartists with the object of identifying their movement with Christianity, there was none more striking than the organization known as the "Christian Chartist Churches." In consequence of their disgust at the lack of sympathy extended to them by the Established and Non-Conformist Churches, and in view of their conviction that none of the churches represented the true primitive Christianity as taught by Christ, they attempted to supply the need as they saw it; and, following the example of many others in similar circumstances, they established churches of their own. There seem to have been three causes which led the Chartists to organize these churches. In the first place, there was the desire to draw the people away from the influence of the existing ecclesiastical organizations in the hope that "ecclesiastical tyranny would soon die a natural death, and that clerical

[1] Gammage, *History of the Chartist Movement*, pp. 55-6.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 371.

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domination would be banished from our land."[1] In the second place there was the wish to repudiate and to dissipate by some unmistakable means the "ecclesiastical bellowing about Chartist infidelity."[2] Thirdly and lastly, there was undoubtedly a sincere desire to return to what they regarded as fundamental principles and practices of Christianity.[3] Services were held in private houses, in schools, in public halls and in any other place where a group of people could meet. In these places lay preachers, chosen from among the local societies, or Chartist missioners, who took no payment for their services, discoursed on politico-religious subjects,[4] and even went so far as to administer the rites of baptism and the Lord's Supper.[5] The usual method of procedure was to select an appropriate portion of the Bible, and, with that as a text, to enter into a discussion of political and economic problems and to attempt to find the solution in the teaching of Christianity.[6]

According to the author of the *Life of James Woodford*, the congregations in Birmingham were comprised almost entirely of Baptists and Methodist working men.[7]

It has been suggested that the opposition to Chartism on the part of some of the bodies of organized Christianity may have been due to some extent to vexation created by the loss of membership for which the establishment of the Chartist Churches was responsible.

If the reports of the sermons delivered by many typical clergymen of the Church of England from about 1840 to 1850 be correct, the unenviable reputation which the clergymen of the Established Church had acquired among the political radicals was, on the whole, deserved. They had not only opposed the Reform Bill of 1832 with vehemence, but they had also supported the opponents of Chartism with vehemence and malevo-

[1] *Chartist Circular*, vol. I, p. 129.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

[4] *People's Magazine*, pp. 159-160.

[5] *Chartist Circular*, pp. 110, 222, 226.

[6] *Midland Mining Commission*, paragraph 610.

[7] Solly, *James Woodford*, vol. II, p. 90.

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ence. Almost to a man, these "Clerks in Holy Orders" stood opposed to any further extension of the franchise, with the result that the Chartists regarded them as their bitterest enemies. Sermons were preached "On the sin of despising dominion", "The Powers that be are Ordained of God", 'Obedience to Lawful Authority", "Fear God and Honour the King"; in some of the printed political sermons Chartism is mentioned by name and in others by implication, but it was alleged that these were "published with the view of checking the spread of democratic principles and the growth of democratic feeling." [1]

The sermons rarely contained an attempt to argue the proposition logically, but are characterized by indiscriminate denunciation of all political reformers, who were referred to as "children of the devil", "filthy dreamers", and the like.[2] One clergyman published a sermon entitled "Chartism Unmasked", in which the statement occurs that "the doctrines taught and urged by the Chartist leaders are as diametrically opposed to the doctrines revealed in the eternal Word of God as the north is to the south." [3] The *English Review*, the *Christian Remembrancer*, the *Church of England Magazine* and the *Christian Observer*, all contained articles in opposition to the Chartist Movement. With remarkable unanimity all these papers witness that the official view of the Church of England was that any increase of the suffrage was to be dreaded, as tending to establish the supreme authority in a single branch of the legislature, thus upsetting the equilibrium of the balance of power.

There seems to be no doubt that in the struggle for a greater democracy in the Church and in the State, the Chartists found little in common with the Church of England, or with its representatives.[4]

W. G. H. COOK

LONDON

[1] *The People*, p. 169.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[3] Jenkins, *Chartism Unmasked*, p. 5 *et seq.*

[4] The concluding portion of this article will be published in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY for December, 1924.

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REVIEWS

Early Economic Thought: Selections from Economic Literature prior to Adam Smith. Edited by ARTHUR ELY MONROE. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1924.—viii, 400 pp.

Monetary Theory before Adam Smith. By ARTHUR ELY MONROE. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1923.—xi, 312 pp.

Professor Monroe is to be congratulated upon providing for the use of students of the history of economics a very useful compilation. No two scholars of course would make the same selection of extracts, and many will no doubt think that it would have been better to omit such well known and easily accessible authors as Mun, Petty and Hume, in order to make place for equally important but less familiar writers. But this is largely a matter of taste, about which it is not worth while to quarrel. The volume will serve a useful purpose and is warmly to be welcomed, especially because the translations are well done.

The same praise cannot be bestowed upon the other volume, on *Monetary Theory before Adam Smith.* The author tells us in the preface that he was led to undertake the work because of the lack of an adequate survey of the subject in any language. This adequate survey, we regret to state, has not been provided in the present volume. Adequate it certainly is not, and instead of being a survey, it is only a sketch.

Attention, however, must first be directed to the good points of the volume. Professor Monroe is a painstaking student who has marshalled a large mass of material and put it in convenient form. It is indeed a dry and unappetizing narrative, contrasting in this respect unfavorably with such an essay as that of Professor Hollander on *British Monetary Theory at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century.* But while hard reading, the presentation is informative.

There are three criticisms to be urged. In the first place, the author relies too much upon secondary material. As an example, in the treatment of Sir Isaac Newton, no reference is made to his interesting contributions, to be found both in the British Museum and in Mr. Pierpont Morgan's library. In the earlier sections of the book

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this neglect of original sources is especially marked. Secondly, Professor Monroe has made no use of the rich but hitherto unutilized British literature. There was a great opportunity to do here, for Great Britain at least—not to speak of the other countries—what Professor Furniss has done so well in his recent book on *The Position of the Laborer in the System of Nationalism*. Take, for instance, the monetary theories at the time of the English recoinage controversy in 1695-97. There are in my own library several hundred volumes, tracts and broadsides, on this one topic alone, which discuss in an interesting way various aspects of monetary theory. Scarcely a single one of these is mentioned by Professor Monroe. What is true of the recoinage controversy of 1695-7 is true of not a few other episodes in English, Scotch and Irish monetary history. A really adequate survey would have made in this respect a notable contribution.

The most regrettable fact, however, is the almost total neglect of early monetary theories. For instance, Professor Monroe devotes to the Middle Ages about twenty-five pages, almost entirely a rehash of familiar secondary material. But even here he does not mention the one important book on the subject, the volume of Bridrey, of some 735 large pages, on *La Théorie de la Monnaie au XIVème Siècle*. As this was published in 1906, the failure to utilize it is unfortunate in the extreme. It is as if someone were to write a history of political economy and to ignore Adam Smith. Bridrey's book contains over thirty-nine pages of closely printed bibliography, mentioning dozens of authors who are unknown to Professor Monroe. An acquaintance with Bridrey would, moreover, have saved Professor Monroe from several hoary errors, as, on page 19, where he repeats the statements of German writers handed down from one to another, that Buridan was the teacher of Oresme; whereas, as Bridrey convincingly shows, the opposite was the case. So, again, with the treatment of Copernicus and others. In fact, the book instead of being called *Monetary Theory before Adam Smith* ought to be called "Monetary Theories in the Eighteenth Century". An adequate presentation of monetary theories before Adam Smith would turn out to be a very different kind of work.

These strictures are presented with reluctance, for Professor Monroe is evidently in many respects an accurate, careful and painstaking student. They are offered in the interests of American economics. It is unfortunately too true that many American economists have devoted far more attention to the writing of textbooks and of

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compilations based on secondary material than to real contributions to science. This is especially true in the history of economic thought. We have no means of knowing whether the present work is a Doctor's dissertation, but we rather suspect that it is. On the European continent it is usual to call attention to this fact, as in the French *thèses* and the German *Seminar-Arbeiten;* and the learned public is accustomed to make allowance for these *Erstlings-Arbeiten.* The Harvard Series, however, does not, as some others, limit itself to Doctors' dissertations, and the authors must therefore run the gauntlet of criticism as mature works. American economics should learn to take its obligations more seriously.

EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN

The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind. By JOHN MOFFATT MECKLIN. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1924.—244 pp.

Why the recent rise and astounding growth of the Ku Klux Klan? Smile as broadly as we may at its nightgowns and fiery crosses, at its Kleagles and Kloran and Imperial Wizard, it constitutes a substantial fact in American politics and American society and a serious problem in our national life. It is worthy of scientific study by American sociologists, and Dr. Mecklin, professor of sociology at Dartmouth, is to be congratulated for the patient observation and extensive correspondence by means of which he has grasped the fact and for the sanity and calm with which he has expounded the problem. His style might be a bit gayer and some of his remarks might be rather more profound, but on the whole his book is illuminating as well as timely.

The Klan as founded by W. J. Simmons at Atlanta in 1915 appears to have been just another fraternal and patriotic society, drawing on the original Klan of Reconstruction days only for its regalia and paraphernalia and depending for its popular support solely upon those psychological and environmental factors which have made the United States a paradise for "joiners"—the charm of mystery and ritual for sufferers from the drabness of small-town life, the "inferiority complex" of mediocre souls, and the longing for like-mindedness in a country surfeited with individualism. Simmons himself is represented as endowed with what Americans term "the gift of gab" but as devoid of requisite organizing ability; and in all probability the Klan would still be an insignificant imitator of larger

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and better organized secret "orders", had its Imperial Wizard not contracted out his child, so to speak, to Mr. E. Y. Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler. These, the *ex machina deus* and *dea* respectively, took hold in June, 1920; they were promoters and salesmen, professions very close to the heart of Babbitt and Main Street; and what they sold to the American public was a commodity greatly in demand in these post-war years—the commodity of hate. They rushed into an arena fevered with war-psychology, with hatred of the Germans and distrust of the Allies, with terror of Bolsheviks and horror of the League of Nations, into an arena littered with Nordic propaganda of William McDougall, Lothrop Stoddard, and Madison Grant and resounding with slogans of "One hundred per cent American", "America for the Americans", "America must not be a dumping ground for foreigners or foreign goods". It was on the eve of the enactment of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, the sharp restriction of immigration, the widespread subjection of historical textbooks to patriotic censorship, and President Harding's declaration that "in the existing League of Nations, world governing with its super-powers, this Republic will have no part".

Nationalism, intensified by the war and the war's aftermath, is thus the marrow on which of late the Klan has thriven mightily. It is a nationalism which is diametrically opposed to the Zangwillian and Rooseveltian notion of the melting-pot; it is a nationalism which would produce unity and solidarity by compelling all Americans to conform *instanter* to the usages and stereotypes of that old American stock which is Nordic and Protestant. Any group that does not look Nordic or espouse Evangelical Protestantism is to be feared and fought, and thus it falls out that such strange fellows as negroes, Jews and Catholics are bundled by the Klan into the same Procrustean bed. That in this process the hater is more significant than the hated is attested by the fact that the Klan has secured its largest and most active following in those very localities where Nordic and Protestant dominance is least threatened, in Oregon, Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, northern Louisiana, Indiana and Ohio.

"The motive which has gained most members for the Klan," Professor Mecklin reports, "taking precedence over all others in the strength and universality of its appeal, is undoubtedly anti-Catholicism" (p. 157). In the minds of a host of Americans of colonial ancestry is lodged perhaps an ignorant and unreasoning but certainly a very real detestation of Roman Catholicism. This detestation is variously expressed in dislike and contempt for the ceremonies of

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the Church, in denunciation of its dogmas, in campaigns against parochial schools, in credence of the most fantastic tales of "escaped nuns" and of the most scurrilous forgeries of ecclesiastical documents, and particularly in fear and hatred of the Church, which, it is imagined, obliges its members to obey the behests of a foreign pope in preference to the laws of the national government. Such an aspersion on the integrity of Catholic citizenship is a time-honored habit of British-American Evangelical thought; it is surely as old as the reign of Queen Elizabeth and responsible for the persecuting statutes of her time. Though diminishing somewhat in force from generation to generation, it has continued periodically to vex American politics, and Professor Mecklin quite appositely connects the attempts of the Klan to secure legislation against Catholic schools and Catholic charities and to exclude Catholics from public office and teaching positions with similar efforts of the American Protective Association and of the Know-Nothing Party. "The antipathy of the Klansman to the Catholic," he concludes, "is nothing new. It is but the latest phase of a mental attribute that has characterized native Americanism from the very beginning" (p. 162).

It is surprising and a little disturbing that the author presents in his longest chapter, that on "The Klan and Anti-Catholicism", only a most superficial commentary on this basic aspersion of Catholic citizenship in the United States. He admits that American Catholics seem to be thoroughly loyal to the United States, but he displays amazing ignorance of the cause and nature of their loyalty. For example, he declares (p. 173) that Catholicism has always insisted upon the union of church and state, which is simply untrue. Again, he states that a peculiarly American tradition of the separation of church and state was seriously threatened by the large immigration of European Catholics, notably "French, German, and Irish" (p. 175); here he is obviously unmindful of the fact that whatever prejudices about the subject the handful of French Catholics may have brought with them to this country, the host of Irish Catholic immigrants and a very large number of German Catholics too have come to our shores wholly without experience of any connection between their faith and their government. More serious still is his confusion of the "Americanism" condemned by Pope Leo XIII with the "Americanism" championed by Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop Ireland, and Bishop Spalding; here the blame probably rests with his sources, for he appears to have relied upon the Modernist French Abbé Houtin when he should have gone straight to the Ency-

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clical Letters of Leo XIII, to the writings of American Catholics, and especially to the excellent digest of Catholic political philosophy recently edited by Dr. John A. Ryan and Dr. J. F. X. Millar. Also from the questionable Houtin must be derived the author's misapprehensions about the Paulists and their founder, Father Isaac Hecker, whom he represents as having been "dismissed" from the Redemptorist Order, presumably because he was too American, and as having had "a minimum of interest in medieval theology and ancient religious forms" (p. 177); it is true that Father Hecker was zealous to convert Americans to the Catholic Faith, but he was not "dismissed" from the Redemptorist Order, he was as "medieval" in his theology as any Catholic, and anyone who knows the Church of Saint Paul the Apostle which he founded in New York knows that the Roman liturgy is there observed in its most exacting form. With matters of opinion rather than of fact, the reviewer is less concerned, but he cannot refrain from expressing a doubt about Professor Mecklin's observation that "the Catholic Church emphatically discourages the critical independence of thought so necessary to citizenship in a democracy" (p. 205), especially since the author in another place explains the strength of the Klan in Oregon (over ninety per cent of whose inhabitants are Protestant and over ninety-eight per cent literate) by reference to the failure of the whole educational system of the state, from kindergarten to university, to evoke any critical independence of thought. Lack of independence of thought is at any rate not a peculiarity of Catholic Americans.

Despite some shortcomings, Professor Mecklin has produced a valuable work; and few critically thoughtful persons, whether they be Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or agnostic, will dissent from his final conclusions: "The Klan . . . is perhaps the most striking example this generation has furnished of the tyranny of the conventionally patriotic, often well-meaning but small-minded, mediocre man" (p. 234); "the uniform opinion of the best element in every community is that the Klan has never had any real justification for its existence—it has flourished by creating false issues, by magnifying hates and prejudices or by exploiting misguided loyalties—it cannot point to a single great constructive movement which it has set on foot" (p. 240).

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B. By J. A. SPENDER. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.—Two volumes: xv, 351 pp.; xiii, 444 pp.

Campbell-Bannerman was not a man of whom many biographies are likely to be written, and for this reason, as well as because of its merits, Mr. Spender's will probably not be superseded in the near future. Though the author has not felt himself under obligation to reveal the complete scaffolding of his structure — he rarely cites authorities and gives no bibliography—it is evident that he has prepared himself for his chosen task by diligent study of the essential materials, especially the correspondence and private papers of Campbell-Bannerman, from which he quotes generously. In addition, though he never obtrudes this fact upon the reader, he enjoyed the advantage of long and intimate association with the subject of his biography, thereby acquiring, in the phrase of William James, that "knowledge of acquaintance" for which "knowledge about" can never be an adequate substitute. That he had an affectionate admiration for "C.-B." is apparent throughout these pages; but his tone is never that of adulation, and when he accords high praise, not many of his readers will deem it unmerited.

Few British prime ministers have had prospects less brilliant than Campbell-Bannerman's. His career as an undergraduate at Cambridge afforded no justification for great expectations, he had entered upon his fiftieth year before he became a minister of cabinet rank, and he was nearly sixty in 1895 when his party was consigned to a dismal decade of Opposition and internal faction. He was accounted a competent administrator, and his judgment was valued in the counsels of his party, but as a parliamentary debater he was rated rather below the standard of front-bench power. It is doubtful if anybody outside of his own constituency, the Stirling Burghs, which he represented continuously from his first election to Parliament in 1868 till his death forty years later, believed that he would be the next Liberal prime minister, and even devoted constituents must have had their doubts. When Lord Rosebery resigned the leadership of the Liberal party in 1896 that position fell into abeyance, and when, early in 1899, Campbell-Bannerman was chosen Liberal leader in the House of Commons in succession to Sir William Harcourt, it was with the understanding that he was not to be regarded as leader of the party, but only of the party in the House of Commons, and that this post did not carry with it a title to the pre-

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miership when the Liberals should return to power. This understanding he always scrupulously observed.

Probably he was never even tempted to violate it, for he had no love of power; though in other respects the least paradoxical of men, he was a politician devoid of ambition. The evidences of this are everywhere in the record of his life, and the crowning proof of it is that he was anxious to retire from the arena of party politics to the speakership of the House of Commons, a fact which his colleague, Mr. Asquith, in an eloquent tribute to his memory, cited to show that he had no desire for political leadership. It did not matter to him who the Liberal leader was so long as the Liberal faith was kept. Lord Rosebery's relations to the party during the years following his resignation had proved intolerable to Harcourt and were bound to embarrass his successor, for Rosebery would neither cooperate nor vanish from the political scene, but persisted in hanging on the flank of the party to the grave impairment of its discipline. His intentions, as Mr. Spender puts it, were always obscured in "a mist of doubt". There seems to be little question that Campbell-Bannerman would have welcomed the return of Rosebery to his former position in the party, but he would have nothing to do with the doctrine of the "clean slate", which Rosebery promulgated during the Boer War. "I am not prepared," he said, "to erase from the tablets of my creed any principle or measure or proposal or ideal or aspiration of Liberalism." That Home Rule survived as a policy of the Liberal party was owing in large measure to the resoluteness of this sturdy defender of the faith. He held it to be inexpedient as well as unethical for a party to jettison principles in order to win votes. "There were times," according to his simple philosophy of party, "when the country wanted Toryism and there were times when it wanted Liberalism, but it never wanted something between the two. For a Liberal to dilute his doctrine in the hope of appeasing national sentiment when the country was Tory was pure folly, for when the tide turned, he would be found to have entangled himself with the very doctrine which the country wished to be rid of." It was like him to claim no virtue for walking in the way of righteousness. On his deathbed he said to an old friend: "If people should say of me that I tried always to go straight there is perhaps no credit to me in that. It may have been mere indolence. The straight road always seemed to me the easiest."

It has been said that Campbell-Bannerman adhered to outworn shibboleths and lacked vision. The reader of these volumes will find

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reason to question such an opinion. The grant of self-government to the Boer colonies, for which the chief credit undoubtedly belongs to him, was the culmination of the South African policy which he had been preaching, and had been reviled for preaching, since the outbreak of the Boer War. It was an act of political wisdom and faith for which it is difficult to find a precedent in history. "I hope," said General Smuts, in a speech in London in 1917, "that when you draw up a calendar of empire-builders you will not forget the name of Campbell-Bannerman — a wise man with profound feeling and profound political instinct, who achieved one of the wisest political settlements in the history of this country." Campbell-Bannerman did not exhibit a lack of vision when, in 1903, he spoke of the British Empire as a "commonwealth of free nations"; nor when, in 1907, he declared that the people of Ireland "should have everything that a self-governing colony had"; nor when, in 1903, he refused to say that Free Trade was a catholicon for the evils of poverty and insisted that it must be supplemented by social reform. If he looked back to the great Liberals of the past for guidance and inspiration and paid tribute to what was best in the doctrines of the Manchester School, he did not believe that even Gladstone and Bright had said the last word. "Again and again," says Mr. Spender, "he pleaded for a constructive social policy which would grapple seriously with the evils of slums and sweating and infantile mortality, and which, as he said in his first speech as Prime Minister, would make the land 'less of a pleasure-ground for the rich and more of a treasure-house for the nation.'"

With the happenings of recent years fresh in memory, Mr. Spender records this final impression:

> No man was ever more of a democrat and less of a demagogue than Campbell-Bannerman, and if there is anything that may be learnt from his example, it is that a man may still in this country save his life by losing it, and win popular applause and affection by bravely resisting the tumults and excitements of the hour. Of all the arts of manipulating opinion, currying favour with newspapers, trimming sails to the popular breeze, he was wholly innocent. Right or wrong he never had his ears to the ground, or could be turned from a cause in which his convictions were engaged by the fear of the polling-booth.

Robert Livingston Schuyler

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Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times.—The Case of America. By THORSTEIN VEBLEN. New York, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923.—445 pp.

Someone has characterized Arthur Balfour as one who knows that there was once an ice age and that, in all probability, there will someday be another. This description is not altogether inapplicable to Mr. Veblen, who brings to the consideration of contemporary life a wide and penetrating knowledge of the past. In commenting upon any of Mr. Veblen's writings, it is well to preface one's remarks with a reminder of this unusual interest and understanding, since the current impression that Mr. Veblen is either obscure or unduly facetious is, in no small measure, due to a failure in understanding his aim.

Mr. Veblen approaches our customary group activities armed with the findings and the methods of the anthropologists, more particularly the historian of culture, material and otherwise. Under his scrutiny, the discrete categories of contemporary economics, political science and sociology are scarcely applicable to the group life he discovers, which moves in terms of the group heritage of ritual, ceremony and symbol and the practice of the industrial arts. Group activities, therefore, are to be understood as a product of the cumulative changes of the past and to be viewed as moving in a direction and at a rate which objective inquiry may approximately reveal.

In this latest book, *Absentee Ownership,* Mr. Veblen has undertaken to trace the evolution of our present-day group life and activities as they come to a focus in the customary practice of absentee ownership of industrial equipment. In this analysis of absentee ownership and its accompanying free (unearned) income as the predominating institution of to-day, he has set forth the genesis of this contemporary culture complex in three main patterns—the national establishment, the price system or credit economy and a mechanical industry deriving from an ever more rapidly expanding technology. Through the growth and interaction of these patterns, from their prototypes in early modern times, there has come about the group life we know to-day, in which the operation of mechanical industry is continually subordinated, through the ritual and ceremony of credit and political control, to the necessities of maintaining the national integrity and the free income accruing to absentee owners.

Having shown the origin of the present, all-pervading control by absentee ownership over the life and fortunes of the several classes

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of people making up the group, Mr. Veblen is then concerned with the discovery of the future trend and development of this culture complex. As he sees the situation unfolding, expanding credits and rising prices will evermore securely intrench the absentee owners in their control of industry, with an increasing necessity of curtailing production in order to support this pecuniary structure. Increasingly the wage earners, through their organizations and, in all probability, the farmers will come to play the same business game of enhancing their pecuniary gains at the expense of output and, more ultimately, of the well-being of the population. (*Cf.* Ricardo's forecast of the increasing domination by the landlords over the group activities and gains.) Such an expansion of business will carry with it an increase in nationalistic rivalry, which is merely the political expression of business interests, so that, both internally and externally, the group life will be devoted more and more to the game of mutual defeat. For the calculable future then, Mr. Veblen sees the present historically derived scheme of things persisting, with an ever-increasing margin of frustration until the burden of it and the privation of the underlying population bring an overturn.

Since Mr. Veblen deals with the future, it may be permissible to offer one or two comments upon his expectations, by way of indicating possible alternative interpretations of the same set of facts which he adduces in his analyses and his forecasts. Thus, one may not be inclined to disagree with Mr. Veblen that business methods are being extended over new aspects of group activities, e. g., agriculture and labor organizations, and yet have certain reservations upon his Marxian conclusion that the situation as a whole will grow worse until a general, rather abrupt, revision occurs. For it appears that those activities which are now coming under the sway of business methods are the rear-guard of a series of changes, the van of which began fairly early in the nineteenth century, as Mr. Veblen has shown. Now it may be questioned whether "big business" in the large key industries, which have about reached the apogee of business-like methods, will remain stable until the other activities of our group life are brought up to a like refined condition. The reviewer is inclined to suggest that long before agriculture, for example, has been put on a thorough-going business basis, mechanical industries will have moved forward to yet another stage, the nature of which may be inferred from the ventures in integration by Mr. Henry Ford.

This is not intended to imply any sudden altruistic development

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in the successors to our present business directors and executives, but merely to suggest that, for all their ingenuity and cleverness (Mr. Veblen is apt to impute a certain volitional and malevolent intent), the business man nevertheless is a creature of the tool and the machine and will be dragged along by it, regardless of his primary concern for pecuniary gain. We may assume, indeed, taking Mr. Veblen's own method of approach, we must assume, that Mr. Ford's increasing integration of hitherto separately managed industries is coming about by the same process of cumulative change which produced "big business", absentee ownership and the like, and that his "ploughing back" of surplus earnings to increase capacity and to reduce prices is an evolutionary development, quite as significant as any of the evidence which Mr. Veblen has so carefully detailed. May it not be possible, therefore, that future developments in the management and direction of mechanical industry may place a business-controlled agriculture (now arising) in the position of a cultural laggard? After all, as Mr. Veblen has repeatedly shown, absentee ownership and the credit economy have been called into being by the exigencies of mechanical industry and they serve only to maintain our cultural heritage of ownership, rights, privileges and the like, as an ever-increasing burden upon industry. Looking at the process in the large, are we warranted in believing that the machine process will be dominated for long by a culture complex deriving from an earlier set of tools? The record is replete with examples of a material culture which has been stifled by social and religious institutions, but nowhere, seemingly, has this occurred where the material culture was being expanded through diffusion and invention.

There are a number of other points which call for consideration, but space forbids. One topic, however, demands brief mention as fairly important in the book Mr. Veblen has given us. Throughout he has spoken of absentee ownership and its right to a free, unearned income ("something for nothing"), in an invidious sense, which serves to contrast the lot of those who must earn their income and are penalized, both directly and indirectly, by the levy of absentee owners upon the fruits of their labor. But in viewing this situation, as it sweeps through early modern times or before, on to the undisclosed future, it appears that every new development of tools and machinery has involved the creation of an unearned income, in so far as they have brought returns, larger or more quickly, than their operators realized before, and that the number of persons

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receiving some form of unearned income is, absolutely and relatively, an ever-growing portion of the group. The question then may fairly be raised, is not the secular trend in the direction of unearned income for everyone, just as we have seen every privilege and benefit begin with a small class, then gradually devolve down to the underlying population, and as we are perhaps seeing now in old age and widow's pensions, accident and sickness payments, life insurance, especially endowment policies, and similar provisions? Indeed "something for nothing" is almost the only unequivocal measure which we can apply to a civilization and, perhaps in the rather restricted form of absentee ownership and an income from the practice of business, we are witnessing the early stages of a major movement in cultural history. If such it be, however, we may be sure that neither the social reformer nor the "hard-boiled" business man will accelerate or retard its coming, since only tools or the natural setting have any enduring influence upon man's group patterns of behavior.

It remains to be noted that Mr. Veblen's usual nicety of expression is to be found in this, his latest, book. For the judicious, the note to chapter xi may be commended, as touching upon the frequent complaint that the church must adopt modern methods.

LAWRENCE K. FRANK

NEW YORK CITY

The Prospects of Industrial Civilization. By BERTRAND and DORA RUSSELL. New York, The Century Company, 1923.—287 pp.

Bertrand Russell has long since demonstrated his deep social sympathies and his capacity for lucid and well-turned thought. In this most recent work upon social problems, he again considers with mingled fatalism and hope where our civilization is going and where it should be led. The first part of the book is devoted to a consideration of the twin forces of nationalism and industrialism that are so dominant today, while the second part sketches the elements which should characterize the good community.

It is an exacerbated nationalism, he believes, that is hurrying on the western world to its apparent catastrophe. Industrialism, instead of checking nationalism, as Herbert Spencer had hoped, has at once increased and intensified the areas of conflict and has furnished the nations with more lethal weapons. International control is therefore necessary and this might seem to be most easily secured by the hegemony of some one state and the establishment of a second *Pax*

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Romana. But since it is improbable that any country, save possibly America, is strong enough thus to establish itself, the development of strong and self-sufficient land empires adapted for defensive but not for offensive purposes seems most probable. Such empires probably will be the United States, China, Russia, and Western Europe, if indeed the various nations of the latter continent are capable of combining. Russell is, however, quite evidently afraid of the growing economic power of the United States and fearful that we may seek to dominate the world.

Within these great empires, socialism, which alone can offer an ultimate solution, cannot be expected to permeate the industrially undeveloped countries, since it will not be able to furnish the capital or the discipline which will be needed. It is from the industrially advanced countries, therefore, that socialism will come. The two chief barriers to this, however, are: (1) the ability of the capitalists, through their control of the schools, the press and the pulpit, to hoodwink the working class, and (2) the prospect that the United States as the embodiment of American capitalism may try to repress the manifestations of European socialism. It is by persuasion and by education, therefore, that socialism is to be effected, although at the end it will probably be necessary to use some force to displace the few capitalists who alone will still continue to believe in their system.

What sort of a life does Russell envisage under socialism? Not an abandonment of industrialism and a return to handicraft as Ruskin, Morris and Penty have urged. Industrialism is necessary to provide the material basis for the good life and if mankind is freed from excessive luxuries and the wastes of war and competition, the four-hour day advocated by Campanella in the seventeenth century and by Kropotkin in the nineteenth, will become a reality. Men will find their greatest development in leisure. Delight in life, friendly feeling, the enjoyment of beauty and the pursuit of knowledge, these fruits of the spirit, will become attainable not for the few but for the masses of mankind. Economic power will be distributed among a large number of guilds who will be checked by associations of consumers with the territorial state as the ultimate court of appeal. Finally, Russell relies upon a purified educational system, freed from being the drill master of narrow patriotism, which will seek to develop creative spirits.

Like everything else that Russell writes, this work is characterized by candor of thought and felicity of phrase. Its speculations are

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broad and general and represent the observations of a sympathetic outside observer of industrial life. One misses the solid foundation of fact, however, which an experimental worker in the social sciences might have supplied, while the irritation-complex which Russell experiences towards religion and towards the United States gives his work, at times, an acerbity which, while excusable, is not in keeping with his usual generous attitude.

In a world, however, where both philistines and particularistic scholars abound, the general reflections of a warm-spirited philosopher are of great value in helping us to decide whether the ends that we should seek are narrow national patriotism and the most effective mechanism of production or the abundant life of the spirit. Western civilization is being forced to decide between these conflicting ideals and this book should assist in clarifying the issues.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Revolutionary New England. By JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS. Boston, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923.—xiv, 469 pp.

In publishing his second volume of early New England history Mr. Adams has established himself in an enviable position among the authorities in that field. There have been, and possibly still are, scholars who have felt that the results of historical research were too sacred to lay before the general public. Writers of this school have therefore embodied their work in learned monographs or bulky volumes, the perusal of which was left to a highly select few. It is partly because of this attitude that the general public has been relatively indifferent to the progress of investigation in American history. Sometimes perhaps it may make little difference what the public knows, thinks, or cares about historical research. But the irrational criticism of the so-called "revised" American history shows how much the public needs to know. The present dispute over the interpretation of certain periods of American history, in so far as it is honest, is due to a lack of understanding and appreciation of what historians have been doing in recent years. It is this very situation that makes Mr. Adams's work valuable. He brings together, in a very readable, vivid account, the products of modern historical study. For those who have not the time, or the inclination, to work through the writings of Greene, Alvord, Osgood, Beer and Schlesinger, to mention only a few of the outstanding authori-

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ties, Mr. Adams presents a most suggestive summary. To this he adds a variety of material gathered from a wide range of reading, in both secondary and primary sources, all of which he illuminates with his own lively observations. Every reader of Mr. Adams's *Founding of New England* knows that he writes well. *Revolutionary New England* reveals the same engaging style, the same knack of selecting apt, vivid illustrative material, and the same ability to construct a thoroughly readable narrative.

This volume deals with the period between 1691 and 1776. Until a generation ago it was customary to jump from the revocation of the Massachusetts charter and Sir Edmund Andros to James Otis and the Writs of Assistance, with a more or less cursory glance at the "French and Indian Wars". Parkman's brilliant volumes hardly touch upon the subject of colonial growth, and Palfrey, valuable as his work was, missed many of the striking features of the period. Mr. Adams devotes a liberal portion of his volume to the years before 1760.

He begins with an analysis of the British system of colonial regulation and control, showing what the policy was, and, more important still, why it was adopted. Then he goes on to explain how the "expanding energies" of the colonies led to a divergence of interests. His skill in marshaling the pertinent evidence before the reader is illustrated again and again, for example in his comments on the Act of Parliament for restricting the manufacture of woolen goods in the colonies (p. 118) or on the Molasses Act of 1733 (p. 152).

His comments on Jonathan Edwards will delight that part of the present generation which finds little to admire in this eighteenth-century exponent of Puritan theology. Edwards, Adams writes, "in part swung New England back to the horrors of its Calvinism and preached a gorilla God of such fiendish deviltry as surpassed the bloodiest heathen Moloch" (p. 170). And again, Edwards "painted a hell that has no equal in all the horrors of theological literature" (p. 171).

In discussing the Seven Years' War Mr. Adams describes the nature and extent of the western interests of the Americans, and shows their complacency in refusing to assume a fair portion of the burden of defense. In these chapters American trade with the enemy receives due attention; so too does the Proclamation of 1763. Mr. Adams's appreciation of colorful comment is well brought out in his quotation from John Wilkes, to the effect that the Peace of

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Paris was "certainly the peace of God, for it passeth all understanding" (p. 278).

The account of the controversy between the colonies and the English government after 1760 is well balanced and sane. If the author occasionally makes an unwarranted assumption, as he does in the suggestion that Samuel Adams began to plan for independence "very early" in his career (p. 303) he more than atones for this in his sensible treatment of the whole dispute. The volume is an excellent specimen of what can be done to present authoritative history in entertaining form.

RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Erasmus, a Study of his Life, Ideals and Place in History. By PRESERVED SMITH. New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1923.—xiii, 479 pp.

This is a most interesting study of a complex and fascinating character; it is safe to say that once picked up, it will hardly be put aside until the reader has finished it. Erasmus was cordially hated—and feared—by most of the religious leaders, Catholic and Protestant, of his day; essentially a man of peace, of the study, of pleasant companionship with gifted and cultured friends, his nostrils were perforce filled with the smoke of battle. Descending but rarely to the coarse invective which characterized the polemic of that time, he none the less winced under every attack, and with subtle irony returned blow for blow.

Through the intimacies of this troubled career we are led by our author, himself Erasmian in the breadth of his reading and the charm of his style. Professor Smith has qualified himself for his task by assiduous study and long reflection. He has exacted tribute from all the more recent researches which have added to our knowledge of his subject, more especially the monumental work of P. S. Allen in the publication of the *Correspondence.* Indeed, were one to criticize adversely the work at any point, it would be in the too great detail with which the narrative is at times encumbered, and which seems to interrupt its flow. This is most noticeable in chapter xiii where is told at considerable length the story of the personal quarrels with individuals more or less obscure, in much of which there seems but little point except the desire to account completely for all the activities of the Dutch humanist. But this one seeming

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defect is easily atoned for in the general excellence of the work as a whole.

Professor Smith maintains the detachment of the true scholar. He has very definite ideas and is not afraid to express them, but he does not urge them upon the reader, whom he leaves to form his own judgment on the basis of materials fully and dispassionately presented. Thus we are led really to see Erasmus and to feel something of the problems with which he was faced. There is no blanket justification for his fulsome flattery, in the hope of favors, of the high-born and high-placed; there is no attempt to explain away the narrowness of interest which led him practically to ignore the art, science and geographical discoveries of his time; the reader is left pretty much to form his own judgment, upon the moot question as to whether Erasmus was a trimmer and a coward. Throughout the work one senses the fairness and complete candor of the author, combined with critical acumen of a high order.

A very high place is properly accorded Erasmus both as a literary critic and a reformer. He was easily the foremost *littérateur* of his day. He loved books. They were his friends with whom he enjoyed "the most delightful intercourse". "With them I shut myself in a corner, where I escape the windy crowd and either speak to them in sweet whispers or listen to their gentle voices" (quoted on p. 37). And no man did more to bring to light the literary riches of antiquity—both pagan and Christian. He was the leader of the Transalpine humanists who set for themselves the task of uniting the religion of Jesus with what was best in paganism. In him the streams of the Renaissance and the Reformation coalesce. "The purpose that gave unity and nobility to Erasmus's life was his championship of the 'philosophy of Christ'; by which he understood a simple, rational, and classical Christianity. . . . His aim was always practical—to aid reform, not primarily to produce a work of disinterested scholarship" (p. 159).

Indeed, apart from producing a very scholarly and readable life of his subject, the author's chief contribution in the book under review is the further elucidation of his conception of the Renaissance and the Reformation as two aspects of essentially the same movement. In this he combats the current tendency to differentiate sharply between the two. "The Renaissance and Reformation were . . . . really one. The conscious opposition of the champions of each, the intense warfare arising from their propinquity and concern with the same interests, have concealed the real similarity of their

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natures" (p. 2). Erasmus and Luther, he argues further, sought much the same ends, but in different ways. Luther was dogmatic, interested in beliefs; Erasmus was interested in the moral issues involved. "The fact that the two were able to join issues proves that they were nearly allied in interest. There was no battle between science and capitalism, between Fugger and Copernicus" (p. 336 *et seq.*). That Erasmus did ultimately come to reject the Reformation Professor Smith regards "as a mistake in itself and a misfortune to the cause of liberalism" (p. 439). It was his virtue, as it was his misfortune, to see the issues involved not as simple, but as very complex. There were too many hesitations, too many qualifications for him to be a man of action. "He, almost alone in his age, knew that truth had many facets, that no rule can be without exceptions, and that no position is unassailable."

Significant in subject and in matter, the book furnishes food for thought as well as enjoyment.

AUSTIN P. EVANS

Diplomatic Portraits; Europe and the Monroe Doctrine One Hundred Years Ago. By W. P. CRESSON. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1923.—xix, 371 pp.

This new volume by Dr. Cresson is a continuation of his previous work concerning the Holy Alliance. The sequel is somewhat more interesting than its predecessor, though the method employed by the author is rather unusual. The gallery of portraits is by no means comprehensive; it simply covers a certain historical period, the apparent aim being to illustrate the epoch rather than to do full justice to the characters themselves. Napoleon (ch. ii) is least satisfactory of all the figures described, and no wonder, for, of so complex, so extraordinarily intricate a personality thirty-five pages can give only a slight glimpse, and the glimpse given by Dr. Cresson, who seems to disregard the tremendous literature on the subject, is not impeccably correct in its valuation. Of what should have been the two most interesting personages, Tsar Alexander and Talleyrand, the descriptions (chs. i and iv) are disappointing; in the case of Alexander too much stress is laid on the first half of his reign, the remainder being slighted, though it was of so much more importance to the period Dr. Cresson is analyzing. Talleyrand is discussed exclusively from the viewpoint of "Ballroom diplomacy", though he well deserves a better fate. The best chapters are those

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devoted to John Quincy Adams (vi), Gentz (vii, which is most entertaining), Chateaubriand (ix) and James Monroe (x, the last in the series). The portraits of the two American statesmen are well depicted, and illuminate nicely the origins of the famous Doctrine; they are not too long, nor too involved, yet they give an adequate picture of the events of their times, and for that reason they will surely remain of value for any future investigator. In Gentz we have, on the other hand, a typical bureaucrat: from Dr. Cresson's narrative the reader can well visualize a diplomat of the old school, all bound up in his red tape, thinking much of titles and decorations, but nevertheless playing an important rôle behind the backs of the greater statesmen; speaking always in whispers; acting invariably from behind the corner. Finally, the portrait of Chateaubriand reflects the post-Vienna period, when Tsar Alexander had become a reactionary; these two men naturally came together and cooperated in many ways, notably in trying to cope with the Spanish situation. According to their opinion, the Spanish revolt had to be crushed, at all costs, the Spanish-American colonies returned to the motherland, and the throne preserved for the sake of the unworthy Ferdinand. No wonder these two men met with such energetic opposition from the United States. The reader watches with interest how the resentment maturing in Monroe's cabinet finally culminates in the President's historic message.

The chapters on Metternich (viii) and Madame de Krüdener (v) are indifferent. From the former, which is possibly too short, the reader fails to get the impression that the Austrian was a statesman who not only guided the destinies of his own country, but led the rest of Continental Europe, giving his name to an era. The history of the activities of Castlereagh (iii) contributes little or nothing new.

In conclusion, one must note the seeming haste with which the book was prepared. Especially the first four chapters evince a lack of deliberation. Foreign names, and notably Russian names, are confusingly misspelled; some, such as Bezboradko, Kotchubei and others, have become quite unrecognizable. Even in footnotes, where authors are quoted, names are incorrectly spelled, e. g. Waliszewski. Moreover, the use at some times of the French, and at others of the English transcriptions, is at least disconcerting.

S. A. KORFF

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War Finances in the Netherlands up to 1918. By M. J. VAN DER FLIER. New York, Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1923.—xvi, 150 pp.

This is the first volume to appear in the Dutch Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War, in process of publication by the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It is an excellent piece of work. If the majority of the other volumes in this collaborative enterprise attain the high level of scientific workmanship achieved by Dr. Van der Flier, the responsible authorities will have abundant cause to be satisfied. The author's English style is crisp and almost always idiomatic, and no typographical error of importance has been noted. There is a useful index.

The author, doubtless in pursuance of a general plan for these monographs, methodically presents a well-selected statistical background of the geography, demography and economic history of the Netherlands and its colonies for the last half-century. Then follows a thorough survey of the situation of public and private finance in the years just preceding the war. The discussion of the budget problem of the Netherlands from 1914 to 1918 is a model for studies of this character. A formidable volume of data has been assembled and analyzed, some of it being set out at length in valuable appendices.

Chapters vi and vii and the few pages headed "Conclusion" in particular exhibit the author's judicious selection of material. Chapter vi, entitled "The Influence of the War on the General Welfare", shows how severe and prolonged an impairment of the economic resources of the Netherlands is directly attributable to the war. The decrease of taxable national income during the four years of the war is worked out as 654.4 million guilders, to which Dr. Van der Flier adds another 200 million guilders of income diminution for those classes ordinarily not reached by taxation schedules. "Hence the total monetary loss to the population during these four years amounts to 854 million guilders, that is to say, the population has had to do without the goods and services it might have procured for this amount." The author is not troubled greatly by the restriction of real national *per capita* income, or even the contraction of the aggregate national wealth—which *appeared,* he observes parenthetically, to increase immensely especially during 1917—nor by the phenomena of inflation. His views on this last subject are briefly set forth;

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they will not meet with general approval. After adverting to the effect of inflation upon various economic groups, he declares:

> It is to be hoped that to a certain degree, an inflation may indeed occur, since this is a simple means of getting rid of a part of the immense war debts. We may recall that in former times, especially after the Napoleonic Wars, inflation has proved the only escape from bankruptcy. It is not to be denied that the decrease of debts in this way amounts practically to a tax on capital, and a partial tax on income, but such a tax would be levied gradually and so be easily borne.

European governments—and some outside of Europe—that have been recklessly consuming the basis of public confidence this last decade by vain efforts to preserve the fiction of the omnipotence and eternal trustworthiness of the state, ceaselessly multiplying paper issues at whatever cost to the health of the financial and commercial mechanism, will thank our author for this comfortable bit of determinist philosophy, available perhaps as a justification for the policies, or lack of policy, that have characterized the war time and post-war years. But others will regret that Dr. Van der Flier should have made a statement so unhappily capable of misuse.

Chapter vii contains an equally interesting study of the effect of the war on different groups of the population. As elsewhere, nominal wages mounted fast; purchasing power shrank. Real distress was widespread. The middle classes were hardest hit. A country like the Netherlands which owed so much of its prosperity to the tranquil development of international trade and finance could not but experience shocking and abrupt changes in the situation of many of its people through the collapse of Russia and the successive blows to capital investment all over the continent.

The conclusions are sombre, though naturally more auspicious than those likely to attend a study of the situation of the countries which actually participated in the great struggle. With the weakening of the middle classes, the author sees coming a sharper conflict between labor and capital. Only "thrift and increase of production," he thinks, "will prove the best means of recovering the immense war losses." The prospect is none too bright; but past experience shows ability to surmount forbidding obstacles.

C. E. McGuire

Washington, D. C.

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The Problem of War and Its Solution. By JOHN E. GRANT. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1922.—384 pp.

One opens this book hopefully because it deals with a great theme, but not without some skepticism because its title promises too much. And one scarcely finishes the twenty pages of introduction without foreseeing that the promised solution is likely to be a purely idealistic one like so many others whose fabrication and contemplation have temporarily enabled philosophers and dreamers to escape from the realities of a world full of strife and discord.

The author sets out to destroy the "fatalistic doctrine" that strife and war are inherent in human affairs. This is a noble crusade and has aroused the martial spirit of many another valiant crusading pacifist. In the introductory chapter he regales us with the story of the internal conflicts shown in strikes, lockouts, religious controversy and political strife, the struggle for power, position, privilege and prestige, the civil war in Ireland and the resort to force even in petty disputes. Then comes the story of international discords, and of the philosophical dialectics of the social Darwinists and militant imperialists. He even finds that the highest moral forces, patriotism and religion, aid and abet the warlike spirit and that the statesmen of every country while denouncing militarism extol the virtues of preparedness for self-defense and the glory of fighting for freedom and a durable peace. All of which is very much of an old story and prepares the way in sound utopian logic for the obvious conclusion that a durable peace can be established by enacting Henry George's Single Tax and by accepting a belief in the efficacy of brotherly love!! All very simple and easy, and absolutely conclusive.

The matter is treated systematically. Book I deals with "The Biological Aspect"; Book II with "The Historical Aspect"; and Book III with "From the Old to the New World". At no point does the discussion rise to the level of scholarship expected in an able treatment of so difficult a subject. At no point does the level of argument and analysis rise above mediocrity. This is not to say that many sound positions are not taken.

Thus in the first chapter of the first book, entitled "Heredity, Environment and the Race Question", the general contention that race and culture are not identifiable would be universally accepted. But few would now wish to accept Huxley's classification of the European race types. The author is obviously correct in holding that the geographical distribution of races does not correspond, and

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cannot be made to correspond, with political boundaries. But few will accept as adequate the solution of both race and political animosities in Europe in two short paragraphs of which the gist follows: "When individuals composing the communities (or nations) have just and equal treatment secured to them, the egotistic attributes of creeds, parties and of the States themselves will gradually disappear. Race problems will then settle themselves, because neither Yellow, Black nor White, forced out of their natural situation, really desire to be domiciled on a part of the globe where their happiness and preservation are at stake."

This is solution of these matters by assertion, by pious wish. It amounts merely to a profession of faith. As well say that, if Japan would only adopt the Single Tax and thus make all her people now and forever happy and secure within her own boundaries, they would care nothing about Korea, California, Australia, Hawaii or the islands of the South Pacific.

This author does not approach his problem in the spirit of the scientist but in that of the seer or prophet. He has a message. Liberty is founded on the golden rule: "social institutions must be founded upon justice—upon equality of opportunity for all" (p. 85). The fundamental cause of the stresses and strains of society is that the earth itself has been subjected to private ownership and monopoly. "The remedy is to restore equality of opportunity by collecting rent where it appears, and making return of it to the people in equal services, and at the same time abolishing tribute upon the activities of the people" (Ch. vii). Thus the last chapter of the first book.

In Book II we are given a graphic picture of the "fall of man" from pristine freedom and happiness to capitalistic and socialistic slavery, captivity and misery. One is a little surprised to learn that certain aboriginal communistic communities were mean and unprogressive; but like some recent ones they were improperly organized, failing to make the fundamental distinction between that property which belongs by nature and divine right to the entire community, that is, the land, and that which equally belongs to individuals.

In Book III the full utopia is disclosed for our enraptured vision. There is first a revision of currency. The gold standard should give place to one based on the economic rent of land. "The total economic rent of a country gives a quotient which represents a unit value in labor services which is more constant than any currency unit based upon wheat, gold, silver, or any other commodity. Within

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the ordered State [note the adjective] built upon economic justice the public servants of the commonwealth would be ordered to pay in Treasury notes [which would be in fractions and multiples of the unit defined above] for communal services up to an amount equal to the economic rent for the whole land."

This is only the beginning — but courage fails us to go farther. Having in times past traveled in imagination through various rationalistic utopias, none of which ever had the slightest chance of realization, one has no zest for a fresh voyage through the wonderlands of a visionary's dreams. If all these fancies could be made real the problem of war might be solved. But they won't, so what's the use of idle fantasy? We can find an occasional escape from the hard realities of a cruel world by shorter and more charming paths. And when we come back to realities one short article grappling seriously with fundamentals is worth a whole library of pious wishing.

F. H. HANKINS

SMITH COLLEGE

French Patriotism in the Nineteenth Century, traced in contemporary texts. By H. F. STEWART and PAUL DESJARDINS. Cambridge, University Press, 1923.—xliv, 333 pp.

The depth and breadth of French patriotism so inspired two young scholars and brothers-in-arms on the western battlefront in 1917—the one British and the other French—that they resolved to explain the phenomenon by reference to its history. The outcome is the volume before us.

The title is a bit misleading. The volume opens with a brief but scholarly essay on the origin of the consciousness of a common nationality among the inhabitants of France; and of the hundred and sixteen extracts from contemporary writings of French patriots, which constitute the body of the book, twelve are of the period of the Revolution and almost two-thirds date from the years 1813-1818; the volume stops short with 1830. The prefatory essay is in English, but all the extracts are reprinted in the original French without attendant English translation. The work is obviously not "popular", but it should prove valuable to the student of political philosophy and social history and particularly to the investigator of modern nationalism.

The opening essay is suggestive and in places brilliant. A permanent attribute of French patriotism is discovered by the authors.

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in love of the land, as witnessed by the Song of Roland, by Deschamps (1380), by Montchrestien, by the Marquis de Mirabeau, by Chénier, Taine and Du Bellay. To this static attribute have been added by historical factors certain variable attributes, such as the notion of personal loyalty, emphasized by feudalism, the notion of free and independent fraternal citizenship (*l'amitié*), developed by the commune, the notion of political unity, temporal as well as spatial, engendered by the growth of royal absolutism, and finally the notion, planted and nourished by Christianity, of a humanitarian goal and missionary object. The combination of these variable characters is peculiar to French patriotism, the authors questionably assert, and likewise is the strength of the French devotion during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the influential renaissance of antique Greek and Roman patriotism, that form of patriotism which was impersonal, which dwarfed the monarch by exalting the state, the nation, *la patrie,* and which finally came to full stature in the dynamic patriotism of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era.

There is one very serious gap in the authors' treatment of French patriotism. They almost entirely neglect the *process* by which consciousness of common nationality was communicated from town to town and from province to province and was at length transformed into the universally accepted dogma of French nationalism. It is relatively easy to show what the dogma is by copious quotation from the writings or speeches of Carnot, Danton, Chénier, Stendhal, Mme. de Staël, the Rémusats, Thierry, Guizot, Michelet etc., and this the authors have done, but it is even more important, if rather more difficult, to explain how the dogma has been propagated among the masses, for, in the reviewer's opinion, modern nationalism, whether it be French, English, German, American, or of another name, is distinguishable from the earlier half-instinctive feeling of nationality chiefly by reason of the fact that nowadays it is consciously and systematically propagated and inculcated by nationally directed public schools, by nationally inspired newspapers, by nationally organized armies and by nationally controlled politics and economics. Of these propagandist factors of modern French nationalism, certainly dating from the Revolution, the authors give no account, save incidentally of the national army; not even the epochal educational report of Condorcet is drawn upon, or any educational enactment of the Convention, of the Empire, or of the Restoration.

But we must not be too critical. Modern nationalism is a very big subject, and if French patriotism in the nineteenth century were to

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be presented in all its aspects a shelf of books would be required instead of the single illuminating volume by Mr. Stewart and M. Desjardins.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

The Burden of Unemployment. A Study of Unemployment Relief Measures in Fifteen American Cities, 1921-22. By PHILIP KLEIN. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1923.—260 pp.

This impartial and well-meant book may bore and irritate the general reader but will be read with profit by the social service executive who is likely to have a part in community efforts to take care of the unemployed when the next big period of depression occurs. Here he will read the objective record of the experiences of his fellow-workers in struggling with the relief problem in 1921 and in the first part of 1922, as related by an investigator of the Russell Sage Foundation who interviewed about 250 executives of welfare agencies, public officials and others, in fifteen representative American cities. The general reader who ploughs through the book will at times stop to wonder at the vast amount of technique involved in such acts as the distributing of $5050.88 in the city of Pittsburgh in January, 1922, among no less than 984 families. He will probably realize he lacks the perspective needed to become enthusiastic regarding the provision of wood-piles and other relief work in New York, Boston and Philadelphia although "it would have been no more expensive—possibly less so—to have given it (the money paid out in the form of wages) outright as material relief" (p. 78). In this respect the restraint characteristic of the study somewhat sterilizes it, and the book has some danger to the professional social service worker of deepening the grooves of habitual thought unless a treatise on more far-reaching and constructive aspects of economic and social reform is not read along with it.

But there is no doubt that no matter how much agitation will be leveled against the practices that cause unemployment, there will be a formidable problem for community agencies to tackle when the next few industrial crises occur. At such times unintelligent and uncoordinated action by the welfare organizations will only intensify the gravity of the situation. Ever-improving standards of community preparation for such emergencies must be evolved, little as this technique sometimes seems to result in when it is all summed up. Much as one wishes the donors to charity and the legislatures had

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been more rather than less prodigal in their contributions to needed relief purposes, it is really a mark of progress that, "No public distributions scandalized the rational conscience of intelligent communities" (p. 137). The book does well to emphasize the development of needed statistical forecasters of distress, the value of strong and permanent social service agencies, the importance of coordination of effort and of continuous, long-sighted planning against emergencies. But the brightest spots in the book are those in which it is hinted that if the worker is given a good chance to save during so-called normal times, he may not need all these social efforts. One of the significant observations is the following: "It is one of the most noticeable phenomena observed by family agencies that the number of union members among applicants was surprisingly small. Testimony on this point was very nearly unanimous. . . . Members of trade unions were both proportionately and absolutely a very small part of the case burden" (p. 147).

H. FELDMAN

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Employment, Hours and Earnings in Prosperity and Depression. United States, 1920-1922. By WILLFORD I. KING. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1923.—147 pp.

This is a book of the first order of importance. It makes significant additions to our knowledge of the business cycle and is, so far as known, the first serious effort to measure employment in any country.

The President's Conference on Unemployment in 1921 was the instigator of the study and the National Bureau of Economic Research was the fact-finding body chosen by the conference because so constituted as to safeguard its findings against bias. The method of insuring against bias is the reviewing of all staff work by the Board of Directors of the Bureau, some twenty men representing widely different economic interests and opinions. The inquiry was conducted on a large scale, principally through questionnaires, and with the assistance of all available official agencies and many important business groups. The result is not only authoritative figures on the changes between the peaks of 1920 and the troughs of 1921 in volume of employment, in numbers on payrolls, and total wage payments, but also essential information never before obtained concerning any business cycle. Although the author conscientiously states

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the possible reasons for discounting some of his figures, and a few errors have apparently crept in, the figures may be taken in general as more accurate than any heretofore presented.

The author summarizes the new knowledge presented by the study as follows:

> It shows the relative responsiveness of different industries to the forces giving rise to the business cycle.
>
> It indicates the comparative ability of large and small scale businesses to resist such forces.
>
> It analyzes the shifts of population from one industrial field to another.
>
> It traces the variations in hours and earnings of employees that accompany the change from boom to depression.
>
> It presents the first approximately complete record of the seasonal changes occurring in the conditions of agricultural labor.
>
> It gives the first picture of the distribution of farm employees according to hours and earnings.
>
> It measures the importance of part-time employment in the chief industrial fields.
>
> It enables us for the first time to estimate the approximate total reduction in employment brought about by the depression of 1921.

The first industries to touch bottom in the depression were construction, factories working wood, textiles and leather. The next group were manufacturers of food, drink and tobacco. Then followed producers of minerals, metals and paper. A whole year after the first group minimum employment was reached in mining, finance and transportation. Hours and wages of farm employees were also fully investigated. The hired girl turns out to be more frequent on the metropolitan stage than on the farm. Unemployed factory workers did not find work on the farm as has been supposed to be the case in previous depressions.

The author carries his scientific caution to an extreme when he omits to point out the significance of his figures which show the rapid recovery of the construction industry while most other industries were still declining. A reviewer may be bolder and cite these figures as corroboration of the theory of a considerable group of economists, among them Mr. Herbert Hoover, that the construction industry is a tail capable of wagging the whole dog. The enormous expansion of public works of cities and states in 1921 and 1922 evidently played a part in arresting the general decline because of its demand for materials and the release of wages as purchasing power.

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Seventy-five tables of figures are interpreted in a brief three-page summary for the tired business man, a feat as admirable as rare. In the spotlight stand the following facts: The number of employees on all payrolls diminished by about $^1/_7$ between the third quarter of 1920 and the third quarter of 1921. The number of hours worked diminished $^1/_6$. Average yearly earnings fell over $^1/_4$ in plants employing over 100 persons, about $^1/_{10}$ in medium-sized plants, and only about $^1/_{25}$ in plants employing less than 21 workers. Although large-scale enterprises (those employing over 100 persons) employed only about $^1/_2$ of the total workers, they were responsible for more than $^3/_4$ of the total number laid off during the depression.

The meaning of this remains to be elucidated. Is large-scale industry the principal victim or the principal villain in the cycle play? Is the better control of the cycle and the partial elimination of peaks and valleys coming within reach of far-sighted business management? This study provides material for those who attempt the answers. If read in conjunction with *Waste in Industry* and *Business Cycles and Unemployment,* a preliminary basis is presented for a theory of industrial statesmanship not heretofore generally held. The theory is a more hopeful and positive one than that of our fathers—man-made evils, being man-made, may be man-controlled.

OTTO T. MALLERY

PHILADELPHIA

Child Labor and the Constitution. By RAYMOND G. FULLER. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923.—xvi, 323 pp.

The widespread discussion of the problem of child labor following the decision of the United States Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional the federal child-labor tax law, together with the present effort to add an amendment to the Constitution which would grant to Congress the power, concurrent with that of the states, to limit or prohibit the labor of children, makes this book most timely. As Executive Director of the Helen S. Trownstine Foundation for Social Research, and former Director of Research and Publicity of the National Labor Committee, the author has had unusual opportunity to study the question from all angles. The seven chapters of the volume—"The Children of America", "Rural Child Labor", "Urban and Industrial Child Labor", "Child Labor and the Schools", "Laws and Legislative Standards", "The Problem of Federal Action" and "International Legislation"—afford a fairly

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complete résumé of child labor past and present, and of the legislation dealing with the subject.

At the outset Mr. Fuller indicates that child labor means many things to many minds. Many individuals, he believes, still think of it as it existed thirty or forty years ago, unmindful of the fact that since that day the worst evils have been removed or at least greatly curtailed. He himself defines child labor not in terms of what the child actually suffers physically from early labor, but, as Dr. John H. Finley points out in an introductory note, in terms of what the child is deprived of in the way of a fair start in life—in terms of health, play, education and suitable work under home and school supervision. "Child labor", he says, "is the labor of children that deprives them of their rightful opportunities of living the life of childhood, fully, happily, in the only time of childhood" (p. 22). From this definition it will be noted that the author draws a distinction between child labor and child work, although he frankly admits that there is no sharp dividing line between the two. He also maintains that the child-labor problem is in reality merely a phase of the general problem of human welfare. And it is on these theses that he bases his discussion and formulates his program of reform.

In discussing the causes of child labor, emphasis is placed on school maladjustment, poverty and near-poverty, greed and selfishness of employers who take advantage of the child-labor supply but who do not create it, ignorance and shortsightedness of parents, and, lastly, materialistic philosophies with their false conceptions of the place of work in human life. The home, the school, the community, the state and the nation are the agencies responsible both for the existence of child labor and for its abolition. Two fairly distinct types of reform are suggested: the first category includes prohibitive legislation, while the second embraces measures of a constructive character such as better schools and suitable work.

Many students of our present social and industrial order undoubtedly will not agree with Mr. Fuller's sweeping statement that the "responsibility for child labor rests primarily on the home" even though he tells us that by this he means that the home is the social agency primarily responsible for the education, protection and welfare of the child (p. 25). Nor will they agree that all farmers and their families seek and find too few pleasures and recreations simply because of their slavish devotion to long hours and hard work (p. 29). When one considers that in England a pound of

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bread, made from American wheat transported across the Atlantic, costs 3.9 cents as against 9 cents in New York City; that on a price basis of 100 in 1913, the farmer's products were worth 75 in 1923 as compared with 154 for wholesale prices; and that since the War almost a quarter of the owning farmers in the upper Mississippi Valley have virtually gone bankrupt, he is pretty apt to be skeptical about farmers' slaving from mere force of habit. That some do is not to be questioned, but it is a safe generalization that the majority are forced to toil as they do in order to make ends meet.

HARRY J. CARMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Worker in Modern Economic Society. By PAUL H. DOUGLAS, CURTICE N. HITCHCOCK and WILLARD E. ATKINS. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1923.—xxxii, 929 pp.

In reviewing a volume of selections, the outline is already at hand. First, does the book meet a need? Second, is the material wisely selected? Third, has the compiler arranged the material in a satisfactory way? The reviewer is more or less confined within these limits, for questions of style, of opinion or conviction do not enter. The styles are various. The conclusions are meant to be contradictory, for the intention of the compiler is that different sides of controversial subjects shall get a hearing.

Does the volume meet a need? It does. Most of the material which has appeared in recent years on labor problems has been in magazine, newspaper or pamphlet contributions. There has been a vast quantity of these, but they are scattered and hard to collect. Considering the insistence of the so-called labor problem it is surprising that there have been so few well-rounded studies of recent developments in this field. Recently there have been a few histories of the labor movement, more or less adequate, but they have not completely met the need. A general treatise like Adams, and Sumner's *Labor Problems* brought up to date is badly needed. Many schools and colleges continue to use this book in spite of the fact that it was originally published in 1905, and has not been revised since that date. Much water has flowed under the bridge in the labor movement since 1905. Mr. Douglas and his associates have helped to meet the deficiency as regards the general conditions of labor by gathering into one volume the various features of change and development.

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There is perhaps more excuse for a compilation of selections in the field of labor than there is in any other field touching economics. The labor movement is a highly controversial subject and the gentle reader usually seeks to find out the bias of the writer in order to make the necessary allowances. Perhaps it is better to permit the leaders of both sides of the controversy to have their say; from which the reader may then draw his own conclusions. As the authors of this book claim in the introduction, the drawing of conclusions is a splendid exercise for the reader.

The material seems on the whole to be well selected. There is much of it—over nine hundred pages. No important aspect of the conditions affecting labor has been omitted. The compilers have begun wisely, I think, with the psychology of human behavior. Part Two attempts a description of diverse "work organizations". The next section deals with the worker in his relation to the market. The market includes both the service sold by the laborer as well as the price which the laborer must pay for consumable goods. The different wage theories are discussed. Part Four deals with Security and Risk, and includes the dangers and liabilities of the workers, as accidents, occupational diseases, unemployment, old age and the proposed remedies. Part Four does not seem an adequate introduction for Part Five, which is, "The Worker's Approach to his Problem". Here are discussed unionism, its policies and methods. The material is well chosen. Then comes the employer's approach to the labor problem, and lastly the community's approach. In the last division the results of legislation and court decisions in so far as they directly affect the condition of the laborer and employer are outlined.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in the material is that there are not sufficient selections which define the issues between labor and capital in a clear-cut way. The short selection by John Mitchell on the reasons for trade unions is good as far as it goes, but it does not clearly point out why a "labor problem" has come into existence, nor why its existence was inevitable under the present organization, nor what the points of friction are.

W. E. WELD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Plans and Illustrations of Prisons and Reformatories. Collected by HASTINGS H. HART. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1922.—62 pp.

One is impressed in reading this volume that the prison problem is one of housing and that first of all we must page the architect. Since the Quakers first urged society over a century and a quarter ago to substitute incarceration for the legal killing and bodily torture of ordinary offenders, we have been concerned with the problem of an adequate prison type. "Safety First" has been our motto, and with intent to protect society we have resorted to feudal structures of stone and iron which, in fact, "loom large" in the less desirable quarters of our prison cities. One reason why "prison reform" has been so slow is because the reformers have had to work with a material equipment that dooms and stupefies a man once he enters its shadow. In any desire to change the prison type the rub comes in the fact that our prisons represent a huge capital investment which we are loath to scrap. In no way has society so monumentalized its errors as in the traditional prison.

Happily, a new idea seems to be dawning. It appears that due to the cessation of public building during the war years, and to the apparent increase in our prison population in some states, our penal institutions have become very much overcrowded. As a result many states have begun, or made plans for, the building of new institutions. Dr. Hart in the volume under discussion presents plans for a county jail, four state prisons, two prison farms for women, a men's reformatory, a county penitentiary, a municipal house of correction, and two private institutions for delinquent boys. In the discussion that accompanies the plans there is a praiseworthy avowal of purpose to discard in the new buildings the grosser defects of the old, that is, the monotony of structure, inadequate provision for light, air and recreation, poor sanitation, the inside cell block, the lack of proper space for medical and hospital work, inconvenient arrangements and the general inadaptability to the requirements for making over men. However, the new plans still adhere to the conception of huge, costly institutions which may, with all their novelty of design, become as great a handicap to the development of scientific treatment fifty years from now, as existing buildings are to us with our present standards.

We may touch upon some of the outstanding features of the plans. The discussion opens with suggestions for a new Cook County Jail in Chicago. Dr. Hart himself presents plans for a "skyscraper jail", to be superimposed on a new criminal court building, utilizing the site of

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the old court building. Dr. Kirchwey in his survey of Cook County Jail had recommended a site farther away from the center of the city where the prisoners would have more space for exercise and recreation. But Dr. Hart, conceiving that it might be desirable for practical reasons to have the court and the jail in the same building, suggests a cross-shaped edifice cleaving the sky for five, six, or more stories above the court building. Classification is thus provided for by the separate stories and by the four wings to each story, outside cells being built on the long walls of the wings with aisle between. The proposal is startling, and has one merit which Dr. Hart does not mention; namely, that it sets the jail up in the air conspicuously, so that the wayfaring man even though he be not a crook may see it. Having had experience in taking students to visit county jails, and knowing their occasional difficulties in finding these institutions, I wonder if a monumental structure would not help us to bear in mind the building and the problem that it represents. A "County Jail" subway station would be additionally impressive!

The plans for Sing Sing as a new type of classification and distributing prison with elaborate provisions for a clinical laboratory and for a training school for male nurses are promising and in line with the new penology. The Westchester County, New York, Penitentiary and the Detroit House of Correction are displayed and characterized as model institutions for short-time offenders, the former as a completed project and the latter still in the planning stage. The new Detroit House of Correction is not yet built for the reason that at least some citizens of that community doubt the wisdom of erecting a huge, expensive institution when the prison farm of Detroit is at present getting along very well with temporary barracks and almost no guards during the day. But of this situation there is no indication in the book under review. Indeed, the weak point of the discussion, considering its source, seems to be that large congregate units are proposed for the embodiment of prison policies for the next half-century or more, whereas progressive opinion in this field seems to favor the development of smaller units. Even the Prison Congress of 1870 advocated institutions of not more than 500 men. The women's reformatories and the boys' school shown in the plans do seem to conform to the newer ideas. They are developed upon the cottage plan without the heavy bars and walls; and the discussion in regard to them indicates that the prevention of escape is a matter of institutional morale and not of locks and bolts. Where intelligence and moral leadership are found in the administration of penal institutions, results follow; without these things the heavy investment in masonry is in vain.

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A final point to be considered is that probably a much larger proportion of offenders could be treated outside the institutions on probation than are at present so treated. Massachusetts, largely through probation, has reduced her prison population by one-half in the last decade. By similar methods other states may do likewise. This being the case, one loses confidence somewhat in the efforts of the architects to develop another costly type of prison even though it does promise to give men an adequate opportunity to breathe and wash. Some people, at least, will hope that before our commonwealths rush ahead with plans for "new" prisons, their penological systems may be carefully studied in the light of modern ideas of treatment. With the strengthening of the probation and parole work, and the encouraging of the agencies engaged in the prevention of crime, it may be that the actual prison problem will be seen in better perspective.

ARTHUR EVANS WOOD

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Sociology and Political Theory. By HARRY ELMER BARNES. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1924.—xiii, 260 pp.

Mr. Barnes has produced a book indispensable to the political scientist in any endeavor to grasp the significance of sociological thought to his own field. The material has been most conveniently arranged for this purpose, for it is cast in the order common to works upon political theory. A consideration of the general relationship of sociology to politics is followed by chapters on the nature, origins, elements, forms and scope, of the state, on international relations, and on extra-legal phases of political processes. There are chapters as well, less familiar to the publicist, on the state and social progress and on the social environment of sociological writers.

There is no attempt in the book to present a consistent sociological theory of politics. The varying views of a very large number of sociologists are set forth under each head of political theory. Systematic unity is therefore impossible. The presentation is almost like a well-devised catalogue of sociological views on political problems, but escapes such a description by the guidance which is given to the reader through emphasis and comment. References are innumerable. The method does not add to the readableness of the volume, but is inseparable from the purpose of the author. It is an achievement to have written so agreeably in spite of these obstacles. The references are of great value and there is in addition an extensive bibliography. The inclusion of writers whose classification as

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sociologists may be questionable, is doubtless justified by their acceptance of the general sociological point of view and certainly does not diminish the value of the work.

The dominant feeling of the political scientist after reading the book is that at least he now understands the difficulty he has had in seeking clues through the maze of sociological literature. It would seem that the sociologists have advanced within the space of a single generation about as many theories in the field of politics as political theory has produced in its entire history. In detail it does not appear that many of these theories have met any general acceptance among sociologists. In regard to the nature of the state, for example, Mr. Barnes shows that one group of sociologists adopts the biological or organic analogy looking at the state as the brain of the social organism; a second group finds in the state a real psychic personality; another finds that the state is the supreme human association whose one function is to secure the general welfare of society; another, that the state is the essential regulator of struggles between conflicting interest-groups; yet another, that the state is the guardian of the rights of citizens as consumers, their interests as producers being left to other organizations; and the list is not exhausted. Some of these theories have been advanced by political scientists or others before their adoption by sociologists, and it is extremely difficult to derive from them any characteristic sociological theory of politics or to determine how far they should be regarded as contributions.

When, however, one turns from the details of the latter part of the book to the broad treatment of the opening chapters the significance of the general sociological viewpoint to political theory stands out boldly. It offers a new orientation in the allied field. Just as the historical method widened the vista of politics in point of time, so the sociological method opens the wider field of relationships to other human groups. If a political scientist may venture to undertake a valuation of the sociological contribution, this consists, not in specific theories but almost wholly in the suggestion of a new attitude, or possibly one may say of an old attitude freed from the legalism by which it has long been cramped.

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BOOK NOTES

Schiller's remark of a century ago that "war always kills off the best" has become a truism. Nowadays we want to know in figures how many and what per cent have been sacrificed, and all sorts of details about what killed them. The Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has added a useful short volume, *Losses of Life Caused by War,* by Samuel Dumas and K. O. Vedel-Petersen (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923; 191 pp.) to the already copious literature on war losses. In the first and much the longer of the two monographs, Professor Dumas presents a magnificent condensation of a veritable library of material on the human toll of wars down to 1914. This is analyzed with a thoroughness and a comprehension of the readers' needs which can hardly be too highly praised. Losses are listed by causes, the military population is separated from the civil and classified according to rank, and the terse comments throw a great deal of light on the figures. The Vedel-Petersen study on the World War collects and correlates many valuable data, but is hardly in the same category with the other from any point of view. It practically limits itself to the British Isles, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Finland. After a mere sketch of military losses, with very little analysis, the civilian population is treated in much more detail. Bakeless and others have already familiarized us with the heavy toll of the recent struggle in lives as compared with previous ones. The authors of this new book have played up in a telling way the decreasing percentage of deaths from disease—or the increased proportion killed by wounds, as some will insist on putting it. Dumas's work is a fairly definitive summary, but most readers will probably feel that the Vedel-Petersen study is hardly more than a taste of what we should soon have concerning the late war. Apparently the manuscript of the latter was over two years old when published, which would account for some of the disappointing omissions without any criticism of the author.

John Simpson Penman's work entitled *The Irresistible Movement of Democracy* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923; xii, 729 pp.) is an excellent brief history of the rise of popular political institutions in the United States, France and England, treated sep-

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arately in that order. A great deal of primary source material is cited in the footnotes, together with secondary works such as are used for reference in college classes. If this book were intended mainly for the use of historians or political scientists, it could be pretty severely criticized for its scant treatment of present-day tendencies, its omission of material (particularly on the early part of the nineteenth century) which might be embarrassing to the smooth development of the main thesis, its narrow confinement within the sphere of politics, and the rather blithe optimism of many of its interpretations. Sound as his sources are for the most part, the author might have leaned a little less upon such writers of an older school as Bancroft and Michelet. While the general tenor of the book is anti-radical, anti-socialistic, the interpretation of the French Revolution is adapted to a considerable extent from works of Louis Blanc, Jaurès, Prince Kropotkin and others who use the material to support general positions rather widely different from that of Mr. Penman. We salt our worship of the seekers after liberty, equality and fraternity, nowadays, with a bit of the dry skepticism of such men as M. Louis Madelin. But this is mere carping at what is on the whole an extremely interesting and worth-while book. The scheme of carrying a serious historical narrative along without fatiguing the reader, through the use of snatches of biography, is not new, but it has seldom been followed with happier results. For example, the chapter on the beginnings of democracy in England is built around the case of John Wilkes.

Another addition to the large number of books now appearing which aim to give a citizen briefly and conveniently a manual of instruction in civic affairs is *American Democracy Today* (Princeton, The Princeton University Press, 1924; 162 pp.) by William Starr Myers, Professor of Politics in Princeton University. The volume is a series of essays which appeared in similar form in *The New York Herald* and *The New York Journal of Commerce*. Professor Myers's purpose as stated in the preface is to "arouse" the public through a discussion of "fundamental principles of political science". These "principles" have a familiar ring. Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt were examples of strong leadership in the presidency. In fact, the presidency has become more important in the generation through which we are passing. The House of Representatives does a great deal of work through committees. State governments are badly organized. State legislatures are unintelligent. America has the two-party system and should be proud of it. The judiciary is im-

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portant and should retain its present power to declare laws unconstitutional. The point of view is illustrated by the author's discussion of the power of the courts. We should keep close to Anglo-Saxon precedents in all things except that we should not permit the legislature to become superior to the courts. Those who say that in a five-to-four decision on the constitutionality of an act of Congress one man often exercises the power to destroy an act of the legislative branch of the government, forget that four other judges agree with the one. If we tamper with the constitution "the door would be left wide open to other amendments . . . which might involve the very integrity of our American institutions." One may expect dissent from the equal suffrage and prohibition workers, who fought through so many campaigns, to the statement that "it has recently been proved beyond question that constitutional amendments may come with greater ease than possibly could have been imagined". It may be questioned also whether the inferiority of state legislatures is due mainly to the length of state constitutions and to the initiative and referendum. Most students think that these features are not causes but results of legislative incapacity. The author contends that "the efficiency with which state administration" is conducted in New Jersey is due to the "great power and responsibility" which are "centered in the governor". The fact is that while fewer state officers are elected in New Jersey the power of the governor over administration is less than in most other states, because of the fact that a large part of the administration is conducted by commissions over which no governor can attain more than minority control. The fundamental root of our ills is the dilution of Anglo-Saxon stock. Lothrop Stoddard himself could be no more devoted to this theme. All of the familiar arguments are mustered. The old army tests appear once more. And the remedy is to "arouse the people". One is disposed to question at the end of the volume why, if American people are so unintelligent—"human cattle" they are called in one place—Professor Myers is so anxious to "arouse" them.

Rear-Admiral Mahan's writing made popular a "naval" interpretation of history and to this interpretation Vice-Admiral G. A. Ballard's *America and the Atlantic* (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923; vii, 351 pp.) is an interesting contribution. Admiral Ballard of the British Navy endeavors to show how very strategically important the American waters were in determining the outcome of the great European wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. With a style that brings the tang of the

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salt sea air to the reader and makes the boom of battle very loud in his ears, the author has caused the naval heroes to live again, directing their ponderous fleets from the blood-stained quarter-decks. We read that America was not discovered until sailing ships had learned how to "tack" and sail against the wind. Then Spain dominated the new world and held sway until she lost her naval power. England's fast-growing naval power defeated her, drove away the rival Dutch and then after a long duel defeated the French and despoiled them of Canada because these Latin people preferred land power to naval supremacy and would not provide adequate fleets. But although driven from the North American continent, France as a parting shot was able to supply the naval aid that was finally decisive in the winning of American Independence. Spain and Portugal, too, lost their colonies; the former because of naval weakness and the latter because of the naval strength of Brazil. Then the rôle of the Atlantic changes. It is no longer a scene of war, it enforces peace. The helplessness of the modern battleship away from its base has made the distance across the Atlantic an almost insuperable barrier and the United States remains supreme to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and to dominate the hemisphere. Finally the Americans have grown tired of the sea, they no longer find pleasure in a life spent on its expansive wastes of waters, and this perhaps has caused them to make their greatest contribution to history. When the close of the Great War left them with the power to maintain world-wide domination of the sea they failed to take advantage of it and took the first step toward naval disarmament at the Washington Arms Conference. These various conclusions are thought-provoking, but opinion as to the validity of all of them will not be unanimous.

It is always refreshing to get an informed and interested outsider's views on American government, especially when such views are woven into a comparative study of the government of the author's country and that of the United States. Mr. Herbert Arthur Smith, who is Professor of Jurisprudence and Common Law at McGill University, has written a searching analysis of the governmental problems of the two English-speaking federations of the western hemisphere, entitled *Federalism in North America* (Boston, The Chipman Law Publishing Company, 1923; v, 328 pp.). His criticisms of American government and politics have the incisiveness that should mark the work of a scientist and yet they are stated so tactfully and so sympathetically that even a blind worshipper of

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our political institutions can scarcely take offense. He scores the separation of the powers, the political decisions of the supreme court, the "dual" (federal and state) judicature, the direct primary, the long ballot, and criticizes adversely, and very pertinently, the state executive. The separation of the powers is spoken of as an obsession, but the author underestimates the directness of contact between the United States executive and Congress, and in discussing finances he makes no mention of recent changes in budgetary procedure. In his criticism of the direct primary, which perhaps is none too severe, he seems to ignore the many defects of the caucus and convention system. In connection with the lack of efficiency in American government he says (p. 242), "No American business man would ever dream of organizing his own business, or indeed any other institution in which he was interested, after the model of his own state constitution." Mr. Smith is, however, fully as critical of Canadian political institutions, and after reading the book one feels that a good friend of both governments has, with due respect to traditions and institutions, suggested certain changes. The author's unorthodox characterization of the United States President as a potentate, irresponsible and practically irremovable, with the power of veto like an old royal prerogative, is a good illustration of his striking descriptions, as is also his statement that the Canadian Senate is a non-contributory, old-age pension scheme for politicians. Another interesting item is the condemnation of prohibition as a part of the Constitution, and still another is his comment on the legal profession in the United States, which, he believes, contains the "best and the worst" lawyers in the world. Two or three minor inaccuracies appear, the most noticeable one being the statement that President Wilson appeared before Congress to read his message in person only once. No one could wish for a more clear-cut statement of the federal idea, of the relations between Great Britain and Canada, of the relations between popular government and efficiency than that which Mr. Smith has given us, and his description of the Canadian government is most excellent. The book is written in such style as will appeal to the average reader and at the same time it can be read with great profit by the advanced student in politics. Appendices contain the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Canada.

Simplicity and responsibility are the fundamental ideas of modern political reform in the United States. And it is for the application of these ideas to budgetary procedure that H. H. Barth contends in

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his dissertation on *Financial Control in the States with Emphasis on Control by the Governor* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1923; 122 pp.). The material for the thesis was secured, the author states, in planning the budget system for the state of Pennsylvania, and to some extent the book may be taken as an explanation and defense of the Pennsylvania law. Classification solely according to bureaus and objects of expenditures is defended both on grounds of simplicity and effectiveness. The complete omission of detail save in those services which are peculiarly susceptible to corruption is urged. In order to render the document still more intelligible to the legislator Dr. Barth proposes that the technical terminology of the accountant be replaced by more descriptive terms. He suggests also a plan for preceding each bureau's estimates with a brief description of the bureau's activities, placing particular emphasis upon proposed expansion. The latter half of the dissertation deals with supervising agencies. The necessity for a budget bureau is pointed out. Through it the author believes effectiveness can be secured not only in connection with the preparation of the estimates, but particularly in connection with the problem of keeping the administrative agencies living within their means. Although reference is made to other states, the pamphlet is chiefly of interest for its discussion of Pennsylvania system. Its style is lucid and the material is quite readable.

Teachers and others who believe that history is more than a mere recital of political events will welcome Harry B. Smith's *Industrial History* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923; xii, 305 pp.) written primarily for pupils of upper grades and high-school age and for vocational school students. Taking "work" as the most powerful constructive force in the history of society, Professor Smith has turned out a brief but admirable industrial history of the English-speaking peoples. After a short account of the origin of trade, he then discusses, in connection with England, the manor, the rise of towns, the influence of the guilds, the expansion of commerce, the agricultural revolution and the factory system. The second half of the volume deals with the outstanding features of American industrial history. The brief survey of industrial education in the United States, which forms the content of the last chapter, is especially suggestive. The many and well-chosen illustrations add to the usefulness of the volume.

Institutionalized education for business has undergone wider expansion in the past twenty-five years than in all of its previous history. Leverett S. Lyon's *Education for Business* (Chicago, University

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of Chicago Press, 1922; xiv, 618 pp.) describes this rapid but irregular growth and discusses the varying emphasis of different types of provision, particularly in the formulation of curricula. This consideration includes an examination of the agencies of commercial education as these exist today: the business college, the private collegiate school, the correspondence school, collegiate schools of business, the high school of commerce, the continuation school, cooperative business courses, evening-school courses, and postgraduate and teacher-training courses. The field is wide and experiments are numerous, but the author's treatment is sufficiently penetrating to bring out salient aspects of varied practice and to indicate avenues to goals of more respectable achievement. The high-school commercial curriculum receives a large measure of attention. This is because of the wide extent of business education in secondary schools and also because this phase of business education has too often wandered far from its proper rôle. The distinct service rendered by the author is his emphasis on the clear sense of objective and of inter-relationships which must dominate the organization of a rational curriculum.

It is always important to keep in mind the people for whom the author was writing. A book written for a French public about the United States necessarily assumes a lack of certain elementary information which is common property of the corresponding American audience. That explains certain characteristics of Frederick William Roman's *La Place de la sociologie dans l'éducation aux États-Unis* (Paris, Marcel Giard, 1923; 428 pp.; in the "Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale" under the direction of M. René Worms). The author, apparently an American, states in his introduction that the book was written "to inform foreigners as to what the American manuals of sociology teach and what our most distinguished sociologists regard as the principal service which sociology can render to the education of the future." This is a rather large order, and has resulted in a curious mixture. We find summaries of the views of individual sociologists; of the characteristics of Americal sociology in general; of educational sociology; of the position of sociology in the curricula of colleges, normal schools and high schools. There is also a discussion in a politically liberal vein of the need of a new orientation of education, which can be secured through the agency of sociology. The author states that (p. 396), "once practical sociology enters a school the entire atmosphere is transformed. Life in that school takes a deeper meaning. Manners and feeling of responsibility are raised." It is at least questionable whether such optimism as this is wholly warranted by the facts.

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In a little volume entitled *Freedom and its Fundamentals*, (Los Angeles, Libertarian Publishing Company, 1923; 255 pp.) by Charles T. Sprading, may be found a clear and well-written survey of the different phases of freedom — thought, speech, the press, religion, the arts and the blue laws. The short aphorisms which it contains are not deep, but they are sincere; if there are no original ideas, there is much, nevertheless, that will appeal to the imagination and sympathies of the reader. Especially good are the paragraphs concerning force *versus* freedom of speech; as Mr. Sprading declares, "The preacher who resorts to force has lost confidence in his own and God's power to convince" (p. 63). Three chapters devoted to a criticism of the blue law propaganda are well written, but the discussions of education, majority rule and statute law seem naïve and unconvincing.

Although a large proportion of Mr. Charles R. Flint's *Memories of an Active Life* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1923; xxi, 349 pp.) is devoted to amusing personal experiences and rather pointless anecdotes, there is sufficient space left for much information concerning the foreign relations of the United States during the last generation. The author's memory goes back to the days when the Yankee clippers came "a-howling down the Long Island shore," home from China, India and the South Sea. His business career dates from the assumption of a partnership in the trading firm of W. R. Grace and Company in the early seventies of the last century. Fifty years of continuous activity in various commercial ventures have given him an acquaintance with financiers and statesmen the world over, and a knowledge of the relation between men, possessed of cash and credit, and governments in need of both. Mr. Flint tells his story joyously and naïvely. On one page he is exploiting the natural resources of Peru and Chile, on another providing the republican revolutionists in Brazil with a ready-made navy, or assisting Secretary Blaine to prevent the disruption of the Pan-American Conference. From efforts in behalf of peace he turns to the difficult task of purchasing battleships for Japan, after the outbreak of hostilities between that country and China. Later, playing no favorites, he performs a similar service for Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. Here and there Mr. Flint sketches in odds and ends; the story of a great trust, the background of a Central American revolution, or the action behind the scenes in China. It is interesting and valuable material for the student of history, but to secure it the reader must endure many irrelevancies in the form of discourses on duck shooting, yacht racing and the way of a trout with a fly.

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A life of William Wilberforce that would meet the test of modern historical scholarship has long been a desideratum. The five-volume biography of the great abolitionist by his sons, published nearly a hundred years ago, is a storehouse of essential information, but it is marred by grave defects and would not prove attractive to the modern reader. Moreover, it is out of print, as are most of the other works that deal with Wilberforce's career. Especially welcome, therefore, is Professor R. Coupland's *Wilberforce: A Narrative* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1923; vii, 528 pp.), a well-informed, well-balanced and well-written biography, scholarly and thoroughly reliable throughout. The part played by Wilberforce in the movement for the suppression of the slave trade is inevitably the central theme in the narrative, but other phases of his career are not slighted. The author is as scrupulously judicious as he is manifestly sympathetic in his treatment of his subject. He does not claim for Wilberforce that he was always on the right side of public questions, and he makes it clear that the "saint" was not wholly unversed in the practical politics of his day. Yet no one who reads these pages attentively will fail to understand the extraordinary moral sway which he exercised over the consciences of his fellow-countrymen.

In *The Life and Reign of Edward the Fourth* (New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1923; two volumes: x, 595, 526 pp.) Miss Cora L. Scofield, favorably known by her monograph on the court of star chamber, has made a notable contribution to the literature of English history. It is not an easy book to read, for the author announces no objectives and rarely pauses in her narrative for a word of interpretation. The facts, all the facts, and nothing but the facts, seems to be her motto, and only historically-trained and self-reliant readers, capable of forming their own opinions, will be benefited by following her on this long journey of eleven hundred odd pages. For such, however, her volumes will prove of great value as a storehouse of thoroughly reliable information derived from a most painstaking study of the sources. A glance over the footnotes and bibliography will show how extensive and laborious the author's researches have been. "I want to know what happened, not what the man thinks," Lord Salisbury once observed in commenting upon the work of a "philosophical" historian. He would have been delighted with Miss Scofield's work.

The purpose of Professor Hume Wrong in his *Government of the West Indies* (New York, Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1923; 190 pp.) is to give the student of the constitutional history

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of the British Empire an account of a neglected phase of that history, and to provide an historical background for those who are interested in contemporary West-Indian political problems. The author modestly speaks of his book as a mere outline, but it is easily the best account to be had, within anything like the same compass, of the government of the British West Indies. A description of the old representative system, both before and after the abolition of slavery, is followed by an examination of present constitutional arrangements. There is a useful select list of authorities.

It is very difficult to summarize in a few lines a small book which is itself a terrifically compressed summary of a most complicated history covering centuries, and bristling with irreconcilable controversies. Helen Douglas Irvine has written a compact agrarian history of Europe—*The Making of Rural Europe* (E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1923; 224 pp.)—for the use of cultivated folk who have no previous knowledge of the subject. It fills this need most admirably. Occasionally it even supplies information which the habitual reader of European economic history may have missed, but as a general thing it is written down from secondary sources already familiar to him. Such a work inevitably slips over problems without suggesting their existence. For example, the medieval manor is painted as suspiciously simple and uniform, suggesting some conceptions about economic evolution regarded by most of this generation of scholars as naïve. Eastern Europe is seen through the eyes of Kovalevsky, von Maurer and Laveleye, so that rural evolution is treated as something like a recapitulation of what occurred in the west. There are two other great schools of historians of eastern Europe who hold rather different views. The Mir or other Slavic village may be a peculiar institution, with a very different history from the manor, or the modern rural organization may be largely an importation from the west, both historical positions being quite respectable. One or two specific errors are rather glaring—for example attributing an 1807 edict to Frederick the Great, who had then been dead twenty-one years (p. 110). The chapters on rural syndicalism, agricultural cooperation and the post-war expropriations are suggestive, but all too short. This is a very interesting book, valuable for its purpose, and probably about as sound as anyone could have written in such small compass.

Louise Bryant's *Mirrors of Moscow* (Thomas Seltzer, New York, 1923; xv, 209 pp.) is a series of brief, lively personal sketches. None of them could qualify as critical biographies, and that they are

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friendly goes without saying. The style is colloquial, easy and interesting, the material often quite intimate. Besides the figures to be expected, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Kalinin, Tchicherin, Dzerzhinsky, Litvinov and Lunacharsky, we get racy portraits of many people less in the limelight, and incidentally quite a good deal of reference to conditions. Whether or not these character sketches are true to life, they are certainly vivid. The little summary of Rakovsky's career, from his expulsion from college in Bulgaria through revolutionary activities in many countries, particularly Russia and Roumania, his published books and his teaching at the University of Paris, to his presidency of the Ukraine, will introduce many to one of the most romantic figures in Europe today. Madame Kollontai and the woman's movement are given sixteen pages between Kalinin and Trotsky. The five illustrations by Césare are admirably adapted to the spirit of the text. This ought to be a subtly dangerous book in the eyes of those to whom the new Russia is a fantastic hell and its leaders fabulous demons, for it and they are treated with a chatty familiarity well calculated to dissolve any such images.

Dr. Hodgkin, the author of *China in the Family of Nations* (New York, George H. Doran, 1923; 267 pp.), is well prepared to write on the current problems of China. He spent some years in the country as a missionary of the English Friends and in later years he has traveled extensively in China, Japan and Korea. For a year or more he gave his attention chiefly to international relations in the Far East, trying, with his Quaker outlook, to bring about understanding and fair dealing among the peoples of that region. He is at present one of the secretaries of the recently formed National Christian Council of China. Except for his sympathy with China and his desire to state the Far Eastern situation fairly, the author's connection with the Christian missionary enterprise is not apparent in his book. He is endeavoring to state clearly and dispassionately for the British reader the international relations of China of the past few years. The book is distinctly for the general reader and not for experts. The latter will, however, find it a temperate, well-rounded presentation of a situation with which they are already familiar. No new material is brought forward and no particularly startling views. The volume begins with a brief sketch of the history and older culture of the country, a sketch which is entirely too brief to be satisfactory. There are somewhat better but still brief chapters on the foreign relations of China in the nineteenth century and the history of China under the republic. The most valuable portion of the book

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is the rather full statement of relations with Japan, Europe and America during the past few years. These are, on the whole, remarkably well-rounded and impartial summaries of events which have usually been treated in all too partisan a spirit. No better brief introduction to these controversial topics is to be found in English. The book also includes chapters on the progress of the industrialization of China and on the remarkable Renaissance or New Tide movement of the past few years. Both of these, while brief, are excellent. The title of the final chapter—"China's Gift to the World"—is something of a misnomer, for it is rather a discussion of the present needs of the country. On the whole, the book is probably the best general introduction to the current China that has come out within the year.

India has many attractions for the social student. One of its greatest attractions has been its monetary history, beginning far back when exchange was merely barter and coming down to our own day with a new and almost revolutionary experiment in monetary organization. Every teacher and writer devotes considerable time to the development in India of the so-called "gold-exchange standard". While the Indian exchange standard has not had altogether smooth sailing it is quite generally assumed to have been an extraordinarily successful bit of social experimentation. Now comes a well-known Indian writer, B. R. Ambedkar, in his *The Problem of the Rupee* (London, P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1923; xvii, 309 pp.), who rudely disturbs our notions about the exchange standard. He shows how India went from a double standard to a single silver standard, and how, in a sense, the exchange standard was foisted upon her by Britain when it would have been relatively easy to adopt instead a single gold standard. He favors a practical overthrow of the exchange standard and the virtual substitution therefor of a single gold standard. Professor Edwin Cannan has written an encouraging foreword for the book, but Professor Cannan dissents from Mr. Ambedkar's rather extreme criticisms of the exchange standard.

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